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Abstract
Power imbalance in dispute resolution processes affects both the legitimacy of the process
and the ability o f the parties to articulate and achieve their interests. In cases where power
imbalance is both the subject matter o f the dispute and a procedural issue, the management
o f power is even more material. In the common law tradition, judicial processes provide
precedents and a structure for allocating power between the parties. In an alternative process
that does not involve the participation o f a third party adjudicator, the parties themselves are
responsible for developing power to assert their interests. The higher degree o f responsibility
in alternative processes brings with it greater possibilities for the parties to change their
power relationship. If no attention is given to the responsibilities and the possibilities that
accompany empowerment, then alternative processes may result in a reaffirmation of the
original power imbalance.
The author examines three aspects o f dispute resolution involving cases o f physical and
sexual abuse in institutions and other environments. She focuses on judicial and alternative
processes that deal with identity formation, empowerment and monetary compensation. She
argues that sexual abuse and physical abuse create specific harms to the identity and power
o f abused persons. These harms should be addressed through a process that can allow for
identity-formation and re-configuration o f the power relationship between the parties. The
author concludes that judicial processes recognize identity formation that occurs outside the
legal arena, and are capable o f recognizing the power o f the testimony o f abused persons.
However, judicial processes depend upon the approval of status quo experts before
acknowledgment of identity and empowerment occurs. The author explores the capacity of
non-judicial processes to allow abused persons to develop identity and to bring their
subjective understanding o f abusive experiences to the broader world. She concludes that
non-judicial processes have a greater capacity to allow identity-formation and empowerment
that is unmediated by objectifying discourses. However energy and attention must be given
to maintaining the integrity o f abused persons’ subjective experiences throughout the process
in order to avoid having their interests defined by pre-existing understandings of abuse. The
author explores judicial and non-judicial treatments o f monetary compensation. She
concludes that judges have ready access to a forum for expressing the non-commodifiable
aspects of compensation. Alternative methods have the capacity to recognize subjective
harm, but they must articulate such recognition in order to avoid the hegemonic
objectification that can accompany the distribution of monetary compensation.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

When Gamini finished surgery in the middle o f the night, he walked through
the compound into the east buildings, where the sick children were. The
mothers were always there. Sitting on stools, they rested their upper torso
and head on their child’s bed and slept holding the small hands. There were
not too many fathers around then. He watched the children, who were
unaware o f their parents’ arms. Fifty yards away in Emergency he had heard
grown men scream for their mothers as they were dying. ‘ Wait fo r meV *7
know you are hereV This was when he stopped believing in m an’s rule on
earth. He turned away from every person who stood up for a war. Or the
principle o f one’s land, or pride o f ownership, or even personal rights. All
o f those motives ended up somehow in the arms o f careless power. One was
no worse and no better than the enemy. He believed only in the mothers
sleeping against their children, the great sexuality of spirit in them, the
sexuality o f care, so the children would be confident and safe during the
night.1

The spectre o f institutionalized children from decades past, sexually and physically abused
by those in institutions2 responsible for their care and custody, is one which has haunted
Canadian society for at least the past ten years. Thousands of claims for damages arising
from historic institutional abuse in Indian residential schools have emerged.3 Adults who

excerpt from M. Ondaatje, Anil's Ghost (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 2000) at 119.
This book is a fictional story set during the ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka.
2Three distinct types o f institutional abuse have been identified: physical, sexual or
emotional; program abuse; and system abuse. Program abuse occur when a program
operates below standards or relies upon harsh techniques and system abuse occurs when the
system improperly assesses, diagnoses, defines the length or treatment or removes a child
because o f inadequate resources: See, Law Commission o f Canada, Review o f the Needs o f
Victims o f Institutional Child Abuse (Background Paper) by the Institute for Human
Resource Development (Ottawa: Law Commission o f Canada, 2000) at Appendix II, p. 5.
In this thesis I will only focus on sexual and physical abuse although I recognize that
program and system abuse may contribute to the likelihood of the other two forms o f abuse.
3R. Mofina, “Truth commission could probe residential-school abuse cases” The
Ottawa Citizen (6 June 2000): This article states that as of June 6, 2000, the federal
government was facing lawsuits from 5,900 individuals; if seven (then) pending class-action
1
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were residents in provincial institutions as children have commenced actions across the
country. Some o f these cases have been processed through the court system. However,
partially because o f the high numbers o f plaintiffs associated with the various institutions,
as well as the high monetary and non-monetary transaction costs4 associated with litigation,
provincial governments and parties have sought to design non-court processes and remedies
that can better address the needs of the parties.5

A. Context

In the late 1980's and early 1990's there was growing awareness o f the vulnerability of
children who were placed in total institutions6. In 1989 the media reported that there were

suits were to be accepted by the courts, the number could jump to 8,900.
S. Simmie, “Churches reap harvest of residential school abuse” The Toronto Star (26
August 2000): In this article officials from the Department o f Indian and Northern Affairs
project that the number o f lawsuits concerning residential school abuse could reach 15,000
over the next decade.
4High transaction costs include the actual fee for retaining lawyers, court and judicial
services and other related items, but it also includes the high psychological costs associated
with proceeding through the legal system. Adult plaintiffs making claims for child sexual
abuse are often in fragile emotional health and not likely to proceed with potentially
legitimate claims if the psychological barriers o f the process are too high. For example,
having to publicly describe intimate details of sexual abuse in an open courtroom and then
cross-examined on those details may prevent a legitimate plaintiff from engaging a process.
Only those who are emotionally capable of facing challenges to their testimony are able to
sue.
sLaw Commission o f Canada, Institutional Child Abuse in Canada (Background
Paper) by Ronda Bessner (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) at 126-8.
6E. Goffinan, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation o f Mental Patients and Other
Inmates (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1961). On page 4 Goffinan defines total
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3
allegations o f abuse against Christian Brothers at the Mount Cashel Orphanage.7 Subsequent
criminal convictions of the various Christian Brothers were reported in the national media8
and triggered widespread recognition o f institutional abuse. In 1990 the RCMP commenced
an investigation into allegations o f abuse at the New Brunswick Training School at
Kingsclear. In 1991 Karl Toft was arrested and charged with committing numerous criminal
offences relating to abusive acts in that institution.9 In 1992, the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples received testimonials about treatment in Indian residential schools.
These testimonials described the destructive effects on individuals and communities arising
from the following: forceful separation o f children from their families; prohibitions on
speaking Aboriginal languages; prohibitions on exercising their spiritual and cultural
customs; and physical and sexual brutality.10

institutions in the following way:
Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social
intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the
physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water,
forest, or moors.
“Teacher ousted over sex charges back at Mount Cashel in
Globe and M ail (28 September 1989) A4.
7K . C o x ,

2

years” The

“Man suing over alleged Mount Cashel Abuse” The Chronicle Herald (29 November
1989) A4.
8“Jury convicts ex-Cashel teacher” The Globe and M ail (18 May 1991) A5.
“Former Brother convicted in Mount Cashel abuse case” The Globe and Mail (2 May
1991) A4.
9Supra note 5 at 26-28.
10Law Commission of Canada, Needs and Expectations fo r Redress o f Victims o f
Abuse (background paper) by SAGE (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) at
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4
While the Mount Cashel cases were going through the criminal courts, investigations of
alleged incidents at the N ova Scotia School for Girls11 and the Shelburne School for Boys
were underway. In 1992 George Moss, a former counselor at the Nova Scotia School for
Girls, was convicted o f indecent assault upon a resident o f the School and sentenced to one
year imprisonment.12 Soon after, Douglas Hollett, another former counselor at the Nova
Scotia School for Girls, was convicted o f having intercourse with a female between the ages
o f 14 and 16.13 In 1993 Patrick MacDougall was convicted o f 11 counts o f sexual
misconduct while he was a counselor at the Shelburne School for Boys.14

Soon after the convictions, complainants from the criminal trials brought civil claims against
the abusers and the Nova Scotia government. In the first and only case to go through the
entire litigation process before the commencement of the Compensation Program, the
defendant Hollett was found to have enticed the plaintiff to run away from the school on his
last day of employment and to live with him. He subsequently kept the plaintiff hidden at

Appendix 3.
1‘in 1985 the name o f the school was changed to the Nova Scotia Residential Centre.
The facility is now a co-educational treatment centre for emotionally and behaviourally
disturbed children aged 10-16 years. See Department of Justice Nova Scotia, Report o f an
Independent Investigation in respect o f Incidents and Allegations o f Sexual and other
Physical Abuse at Five Nova Scotia Residential Institutions by the Hon. Stuart Stratton, Q.C.
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Department o f Justice, 1995) at 38.
l2R. v. Moss, (9 October 1992), Colchester 296219 (N.S. Prov. Ct.).
13R. v. Hollett (5 February 1993), Halifax N.S.J. no. 76 (N.S.Prov. Ct.).
14J?. v. MacDougal (6 July 1993), Shelburne 372598, 372600, 372602, 372604,
400582 (N.S.S.C.);R. v. MacDougal (17 February 1993), Shelburne 330201 (N.S.Prov.Ct.).
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his home and sexually and physically abused her from October 1976 until she was
apprehended and returned to the School in May 1978. The trial judge found the government
o f Nova Scotia liable in negligence for failing to terminate the abusive employee when
complaints initially arose about his conduct with the girls.15 The plaintiff appealed the trial
judge’s decision to not award punitive damages. The government of Nova Scotia cross
appealed on the issue of liability and on the award o f aggravated damages. On appeal, the
Court upheld the findings o f liability and a $50,000 award for general damages. However,
the Court o f Appeal overturned the trial judge’s award o f $25,000 for aggravated damages
and found that punitive damages o f $35,000 were warranted.16

Roose v. Hollett et al. was the first case that the government litigated concerning the
existence and extent of government liability for the actions o f employees17. The Court of
Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding o f liability in negligence for the damages to the
appellant, even though the abuse started after he had been terminated and even though Roose
had run away from the institution. Further, in awarding punitive damages, Pugsley J.A.
found that the employer’s failure to terminate Hollett’s employment was “inexcusable,
outrageous, callous and reprehensible” 18. Therefore punitive damages were required to

lsRoose v. Hollett et al. (1995), 143 N.S.R. (2d) 38 (N.S.S.C).
l6Roose v. Hollett et al. (1996), 154 N.S.R. (2d)161 (N.S.C.A.).
xlIbid. at 189. The Crown brought a cross-appeal on the issue of liability. Crown
counsel argued that there is no substantial connection between the failure to dismiss Hollett
and the appellant’s injuries; Roose’s act o f running away and taking up residence is enough
to sever any connection that might exist.
nIbid. at 211.
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indicate condemnation. Flinn J. A. agreed that punitive damages were warranted but on the
narrower grounds that the conduct o f the employer was reckless and blameworthy.19 On
November 1, 1996, the Attorney-General o f Nova Scotia filed an application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court o f Canada on the issue o f punitive damages, pre-judgement
interest and costs. This application was denied.20 Around the time the case was concluded,
the government o f Nova Scotia opted to explore the possibility o f setting up a non-judicial
process for dealing with claims o f abuse.

The Nova Scotia government decided on a three-pronged approach to deal with the emerging
claims o f abuse. Viki Samuels-Stewart was commissioned to investigate existing residential
institutions to ensure that abuse was not currently occurring and that there were proper
safeguards in place to protect residents from abuse.21 The former Chief Justice of New
Brunswick, Stuart Stratton, was asked to investigate allegations of physical and sexual abuse,
practices and procedures for detecting abuse, and employee action or inaction in dealing with
any abuse that occurred.22 The government indicated that if Stratton found that there was

19Ibid. at 212-3.
20G.B.R. v. Hollett, [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 541.
21Department of Justice Nova Scotia, 'In Our Care: Abuse and Young Offenders in
Custody - An Audit o f the Shelburne Youth Centre and the Nova Scotia Youth Centre Waterville by Viki Samuels-Stewart (Halifax: Department o f Justice of Nova Scotia, 1995).
22The terms of reference o f the Stratton Report are as follows:
“investigate the incidents o f sexual and other physical abuse of residents that occurred or are
alleged to have occurred at the institutions;
investigate and determine the practices and procedures in place at the institutions that either
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abuse in the institutions, it was prepared to follow Stratton’s recommendations to en%2 §e in
an Alternative Dispute Resolution [hereinafter “ADR”] process to deal with claims o f abuse.

On June 30, 1995 Stratton released his report. In it he concluded that there were 89 vjctims
o f sexual and physical abuse at three o f the five institutions investigated.23 He recommended
that the government engage in an ADR process with the survivors of abuse for the pufbose
of compensating them.

The idea o f an alternative process and remedy was not new; the Ontario government had
announced its intention to compensate victims o f abuse with relation to the St. Joseph’s
Training School for Boys and the St. John’s Training School for Boys.24 In 1992 the Ontario
government had authorized the use o f an ADR process to address abuse claimed by fctrrier
residents o f the Grandview Training School for Girls.25 In 1995 the New Bruti^tyick
government had approved ADR as a way to deal with claims o f former residents of the hjew

permitted or hindered the detection o f abuse o f residents;
investigate and determine whether any employees in the institutions or any public officials
were aware of abusive behaviour o f staff toward residents; and
investigate and determine what steps, if any, were taken by employees or o ffic e s in
reference to any such abuse.” Supra note 11 at iv-v.
“ Department o f Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release “Justice - Province Needs More
Time” (1 November 1996).
24D. Downey, “Victims o f abuse to be compensated” The Globe and Mail (14 Aug ust
1992) Al l .
25Supra note 5 at 129.
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Brunswick Training School at Kingsclear.26 The Nova Scotia government took the
opportunity to initiate a non-judicial process to deal with claims o f historic child abuse.27

The Nova Scotia government responded quickly to the Stratton Report and announced that
it would negotiate with the group or groups o f survivors o f abuse via their chosen lawyer
whose fees would be paid by the government.28 Negotiations occurred in early 1996 and an
agreement was reached between the parties in m id-1996. The negotiations did not end up
being between the government and one lawyer who represented a group of survivors29;
rather, the claimants were each represented by a lawyer o f choice and these lawyers together
negotiated with the government.

The meetings between the Nova Scotia government and the lawyers for individual claimants

26fbid. at 142.
27I use to term historic child abuse to refer to abuse that happened when the adult
claimant or plaintiff was a child.
28Department o f Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release, “Justice - Progress Report Stratton Report Response” (17 October 1995).
29The reader m ay note that I use the term “survivor” and “claimant” to describe a
person who has suffered from abuse and who is involved in a non-judicial dispute resolution
process. The term “survivor” has entered the lexicon of terminology to counteract the
passivity o f the word word “victim”. Both refer to people whose experiences of abuse are
not doubted. The term “claimant” describes a person who is making an allegation o f abuse
for the purpose o f qualifying for compensation. I use the word “claimant” when referring
to persons within the Nova Scotia process as there is currently some controversy about the
degree of abuse that occurred in Nova Scotia institutions. When speaking o f court processes,
I will use the terminology used by the court. When I am speaking o f a person outside o f any
process I will refer to her as an “abused person”, “victim” or “survivor”. For an explanation
o f my use o f gendered pronouns, see note 42.
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resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding30 [hereinafter “MOU”] which outlined the
process for compensating abuse claimants.31 Among the provisions in the MOU were the
following:

AND WHEREAS the Province has agreed to compensate Survivors of
Physical and Sexual Abuse through a compensation process that is principled,
respectful, timely and consistent with the following principles:

THAT the physical and sexual abuse o f children by adults in
positions of power and trust is a fundamental betrayal that
operates to deny a child’s dignity and autonomy;

THAT the fundamental purposes o f this compensation
process are:
•

to acknowledge moral responsibility for the Physical
and Sexual Abuse experienced by the Survivors which
was perpetrated, condoned, or directed by employees
of the Province during the time the Survivors were
resident in the Institutions;

30“Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Compensation for Survivors of
Institutional Abuse”: see Appendix ‘A’.
31This Memorandum ofUnderstanding was subsequently changed by the government
following a suspension of the Compensation Program on November 1, 1996. As stated in
the December 6,1996 press release, the Minister o f Justice suspended the Program because
o f the large number of claimants who came forward and also because old records providing
historic information had just been discovered. The Compensation Program resumed on
December 16,1996 with the following changes, among others: the government has 120 days
instead o f 45 days to assess the claims; internal investigation is not only o f government
employees for disciplinary purposes but also of the claims themselves; and the statements
taken from the claimants will now be used for investigative purposes (criminal, disciplinary)
and for the Child Abuse Registry : see Department o f Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release,
“Justice Compensation Program Moves Ahead”(6 December 1996).
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•

to affirm the essential worth and dignity o f all o f the
Survivors, who were residents o f the Institutions;

•

to assist the Survivors, in a tangible way, with the
healing process;

•

to affirm to the Survivors that they were not
responsible in any way for the Physical and Sexual
Abuse perpetrated, condoned, or directed by
employees o f the Province while the Survivors were
resident in the Institutions; and

•

to implement financial compensation and other
benefits to Survivors in a principled, respectful and
timely fashion.

These provisions outline worthy goals and purposes. Yet to this day, there is controversy
surrounding the Compensation Program. One o f the sources of controversy is the fact that
former and current employees o f the institutions were not included in the negotiation process.
The government opted for a process that could provide compensation quickly, without first
conducting an extensive investigation into the conduct of the employees. Instead o f having
the employees respond to allegations o f abuse, management level government officials
negotiated the MOU and a separate internal process was set up to investigate current
employees. As the numbers o f claimants grew and the stories o f abuse came out in the
media, past and current employees32 protested that the claims were exaggerated or false.
They claimed that it was unfair that they were not able to face the accusations made against

32Current and past employees have distinct interests in this situation and belong to
two separate advocacy groups. In 1997 and 1998 the current employees were represented
by their Union in a policy grievance against the government. As a result o f the grievance a
Memorandum of Agreement was developed to address the employment and human resources
problems facing current employees as a result o f the Compensation Program.
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them; even if they faced no monetary loss, they were facing loss o f reputation and dignity.33
As noted in the Globe and Mail newspaper, former employees found themselves accused of
abuse but had no forum to challenge the claims.34 They contended that the Compensation
Program was set up in such a way as to muddy the distinction between true claims of abuse
and false ones.35

Throughout the process and to the present day, lawyers and representatives o f the employees
have stated in the media that the majority o f claims were exaggerated or false36. The lawyers
for the claimants and the claimants themselves have asserted that the abuse did happen and

33K. C o x , “Workers in Nova Scotia feel vindicated as inquiry says lure of
compensation led to many false charges at Shelburne” 77ie Globe and Mail (16 September
2000) A ll. In this article Cameron MacKinnon, a lawyer representing some of the
employees, is quoted as saying that “(t)heir lives have been ruined by the way the
government cast them as perverts and pedophiles. The insidious nature o f this has left them
ruined spiritually, physically and psychologically”.
D.
Jobb, “Ex-Shelbume worker’s family ‘tom apart’ by allegations” The Halifax
Herald (28 September 2000).
34K. C o x , supra note 33, para. 10. In cases where allegations o f sexual and physical
abuse are made, it may be argued that the nature of the wrong is so serious and so public that
any allegations should have been dealt with by way o f criminal proceedings. That way,
persons named in allegations can access procedural protections more readily than is possible
within employment law processes. For more on the criminalization o f wrongs, see: S. E.
Marshall & R. A. Duff, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs” (1998) 11 Can. J. L. & Jur.
7.
35D. Jobb, “Hamm refuses inquiry into payouts o f abuse victims” The Halifax Herald
(27 October 2000).
36D. Jobb, “Compensation triggered false abuse claims - report” The Halifax Herald
(12 September 2000).
R. Boomer, “Keating wants details o f his alleged abuse: Ex-School for Boys
supervisor asks for info to clear name” The Daily News (30 January 2001).
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the majority o f claims were true37. There are various possible reasons why this process upset
past and current employees whose interests were affected by the claims. One can speculate
that the lack o f legitimacy was in part related to the absence o f a validation method that was
satisfactory to all parties affected by the claims o f abuse.

The newly elected government pledged to address the various concerns expressed about the
Compensation Program. On November 30, 1999, the Minister o f Justice appointed former
Quebec Court o f Appeal Judge Kaufman38 to do the following: determine whether the
process upheld the rights of both the claimants and the accused; determine if the response
to institutional abuse has been appropriate, fair and reasonable; document and describe the
government’s response to allegations o f abuse; assess the appropriateness of the response in
light o f the interests of claimants, the public interest, the interests of staff and former staff
o f the institutions; and assess the implementation o f each element o f the government's
response to allegations of abuse in provincial institutions.39

Until the Kaufman Review completes its research and analysis, the public will not have a

37D. Jobb, “Claimants’ lawyer insulted by abuse report” The Halifax Herald (27
October 2000).
C.
Nicoll, “Report diminishes victims’ suffering - ex-Shelbume resident” The Daily
News (13 September 2000).
38I am currently assisting the Institutional Abuse Response Inquiry with its work.
However, the views throughout this thesis are entirely my own and do not reflect the
position, work, or opinions o f the Institutional Abuse Response Inquiry.
39Department of Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release, “Retired Judge to Conduct
Independent Review” (30 November 1999).
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global description o f the government o f Nova Scotia’s response to allegations of historic
child abuse. However with the information that is publicly available about this Program and
with the use of other instances of abuse, I will explore the capacity o f judicial and non
judicial processes to achieve the specific remedies required to deal with the particular forms
o f damage that result from institutional abuse.

B. Thesis inquiry

Through the MOU the parties expressed recognition that abuse “is a fundamental betrayal
that operates to deny a child’s dignity and autonomy”40. The Minister o f Justice further
stated that the “ADR process. . . empowers survivors by giving them control--an essential
component of the healing process—by giving them an opportunity for input into the
negotiation of the framework agreement”.41

The provisions the MOU and the Minister’s statement assume two things: that abuse goes
to the core o f a person’s identity by denying dignity, and it affects the ability of the person
to exercise autonomous power. In my thesis I will examine the impact that abuse has upon
identity and empowerment. I will examine the possibility that abuse involves a process
whereby the abuser either reinforces or imposes the sense that a person’s body is for the use
o f another. The consequent loss of integrity or wholeness diminishes the abused person’s

■^MOU, supra note 30.
4IDepartment o f Justice, supra note 28.
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sense of his42 ability to assert his own idea o f what is meaningful in the discursive arena. I
will argue that if the parties want to remedy the core harms to abused persons, they must
focus upon damages to identity and damages to power that are inflicted through the abusive
relationship. In this thesis I explore the possibility that this fundamental form o f damage can
be addressed through a dispute resolution mechanism. Further, I will explore the possibility
that the parties’ ability to control the design o f a dispute resolution process may provide
some remedial effects for the parties. Although addressing these damages through various
substantive remedies is vitally important, I would like to explore the capacity o f the parties
to achieve a healing or transformative result through participation in the design o f the process
itself.43

One o f the key problems that arises when parties attempt to design a process is that they rely
on the idea that ADR processes contain ‘free spaces’ wherein the parties can exercise agency
to create a process ex nihilo. This idea may be somewhat illusory. Discourse exists within

42Throughout the thesis I will alternate between masculine and feminine personal
pronouns when speaking o f abused persons. However as 95% o f abusers are male, I will use
the masculine pronoun to refer to individual abusers: see J. Neeb & S. Harper Civil Liability
fo r Childhood Sexual Abuse (Toronto: Butterworth, 1994) at 22.
43In recognizing the potential o f the process to address substantive concerns, I
acknowledge the questions put by Bruce Feldthusen in his article “The Civil Action for
Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (1993) 25 Ottawa L. Rev. 204. Feldthusen
examines the possibility that civil actions for sexual battery cases are therapeutic for the
victims of sexual assault. He concludes that although a tort action may have many
therapeutic benefits, costs and other barriers to litigation will likely be prohibitive. Further
he states that it is worth considering whether legitimate therapeutic needs might be addressed
more efficiently to the benefit o f more victims outside the tort system. In this thesis, I am
not only exploring whether or not a conflict resolution process has therapeutic potential, I
am exploring the possibility that the process can effect a re-configuration o f power
relationships between a disenfranchised group and a group in authority or dominance.
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ADR spaces also, although they are perhaps not o f the same nature as the discourses that
exist in the legal arena. If the space for agency to operate in ADR is possibly illusory, is
agency itself an illusion perpetuated by discourses? This question will also be examined in
the body o f the thesis.

In much o f the negotiation literature and in the discourse o f dispute resolution, power is
conceived alternately as the ability to inflict damage or the ability to influence the decision
o f others.44 The latter view, which is promoted by advocates for the Harvard model o f
principled negotiation, focuses the analysis o f power upon the discrete manifestations of
power in the microcosm o f the negotiation itself. The model does not address issues of
systemic power imbalance.45 In mediation, power is perceived as a problematic variable that
must be re-distributed or controlled by an intervenor such as a mediator.46 Power is
something that can be re-distributed by the mediator, with the agreement of the parties. Selfempowerment is not as important as an equitable distribution of power.

44B. Mayer, “The Dynamics o f Power in Mediation and Negotiation” in J.
Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: the Mediation Alternative (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1997) at 77.
45R. Fisher, W. Ury & B. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991).
46M. Coyle, “Defending the weak and fighting unfairness: can mediators respond to
the challenge?” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L. J. 625.
G.
A. Chomenki, “Mediating commercial disputes: exchanging ‘power over’ for
power with’” in J. Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: the Mediation Alternative (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1997) at 159.
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Existing alternative dispute resolution literature focuses heavily upon the ability of the
parties to exercise their autonomy to control the process and the outcome o f the process.47
These are the key features that distinguish alternative dispute resolution processes from
judicial processes, which rely upon the authority o f a third party who acts within the bounds
of an existing process.

In relying upon autonomy, negotiation and alternative dispute resolution theorists are
assuming that people exercise power autonomously in a relatively fluid power environment.
Although a party may not have as much negotiating power as the other party in the
negotiation arena, there are ways to increase power through the manipulation of various
aspects o f one’s situation.48 This perception o f power relies upon a liberal conception of
personhood that tends to maximize autonomy and freedom. However, it may minimize the
richness o f the relationship and power dynamics that may limit the degree to which
negotiating parties can exercise power.

In my thesis I will locate the actual possibilities for self-actualization that exist in alternative
dispute resolution processes as opposed to assuming an automatic license for the exercise of
autonomy. My analysis focuses on the benefits and potential pitfalls o f a bilateral, non
judicial process where the parties may have a degree of control over process design and
outcome, and the benefits and pitfalls o f a judicial process where the process and outcome

47Supra note 46 at 626.
4SSupra note 45 at 97-106, 177-89.
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are controlled by a third party official.49

Before determining whether a process that requires agency has more remedial capacity for
abused persons than a more structured judicial process, I will first examine the capacity for
the self to exist subjectively and with volition. If a person is simply an effect o f power and
is completely socially constructed such that the subjective self is illusory, then the agency
o f such a person is severely limited, or in fact is non-existent, vis-a-vis the constructs o f
knowledge and power the exist in dispute resolution processes. In this view, as pointed out
by Benhabib, knowledge is power and it generates access to knowledge thus creating a selfperpetuating basis for legitimacy.50 On the other hand, if knowledge is, as Benhabib states,
“in the service o f the subject; its g o a l. . . not the legitimation of power but the enabling
o f empowerment”51, then there is greater potential for agency and manifestation o f potency
in a dispute resolution process that is in the control o f the parties. In chapter two I will
explore some o f the issues surrounding liberal, post-modernist, and relational conceptions
o f the self for the purpose o f locating a conception o f the self that accurately reflects the
situation o f abused persons.

Throughout my thesis, I want to recognize the embodied nature o f the experience o f abuse.

49J. Thibaut & L. Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Toronto:
Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1975) at 7.
50S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Post-Modernism in
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 204.
51Ibid. at 205.
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In an article about judicial decision-making, Nedelsky explores the importance o f the body
and emotion in the process o f arriving at a judgement.52 I would like to recognize the
importance of bodily and emotive experience to the recovery process o f an abused person,
injudicial and non-judicial processes. In focusing upon the abuse survivor’s description of
their physical and emotional reactions, the foundational nature o f physical experience is not
neglected in the examination o f aspects o f abuse and recovery.

The tension between a conception o f selfhood that is objectified by discourse and one that
is self-actualizing manifests itself in other ways throughout my thesis. In my work, I will
rely upon theory but also upon the actual experiences o f abused persons, as articulated in
various literature, in order to illustrate my argument. Although I recognize the importance
for reflection and theoretical knowledge, I am concerned about the potential for expert
theoretical knowledge to overwhelm the physical knowledge that abused persons have of
their experiences. Both this tension, and the earlier problem o f agency existing within a
discursive world, have at their source concern about the subjugation o f the self. In exploring
various facets of processes that deal with institutional abuse, I hope to illuminate some
approaches to these issues.

Another area o f tension within my thesis is the stress between dominant and dominating
discourses. The source o f the stress is the degree to which a person is capable o f exercising
agency to benefit from discourse and yet be able to resist being subj ugated by it. Throughout

52J. Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” (1997) 42 McGill
L. J. 91.
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the analysis, it will become apparent that dominant discourse can have a liberating effect for
those close enough to be captured and named by it, but it can also dominate and prevent the
emergence o f meaning for those whose experiences are not yet named. Dominant discourses
and forms o f knowledge do not necessarily have a negative impact upon those who are trying
to assert power from a position o f subjugation. In many instances, both in the court system
and elsewhere, the ability o f a subjugated person to locate some aspect o f dominant existence
that resonates with their experience provides that person with an access point for expression.

The prime concern that I raise is the tendency of dominant discourses to over-master and
suppress new meaning that may arise from the experiences o f the subjugated person. When
this occurs, dominant discourses become dominating and oppressive to the new and
emerging knowledge form.

The carriers of dominant discourses are experts who are

recognized as understanding the structure and meaning o f the particular discourses of their
expertise. Experts themselves are not necessarily oppressive. However, in exercising their
expertise to provide meaning for a particular phenomenon, they should not invalidate the
knowledge o f the person who has experienced the phenomenon. Thus, in my paper, I am
concerned with the boundaries o f discourse and the capacity o f the subject to assert her own
meaning in the discursive arena.

C. Location of analysis

My thesis inquiry is primarily targeted at the areas around the process itself. I am concerned
with the ability o f a disenfranchised party to form and assert his interests. Consequently,
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I am primarily concerned with the development that must occur after there is willingness to
engage in a non-judicial remedy o f some sort, but before that engagement actually takes
place. In chapter 2 the analysis is located in the space before the parties must articulate their
interests, even their interests in determining the type o f process for resolving their dispute.
In chapter 3, I am interested in examining the events around interest formation before
engagement in a non-adjudicated process that is designed by the parties. The rest o f my
analysis is concerned with preserving identity formation in the conceptualization o f one
substantive remedy - monetary compensation.

I am interested in the transformative potential that exists for disenfranchised parties who are
considering engaging in an non-judicial dispute resolution process. If the abused person is
able to develop into someone who can know her own experiences and express her will in
the world, there is greater possibility for the expression o f new knowledge, the exercise o f
negotiation power, and the achievement o f effective remedies when the parties engage in a
dispute resolution process.

D. Outline

Before developing a method for maximizing the ability o f a disenfranchised party to assert
negotiation power, it is important to describe the nature of the self and its capacity to
exercise power. In chapter 2 I will examine the nature o f identity, especially as it pertains
to the experience of abuse. I will assert that the common law legal system relies upon a
particular conception o f identity and corresponding procedures to achieve the goal o f justice.
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Once the parties step outside the procedures o f the legal system, there is the possibility that
other conceptions o f identity can be asserted. When parties in conflict agree to attempt
resolution outside traditional legal processes, they have greater potential to assert a
conception o f identity, and corresponding processes, that emphasizes what they find
important. Although a disenfranchised party may favour a conception o f identity that exists
within another powerful discourse in order to advance their interests, this strategy may fail
to acknowledge the full significance o f the abusive act. Consequently, the more disruptive
aspects o f the experience will remain unknown in discourse and in the dispute resolution
environment.

In order to truly address the core harms o f abuse - namely the imposition o f identity,
disenfranchisement, and harmful privacy - a party must be able to assert her own meaning
for the abusive experiences. An abused person must know herself apart from the meanings
provided by the abuser, in order to be able to assert the power to advance her interests. A
person may find that they require validation of their experience of abuse through
psychotherapeutic discourse.

This discourse, however, may still not capture the full

significance o f the experience o f abuse for the abused person. Her ability to convey the
meaning o f her experiences may still be limited by non-legal discourses.

In chapter 3 I will examine the conditions that are likely to maximize the potential for new
meaning to survive in the public arena. Assuming that the abused person has broken the
false privacy imposed by the abuser and has established his own identity apart from the one
imposed by the abuser, how does the abused person establish the legitimacy of his testimony
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such that it has the strength to resist pressure from discourses that are potentially dominating
in nature?

I will argue that public speech falls into different categories o f testimony depending upon the
purpose o f the speaker and the purpose of the listener. Legal testimony demands a fairly
high level o f external validation as does historic testimony; both are for the purpose o f
establishing a level o f truth for the parties affected by the claims. Therapeutic testimony
requires much less external validation for it to be legitimate as it is primarily concerned with
the subjective aspect o f the speech. I will examine the forms o f testimony given injudicial
and non-judicial processes. I will argue that in order to retain the subjective aspect of
speech, survivors should establish their own group that can internally validate their speech.
Political testimony is the speech asserted in the public realm by a representative of a group.
Political groups have the responsibility for ensuring that the speech o f its representatives
reflects the true experiences o f group members. In doing so, survivors can assert the
legitimacy o f their previously subjugated knowledge and resist the pressure from dominating
discourses.

I will argue that political organization is instrumental in establishing the

negotiation power o f the parties and for enabling the parties to assert their interests.

The way in which political testimony is asserted affects whether the individual testimony o f
the claimants will survive once it is in the public realm. A political body, formed on the
basis o f shared experiences and similar meaning, is required in order for the disruptive
testimony o f the individual to resist the pressure o f dominating discourses. However, where
the political group asserts further goals and interests that affect members of other groups,
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truth-claims will have to be validated to the satisfaction o f the parties affected by the claims.

Finally, in chapter 4 I will discuss the necessity o f conceptualizing substantive remedies in
the negotiation process such that they reflect and protect the subjective experience o f the
abuse survivor. I will focus on the benefits and limitations o f purely monetary compensation
that is provided as a remedy to abuse survivors through a non-judicial compensation
program. I will argue that it is easy to conceptualize monetary compensation as a remedy
for a commodified injury. In order to prevent the objectification of the survivor’s injury,
compensation must recognize the subjective aspect o f the harm. I will examine judicial
monetary compensation remedies to evaluate whether they recognize the subjective aspect
o f harm. In examining non-judicial remedies, I will evaluate whether subjective harm is
recognized where a grid is used to administer monetary awards. I will suggest that in order
to resist this dominant and hegemonic conception o f monetary compensation, it is necessary
to explicitly articulate the symbolic nature o f the remedy such that the abuse survivor is not
objectified and fragmented at the end of a process that was initially designed to promote the
self-actualization o f the abuse survivor.

E. Methodology

In order to better understand the issues o f identity and power in a non-judicial process, I
examine some aspects o f these issues as they arise injudicial decisions. As the parties can
resort to court processes instead of an alternative process, it is important to understand which
process can best address their needs. In speaking generally about processes, I do not define
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which type o f dispute resolution mechanism will be engaged by the parties. My analysis
focuses on the pre-negotiation preparation that will help the parties negotiate the non-judicial
process and the meaning o f a particular form o f redress that may arise from the process. My
analysis also refers to other situations besides institutional abuse where other forms o f abuse
o f power have resulted in physical or sexual harm. For example, I refer to incest survivors,
oppression in Guatamala, Holocaust survivor testimony, and adult sexual assault survivors
among others. I examine certain legal decisions that demonstrate the capacity within judicial
processes to deal with the issues at hand.

Throughout my thesis the main purpose is to examine the situation where there are large
numbers o f abused persons who have disputes with institutional authorities such as the
government or churches. I am not suggesting re-configuration o f the power relationship or
identity through re-engagement between an individual abused person and his abuser. In
individual cases, there are strong arguments to be made for a severance o f the abusive
relationship instead o f an attempt to heal the relationship.

I will not deal with those

considerations in this thesis.

This thesis is the beginning o f an inquiry into theoretical aspects o f alternative dispute
resolution practices. In law, the movement toward alternative processes that may involve
non-justice goals has not been adequately explored, especially with respect to the power held
by the parties. In all disputes there will be power differentials. In examining a situation
where the power differential is both the subject matter of the dispute and a matter of
procedural fairness, I hope to illustrate some o f the mechanisms available in a non
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adjudicated and non-judicial process that may not be available where there is a third-party
decision-maker. I also hope to point out some of the pitfalls inherent in a process which is
developed anew by the parties in each dispute. In comparing the relative rigidity of the
judicial process to a party-controlled process, I may find that the structure o f the judicial
process provides some safeguards against the influence o f potentially dominating discourses.
Although my thesis topic touches upon a fairly broad range o f disciplines53, philosophical
areas, and legal issues, in the interests o f developing recommendations for parties who wish
to design a process that can recognize significant power imbalances I have tried to keep to
a fairly narrow analytical path. Although I would like to explore all the various trails leading
from my main argument, I will not be able to do so in this thesis.

53In this thesis I deal with legal, economic, political, and psychotherapeutic discourse
although I recognize that there are many other disciplines that are relevant.
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CHAPTER 2 - IDENTITY
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort o f elementary nucleus, a
primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten
or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes
individuals. In fact, it is already one o f the prime effects o f power that
certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to
be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the
vis-a-vis o f power; it is, I believe, one o f its prime effects. The individual is
an effect o f power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which
it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation.54
Why didn’t my uncle just stay away? I wish he were dead . . . She’s not
family and that makes a difference. I can talk to her and she listens. She
doesn’t try to change the truth like some o f the family try to do. Why do I
keep coming up with locked doors that need to be opened before I can be
Pauline?55

A. Introduction

Abuse affects a person’s identity on at least two different levels. On the physical level56,
abuse breaches a persons’s sense o f wholeness or integrity through the use of coercion or
outright force. In “Standing for Something”, Cheshire Calhoun defines loss of integrity as

54Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures” in Power/Knowledge, ed. by C. Gordon, trans.
C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mephan & K. Soper (New York: Pantheon Books,1980) at 98.
55P. Mantley with Marjorie Willison, Silent Cries (Lockport: Community Books,
1999) at 95. Mantley’s courageous account of her childhood sexual and physical abuse at
the hands of uncle and her journey through the legal system is described in this book. Her
description of what occurred to her creates a visceral emotional impact on the reader that is
beyond intellectual understanding.
56I use the term physical instead of individual in order to focus the reader on the
centrality of physical existence as the primary site for individual experiences.
26
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the “failure to regard one’s own judgment as one that should m atter to others”57. Calhoun
also examines the view that “integrity . . . is intimately tied to protecting the boundaries
o f the self - to protecting it against disintegration, against loss o f self-identity, and against
pollution by evil.”58 Abuse breaks down the integrity of the abused person such that they
cannot protect their boundaries against disintegration and they fail to recognize that their
judgment should matter. On a collective level, abusers prey on the pre-existing social
powerlessness o f the abused person which exists by virtue o f their identity as a member of
a disenfranchised group and create a new subgroup of disenfranchised persons. Abusers also
impose a false privacy around the abusive relationship. This privacy precludes the abused
person from identifying with other abused persons for the purpose o f acting in concert to end
the abuse. The abusive act has an insidious effect upon the abused person’s ability to act in
the world. Chapter 3 will focus on addressing the problem of asserting identity and interests
that are not defined by the abuser in the public arena. In this chapter I will concern myself
with the establishment o f identity and interests that are defined by the abused person and not
by the abuser.

Before determining how to remedy damages to identity, it is necessary to examine the nature
o f identity and how it is affected by abuse. In this chapter I will argue for a conception o f
identity that is neither entirely constructed by relations o f power, nor entirely autonomous
or individuated as conceived by liberal philosophy. I will assert that one o f the prime effects

57(1993) 92 J. o f Phil. 235 at 258.
5*Ibid. at 254.
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o f abuse on identity is the inability for the abused person to attribute her own meaning to her
own physical experiences.

In order to remedy the violence inflicted upon the abused

person’s identity, I will argue that it is necessary to provide a space in a dispute resolution
process for the emergence o f new meaning for the abusive experiences that is created by the
abused person.

In this chapter I will analyze the capacity o f the traditional common law litigation system to
accommodate new meaning within its parameters.

I will examine the capacity of an

alternative dispute resolution process to accomplish the same purpose. I will conclude with
recommendations on how to promote identity formation that does not rely upon dominating
discourses.

B. The Nature of identity

Identity formation at any particular moment is the act o f finding a particular experience or
set o f experiences meaningful.59 This definition presupposes some ability o f the person to
exercise agency or volition in the determination o f what is meaningful. In post-modernist
understandings o f the individual self, however, there is not much room for the exercise of
agency among the operation o f social discourses.

59I have come to this definition o f identity after years o f pondering what it means to
be a member o f a visible minority in Canada. I am aware that I am often identified on the
basis o f several personal features, and yet I am also aware that my own sense o f identity is
not confined to those identities attributed to me and they are not always as meaningful as
other aspects o f my selfhood. Consequently, I see self-conscious identity as derived from
those experiences that I find meaningful at any given moment.
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In the quote at the beginning o f the chapter, Foucault asserts that the individual is one of the
prime effects o f power and is also the point o f its articulation. In his conception, the
individual is not the source o f a substantive form o f power as is suggested by many
contemporary ADR proponents. Rather, as he states:

(I)n any society, there are manifold relations o f power which permeate,
characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations o f power
cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning o f a discourse. There
can be no possible exercise o f power without a certain economy o f discourses
o f truth which operate through and on the basis o f this association.60

Power is a fluid force that operates throughout the social network and sets the conditions for
establishing what is to count as truth and knowledge.61 Discourses provide the medium for
the operation o f power and at the same time provide constructions o f social meaning that
allow for the manifestation o f the individual self.

Although Foucault’s analysis of

knowledge and power provides a rich understanding o f the importance of social
constructions in the formation o f identities, there is little room for recognition of the subject
as a source of resistance from discursive constructions o f the self.62 As stated by one of

60Supra note 54 at 93.
6IA. Schrift, “Reconfiguring the Subject: Foucault’s Analytics o f Power” in R.
Miguel-Alfonso & S. Caporale-Bizzini, eds., Reconstructing Foucault: Essays in the Wake
o f the 80's (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994) at 190.
“ There is some debate over whether Foucault’s later work recognizes agency in the
subject’s interaction with surrounding discourses. For discussion o f this issue, see H.
Dreyfus, “Heidegger and Foucault on the Subject, Agency and Practices”,online: H. Dreyfus
Homepage <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfiis/Heidegger_Foucault2.html> (date
accessed: 17 March 2001). Further see R. Warfield, “Considering an Exercise of Self and
Justice in the Later Foucault” (1999) 18 Carleton Univ. Student J. o f Phil., online: Foucault
Site <http://rideau.carleton.ca/philosophy/cusjp/vl8/nl/warfield.html> (date accessed: 17
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Foucault’s critics,

Foucault’s claim that subjects are constructed by power (is fallacious
because) in fact there would be no power, no relation o f authority, force, or
discipline, if there were no subjects whose acts o f subordination or
insubordination in regard to each other produce or elicit power.63

In effect, Foucault ‘vanishes’ the subject and neglects to recognize the provocative or
dangerous aspect o f resistance to the positivity o f discourse. If Foucault’s characterization
o f the subject self is fallacious, then what is its nature? Is it fully autonomous and operating
within a void or do Foucault’s discourses provide some basis for understanding selfhood?

Liberal conceptions o f the self provide a much fuller sense o f individuality. A liberal person
has the power to act autonomously for the purpose of self-actualization in an arena with
other, equally self-actualizing agents.64 In various iterations o f the liberal model, autonomy
is a key feature that allows individuals to achieve actualization. But autonomy indicates an
a priori ability to exist separately and free from the interference o f others. This assumption
fails to recognize the level o f inter-dependence that exists for all humans, both on a social
level and on a physical level. The individual does not act in a void but rather from within

March 2001).
63M. Ryan, “Foucault’s Fallacy”in R. Miguel-Alfonso & S. Caporale-Bizzini, eds.,
Reconstructing Foucault: Essays in the Wake o f the 80's (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994) at 15960.
MC. Koggel, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) at 73-4.
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a relational matrix65 that supports physical and social existence. I would assert that the
individual cannot physically survive without the support o f physical relationships66 and
cannot construct meaning independently from relationships with others.67 As outlined by
Ryan in his critique o f Foucault, post-Structuralist schools o f psychology describe the self
in the following way:

Relations to others shape the self through care or abuse in childhood, as well
as through the social processes o f aggression, shaming, friendship, eroticism,
and the like in adult life. .. . Relations assume different configurations and
there is no identity outside such relations The self, in other words, is made
up o f image surfaces that demarcates identity from alterity and are the

6SThe concept of a relational matrix must be distinguished from the more impersonal
and less interactive concepts o f external environments or social constructs. It is not simply
that an external agent acts upon a person, but rather that a person dynamically interacts with
other people to produce and internalize “worlds” (as Lugones would say)of meaning: infra
note 72.
66In a recent book, three psychiatrists argue that emotional existence is fundamental
to human existence. Emotions cause us to inter-relate from the moment we are bom and thus
ensures a child-mother bond thatl serves to teach the child physical survival. From the
beginning, our physical existence is predicated on a relationship o f expressiveness. The
authors quote the results from studies o f children who were raised in sterile environments
away from their mothers. Psychoanalyst Rene Spitz reported that 75 to 100 percent o f the
children, who were physically cared for but not emotionally nurtured, died.: See T. Lewis,
M.D., F. Amini, M.D. & R. Lannon, M.D., A General Theory o f Love (Toronto: Random
House o f Canada Ltd., 2000) at 69-70.
67In chapter IV of Interpreting the Personal: Expression and the Formation o f
Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), Professor Campbell develops a model for
understanding how meaning is attributed to emotional affect. Although her project deals
primarily with non-linguistic, emotive expression, it provides an interesting philosophical
discussion that is relevant to this paper. At page 133 Professor Campbell states that “the
expression o f feeling is the attempt to form the personal meaning or significance o f some
experience or occasion”. Finding meaning requires an interaction or attempted
communication between two persons. Professor Campbell also explores the political
consequences o f her theory. Although relevant, I am not able to do justice to her work by
providing an in-depth analysis o f the philosophical issues that she raises within the scope of
this thesis.
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synapses o f the self’s constitutive social relations.68

And so, as between a Foucaultian conception o f discursive power that seems to prelude the
existence o f a subject that has agency, and the liberal conception o f the autonomous
individual who is relatively independent o f the influence of others, is there a conception of
selfhood that can capture agency within a relational existence?

(a) Relational identity

In outlining a relational understanding o f rights, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that to
conceptualize autonomy as freedom from intrusion is deeply misguided; instead dependence
upon others should be understood as a pre-condition to the exercise o f autonomy.69 This
view o f autonomy recognizes that self-actualization cannot occur in a vacuum but requires
a social and relational context within which to operate. Nedelsky’s analytical project is to reframe concepts used within our legal system in terms o f a relational as opposed to a liberal
understanding. In doing so, she injects relational theory into rights discourse. This serves
her purpose of overcoming the problem o f individualism without discarding the existing
legal tradition, but it does not adequately theorize the nature of conflict resolution that occurs
outside the arena o f rights-based litigation. Nedelsky’s re-conceptualization of rights and
autonomy does not sufficiently acknowledge the importance o f relationships in identity

68Supra note 63 at 164-5.
69J. Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship” (1993) 1 Rev. of Constit.
Studies 1 at 7-8.
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formation. For an analysis that embraces the significance o f social existence, it is tempting
to return to Foucault’s description o f knowledge and the role o f discourse in the construction
o f social matrices. However to do so would be to cede the subjective self as an agent for
identity formation.

Maria Lugones provides a description o f identity that is rich in its recognition of our location
within various relational matrices and modest in its conception o f agency. Lugones gives
up the idea o f a unified subject in favour of an understanding o f personhood that is
pluralistic. As she states:

. . . the cases of bicultural people . . . provide(s) me with examples o f
people who are very familiar with experiencing themselves as more than one;
having desires, character, and personality traits that are different in one reality
than in the other, and acting, enacting, animating their bodies, having
thoughts, feeling the emotions, etc., in ways that are different in one reality
than in the other.70
Though a person is plurally constituted, in her conception there is the possibility of
exercising some liberatory function or agency. As Lugones states:

the liberatory experience lies in this memory, on these many people one is
who have intentions one understands because one is fluent in several
‘cultures,’ ‘worlds’, realities. One understands herself in every world in
which one remembers herself. . . All oppressive control is violent because
it attempts to erase selves that we are that are dangerous to the maintenance
of domination over us.71

7(>M. Lugones, “Structure/Antistructure and Agency under Oppression” (1990) 87 J.
o f Phil. 500 at 503.
71Ibid. at 504-5.
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A person’s awareness of her various selves contributes to a liberatory understanding of
oppression in the worlds that she inhabits. Further, a subject exercises agency through
traveling to aplace between realities, called the ‘limen’, where it is possible to become aware
on one’s multiplicity and to form intentions not contained within oppressive worlds.
In another illuminating essay, Lugones explores the concept o f loving world-travel or the
ability to move within the world o f another subject and “witness her own sense o f herself
from within her world”72. World-traveling is the “experience o f being a different person in
different ‘worlds’ or cultures and yet of having memory o f oneself as different without quite
having the sense o f there being an underlying ‘I’.”73 Lugones sees a world-traveler as having
authenticity, in that they are not pretending to be another person: “one is someone who has
that personality or character or uses space and language in that particular way”74. Lugones
states that we do not have to be completely aware of the act o f traveling but she states that
the traveling can be done willingly. With Lugones’ understanding of identity, there is the
possibility o f inter-subjectivity that is non-dominating and also loving in nature. Later in this
chapter, a similar understanding o f inter-relatedness will form the basis for the movement
o f an abused person from injury to recovery.

Lugones’ term ‘worlds’ seems similar to the discursive areas described by Foucault.

72M. Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World-Traveling’, and Loving Perception” in A. Garry
& M. Pearsall, eds., Women, Knowledge & Reality : Explorations in Feminist Philosophy
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989) at 280.
13Ibid. at 283.
14Ibid.
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Lugones defines ‘worlds’ as possibly “an actual society given its dominant culture’s
description and construction o f life, including a construction o f the relationships of
production, o f gender, race etc.”.75 But she also provides for the possibility o f non-dominant
worlds and worlds that are constructed negatively, in contradistinction to other worlds. This
conception is perhaps paralleled to some extent by Foucault’s understanding o f subjugated
knowledges, except that Foucault’s definition of these non-dominant areas is more negatively
defined vis-a-vis dominant knowledges. Foucault describes subjugated knowledges as forms
o f knowledge that are “beneath the required level o f cognition or scientificity”76.

Although Lugones recognizes the fixative nature o f oppressive worlds, she also refuses to
negate the power potential within an oppressed existence. In fact, her description allows for
a level of richness and plurality in the identity o f those who exist outside the mainstream that
is lacking in Foucault’s description o f knowledge, power and discourse. Foucault’s
geneology o f knowledge, however, does provide useful descriptions o f the dynamics of
power and knowledge for the purposes of describing abuse. As an example, Foucault states
that undifferentiated knowledge, perhaps what Lugones would call an incomplete or negative
world o f existence, “owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by
everything surrounding it”77. The speech of institutional abuse survivors is perhaps such a
form o f subjugated knowledge that is disruptive to the existing knowledge structures that

75Supra note 72 at 281.
16Supra note 54 at 82.
11Ibid.
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surround it.

Throughout this analysis, I will use a conception o f personhood that closely relates to
Lugones’ description of the ‘world-traveler’ or a person who has identities depending upon
their orientation within their relational worlds.

I will also rely upon Foucault’s

understanding o f the dynamics o f power and knowledge through the operation o f discourse.
These two theoretical conceptions provide the most useful tools for understanding the
dynamics o f an abusive relationship and the potential for recovery in dispute resolution
processes.

To return to my initial definition o f identity with the benefit o f Lugonesian terminology,
conscious78 identity formation is the act o f finding meaning within particular experiences
within socially constructed ‘worlds’79. These worlds consist o f relational matrices that to
some degree fix the person in certain positions of power. These positions are not fixed, they

78This definition refers to conscious or active identity formation and not acts of
survival which although necessary for the self to exist, are not necessarily exercises of the
conscious will. Psychotherapists who deal with historic child abuse survivors witness
patients who have used unconscious mechanisms for survival. In his book, Soul Murder:
The Effects o f Childhood Abuse and Deprivation (New Haven: Y ale University Press, 1989),
L. Shengold, states on page 26 that to maintain the overwhelming stimulation and bad
parental image - means annihilation o f identity, of the feeling o f the self. So the bad has to
be registered with the good. This is a mind splitting or mind-fragmenting operation. To
survive, such children must keep in some compartment o f their minds the delusion o f good
parents and the delusive promise that all the terror, pain, and hate will be transformed into
love.”
79Lugones recognizes that we are not always aware o f the worlds which we inhabit
through the perceptions o f others. Nor are worlds always completely defined, understood,
or accepted by the traveller. In my definition I am concerned with the ability to actively
locate meaning among worlds for the purpose of identity formation.
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are capable of fluctuation. The relationships o f power can be both restrictive and expansive
for the individual. As we shall see in the next chapter, the fluctuation in these power
relationships is not sustained by the individual but rather by the political group that can
protect assertions o f disruptive meaning in the dominant discourse. The individual, however,
is not completely passively governed by the variety o f constructs and relationships within
which she operates. Rather, as proposed by Maria Lugones, individuals participate in worldtraveling and can move among various socially constructed worlds.

As stated by Susan Brison, the self is “related to and constructed by others in an ongoing
way, not only because others continue to shape and define us throughout our lifetimes but
also because our own sense o f self is couched in descriptions whose meanings are social
phenomena.”80 Christine Koggel, in asserting a relational theory o f equality states that
“persons give meaning to and shape their lives only in relationships with others in social
contexts” .81

I would suggest that we feel some experiences have personal significance; the meaning of
that significance can only be articulated through interaction with others. An inchoate feeling
that something important has happened can only be capable of expression once the concept
is articulated in linguistic terms. At the point when a concept exists in language a person
might exclaim, “Aha! That’s exactly what happened to me and I know what you are

80S. Brison, “Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity” in D.
Meyers, Feminists Rethink the S e lf (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
81Supra note 64 at 84.
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saying!”82 The concept captures the previously inchoate experience and resonates with the
subjective person.

But how does one convey the physical experience o f what has previously been left
unexpressed? How can a person explain a new experience that has not been imagined and
has thus not been reflected back, even from a loving matrix o f relationships?

(b) The problem o f conveying new meaning

A person may speak but be effectively isolated either because his words cannot be
recognized within the dominant discursive arena or because his trauma is too disruptive to
the status quo. As noted by Alcoff and Gray, to the extent that survivor discourse cannot be
subsumed within a given discourse, it will be disruptive and will at least point out the

82As a example, psychological syndromes are developed in order to describe a series
o f phenomena experienced by individuals. The source or etiology of these symptoms may
be unknown but scientists name the malady, thus enabling the patient to attribute some
meaning to their problem. In other words, the patient can identify their experience o f pain
or ill-health. Where this is not possible, people often feel that they do not have a legitimate
experience or they do not characterize their experience entirely within the four squares o f the
syndrome named by the expert. This may lead to a distortion and repression o f the
experience as the person strives to attach a societal meaning to experiences that cannot be
entirely captured by the negative definition provided by the expert. Disruptive speech is
necessary to dislodge inaccurate understandings o f patients’ experiences. There is a question
raised by pain psychologists about whether or not social constructs in the form o f pain
syndromes actually stimulate physical pain phenomena. Although I am very interested in
pursuing the question o f whether physical pain has a social etiology, I will not be able to
pursue that question in depth in this thesis. To read an interesting article on this issue see:
Atul Gawande, “The Pain Perplex” The New Yorker (21 September 1998) 86. For further
information on pain phenomena, see: R. Melzack and P. Wall, The Challenge o f Pain (New
York: Penguin Books, 1991) and R. Melzack and P. Wall, Textbook o f Pain (New York:
Churchill Livingston, 1999).
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possibility o f a different set o f formation rules.83 The barrier that must be overcome is the
imposed privacy of marginalization. One way to escape a marginalized existence is to bear
witness, both to one’s own life experiences and to the experiences o f others who have been
the victims o f acts o f oppression. Bearing witness and testifying seem to be crucial acts that
have the potential to create new discursive terms for abuse. In moving from the act of
testifying towards developing new meaning, the potential exists for manifestations o f
political power.84

In breaking into the dominant discourse, the speaker faces the difficulty o f trying to translate
experiences into existing language. As noted by Lea Fridman Hamaoui in an article about
testimony and the Holocaust:

(e)xtremity strains beliefs and exceeds the experience, expectation and
capability o f the reader to re-imagine the event told. Such events are without
analogy, in the sense that we lack the mental construct and reference points
to make sense o f them. In a certain sense, they cannot ‘exist’ for us because
they lack a lexicon o f words and forms into which they might be translated.85

83 L. Alcoff and L. Gray, “Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?”
(Winter 1993) Signs 260 at 268.
84As noted by Alcoff and Gray, “(s)peaking out serves to educate the society at large
about the dimensions o f sexual violence and misogyny, to reposition the problem from the
individual psyche to the social sphere where it rightfully belongs, and to empower victims
to act constructively on our own behalf and thus to make the transition from passive victim
to active survivor”. They also note that survivor disclosure o f trauma and testifying is the
principle tactic used by the survivors’ movement. Ibid. at 261-2.
85L. Fridman Hamoui, “Art and Testimony: The Representation o f Historical Horror
in Literary Works by Piotr Rawicz and Charlotte Delbo” (1991) Cardozo J. o f L. & Lit. 243
at 243.
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Events such as the Holocaust o f World War II gave rise to witness accounts that are difficult
to fathom through direct language. We need to have our parameters o f understanding
reconfigured in some dramatic, emotional way so that new meaning can be stretched and
pulled out of the experiences into language.

Symbolic acts, art, literature and other

demonstrative media help to establish the room for a new discourse to emerge.86 Again, the

86The necessity of using symbolic, emotional acts to create the space for bearing
witness and collecting political power has manifested itself in interesting ways in different
countries. In Argentina, the mothers o f the ‘disappeared’ demanded information about the
whereabouts of their children. They demonstrated in silence on a weekly basis with the
names and date of disappearance of their loved ones embroidered on kerchiefs that they wore
around their heads. Their silent insistence was a symbol o f resistance to fascism; their cause
was o f such universal and immediate concern to all parents that the significance of the
physical representation o f their loss could not be readily ignored: Law Commission of
Canada, An International Perspective: A Review and Analysis ofApproaches to Addressing
Past Institutional or Systemic Abuse in Selected Countries (Background Paper) by M.
Gannage (Ottawa: Law Commission o f Canada, 2000) at 79-80.
In Guatamala, the widows o f disappeared persons insisted that the government find mass
graves and provide genuine burials for victims. By forcing the government to focus on the
bodies o f the victims, the widows provided a visceral, real, and emotional focus for their
audience. A demand for a burial is in some ways a politically humble demand; it is not a call
for reform or revolution. It does, however, create a significant political impact because of
its emotional weight and relation to physicality and core human relationships. This allows
for the development o f a solid foundation for political empowerment: See Rigoberta
Menchu, Crossing Borders (New York: Verso, 1998) at 163-4.
Both examples involve speaking or demonstrating the effects o f a violent breach o f close
emotional and physical bonds. The universality of the physical bond and the emotion that
accompanies the breach provides a perfect vehicle for communication. There is no third
party description o f the pain and no objectification of the loss. These women lost parts of
themselves in the disappearances, massacres, and acts of oppression; their testimony reflects
that very immediate impact. Although the act o f expressing themselves may not have been
intended to be part o f a broader political movement when each individual first spoke o f their
loss, the collective act of expression in itself is a very active political gesture. Instead of
choosing the silence o f oppression, where the importance o f their loved ones would remain
guarded within themselves, these women were choosing to bring their experiences into the
open - in some cases despite great danger o f reprisals from the perpetrators of the original
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body and the immediacy o f physical needs act as the source of these communications.
Hamoui examines the literature o f two Holocaust survivors and the account o f their
experiences.

She notes that “description (of extremity) thus continually moves in the

direction o f the body since human awareness, under acute physical threat, is continually
forced back to the threatened and tenuous existence o f that body”.37 The body becomes the
focus o f description, perhaps because o f the fundamental relevance o f physical survival, and
the reader in able to ground some understanding o f the extreme experience in a corporal
existence that we all share in common. The physicality o f the extreme experience becomes
immediate and relevant when described in the language o f the body. The visceral impact of
such communications creates a link based on our common physicality.

The links that emerge from such types o f communication provide for the emergence o f new
meaning and some recognition in discursive arenas o f new types o f experiences, and new
types o f people. Koggel explains that certain categories o f people only come into being
when the category itself is being developed socially.88 In the case o f institutional abuse, the
term itself was put forward as a social problem by David Gil in 1975. He noted that
inadequate definitions and guidelines regarding abuse lead to inadequate reporting o f abuse.89

crimes. They used their genuine and unassailable experiences to carry their claims forward
into the political arena. Once spoken o f and repeated by others, the murders, disappearances
and massacres began to enter a new space in the discourse and create a new history o f events.
87Supra note 85 at 257.
88Supra note 64 at 31.
89Supra note 2 at Appendix II, p. 5.
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Only when the rules that guided meaning within the discourse o f the social sciences failed
to correspond to a physical experience did the new term emerge. With new terminology came
an expressive tool for those who experienced abuse. Where there had been no previous
understanding that persons in institutions were capable ofbeing abused, there was now a new
kind o f person - an institutional abuse victim or survivor. This does not mean, o f course, that
the experience o f abuse did not happen previous to the concept emerging in discourse. The
experience was always there and may have had personal significance but there was no readily
available meaning that could communicate the personal significance within the discursive
arena until the social concept o f institutional abuse was developed within a disciplinary
context.

As asserted above, although disciplines operate as carriers o f discourse and meaning,90 a
person may assert agency in their own identity formation. A person may choose to find
meaning and personal significance in the term “institutional abuse survivor” or she may not.
As an example, a person who has suffered abuse in the past may know that abuse happened
and that it was a significant event in her life. She may, however, choose to find no meaning
in the acts perpetrated against her in the abusive relationship. She will not identify with those
acts and will choose not re-enter the world o f abuse. This act o f detachment91 resists against

90Supra note 54 at 106.
9IDetachment is a very effective tool for asserting one’s will against dominant
discourse. In refusing to participate, a person or group deprives the other party the
opportunity to engage in an oppressive relationship. Although I would like to explore the
act o f detachment in identity formation and empowerment, this thesis is focused on situations
where the parties are engaged in a relationship for the purpose o f resolving a dispute. My
analysis is concerned with the re-configuration of the power relationship once the parties are
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identification as an abused person.

(c) Summary

I have thus far developed a definition o f identity that fixes a person in a flexible matrix or
grid o f relationships. Within this grid, power is somewhat fixed but does fluctuate. The grid
o f relationships provides an individual with a variety o f environments within which to
operate. For example, by virtue o f the experiences that a person has undergone, he may exist
in relationship to others who either have or have not shared those experiences. A person can
exercise agency within this grid in two ways: he may select which clusters o f relationships
produce concepts that have meaning for his experiences. A person can also travel among the
worlds or clusters of relationships that have meaning for him. Thus, from within the matrix
o f power-bound relationships, a person can exercise agency in order to form his identity.

Now that we have an understanding o f identity, the remaining questions that require answers
in this chapter are as follows:

1) What is abuse?
2) What happens to a person’s identity when she has been abused?
3) What type o f remedy is needed to address the effects o f abuse upon identity?
4) How effective are the judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms in

engaged and not with the accrual o f power through absence.
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achieving this remedy?
5) What is required for a dispute resolution mechanism to be effective in achieving the
remedy?

C. Definition of abuse

Dr. Shengold, a psychotherapist who deals primarily with child abuse victims, defines child
abuse in contradistinction to deprivation. He states that “child abuse means that the child has
felt too much to bear; child deprivation means that the child has been exposed to too little
to meet his or her needs.”92 Dr. Shengold is describing child abuse primarily from the effects
on the child. In the context of this chapter, I propose another definition of abuse that is more
broadly about the abuse of power. Abuse is the imposition o f the abuser’s will or power over
another being for the purpose o f gaining or expanding the abuser’s sense o f ego, power, or
will, to the detriment o f the other person’s integrity and sense o f self.93 This is an abusive
act. The other side o f abuse is love. A loving act94 is having the power to impose one’s will
but only exercising it with recognition, respect and even to the benefit of the other person’s

92Supra note 78 at I.
93In this definition, neglect could be seen as the exercise of the will o f the abuser for
the purpose o f effecting detachment from the relationship for the purpose o f depriving the
other person o f their needs.
94A loving act need not be so overt and demonstrative as making love to someone;
it is quite simply knowing one’s power in relationships but not acting for one’s own benefit
to the detriment o f the less powerful person. This type o f loving act may be as mild as
knowing that I have the capability to have someone disciplined for negligent behaviour but
not exercising that power in the interests of allowing the person to remedy their behaviour.
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sense o f self and integrity.95

Dr. Shengold asserts that there are combinations o f overstimulation and neglect in
everyone’s development but abuse and deprivation only exist if intensity, and duration cause
enough psychic damage to result in “soul murder”. Shengold defines soul murder as follows:

(soul murder) is neither a diagnosis nor a condition. It is a dramatic term for
circumstances that eventuate in crime - the deliberate attempt to eradicate or
compromise the separate identity of another p e rso n .. . . (I)t depriv(es) the
victim of the ability to feel joy and love as a separate person.96

In the definition that I propose, there should also be recognition that although abuse o f power
occurs in everyday transactions, not all of these result in damage to the object of the act.
Although the intent o f the action may be to gain power at the expense o f others, the actual
expense or damage does not always manifest itself.97 When damage does occur from the
abuse o f power such that there is attempted “soul m urder”, what are these effects?

D. Effects of abuse

95In her description o f her relationship with her mother, Lugones uses a similar
love/abuse dichotomy. Supra note 72 at 276-81.
96Supra note 78 at 2.
97Repression or dissociation, and non-reporting o f abuse should not, however, be
mistake for lack o f damage. M any people who suffer psychological damage do not report
abuse. In “Victims of Sexual Assault: Psychiatric Profiles” in The Canadian Institute, Civil
Liability fo r Sexual Assault in an Institutional Setting (Toronto: The Canadian Institute,
1993) at Tab VI, Dr. H. Armstrong cites a study where 28% o f those surveyed did not report
sexual abuse prior to the survey.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
(a) Abuse

Clinical observations o f the effects o f child abuse list the following psychological impacts:
depression, increased fears, sexual problems, feelings of isolation, anxiety, guilt, distrust,
anger, low self-esteem, self-destructive behaviours, nightmares, sleep difficulties,
nervousness, tendency to be revictimized, phobias, substance abuse, becoming easily
startled, re-enactment o f trauma, and aggression.98 Other more general terms such as “reexperiencing”, “avoidance”, and “arousal” describe physical memories forcing their way
through into consciousness, the tendency to develop coping strategies to avoid stimulus, and
the symptoms whereby a person is hyper-alert, respectively. These last three terms refer
generally to the psychological syndrome known as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.99

These clinical observations and diagnoses depend upon recognition o f behaviour by
experts.100 They are useful for understanding which experiences have been recognized and
given meaning within disciplinary and common discourse.

They also allow for the

expression o f the abusive experience to a caring listener. What are the specific effects of
abuse upon identity? The specific effects are best described by abuse survivors themselves

98A. Rowan & D. Foy, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Child Sexual Abuse
Survivors: A Literature Review” (1993) 6 Journal o f Traumatic Stress 3 at 4.
"D . Jehu, “Post-traumatic stress reactions among adults molested as children” (1991)
6 Sexual and Marital Therapy 227 at 228-32. See also S. Burge, “Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder in Victims o f Rape” (1988) 1 Journal o f Traumatic Stress 193 at 194-5.
IOOFor a comprehensive description o f the psychological effects o f child abuse, see
supra note 42 at 3-45.
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who, even though they may use the language o f the discourses around them, are still able to
judge whether those discourses correspond to their subjective experiences101.

From the above observations of the effects o f abuse, it seems apparent that abuse affects the
physical and psychological well-being o f a person.102 The subjective description o f the
survivor and the inter-subjective observations o f a psychoanalyst provide immediate
descriptions o f what happens to identity and self-hood after suffering from abuse. Although
recognized by therapeutic discourse, these particular descriptions are not generalized to the
point o f losing their connection to the bodily experience o f abuse.

*

*

*

I just blocked out what my uncle had done, and thought it would never
happen again. I remember a dream I had about that time. I dreamed I was
dead in my coffin, looking at myself, but not knowing it was myself lying
there. I now feel that I separated m yself from my childhood then. I realized
dead people didn’t hurt, so I feel that Pauline, the child, died at ten years o f
age . . . I started to leave my body to cope with the pain he was putting me
through.103

,01S. Madigan, “The Application of Michel Foucault’s Philosophy in the Problem
Externalizing Discourse of Michael White” (1992) Journal of Family Therapy, online:
Massey University Homepage<http://www.massey.ac.nz/~i75202/lectla/frev.htm> (date
accessed: 17 March 2001). In this article, Madigan examines White’s therapeutic technique
o f helping people to be free from totalizing descriptions of themselves so that they can
construct alternative stories that make sense o f the unique outcomes o f their experiences.
I02J. Neeb & S. Harper, state that “sexual abuse affects the relationship adult survivors
have with their own bodies. The sexual invasion of the child’s physical boundaries is a
profound violation o f her sense o f self. The child’s first sense of competency and trust has
a physical base....Her body is used by the perpetrator as a vehicle for his sexual pleasure
leaving the victim overwhelmed and betrayed by her body”: supra note 42 at 18.
l03Supra note 55 at 37-8.
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* * *

In Jehu’s article, the author quotes a patient’s description o f dissociative behaviour. The
patient states the following:

though I was physically present during the abuse I remember feeling nothing
other than the initial revulsion when I would first touch his penis and . . .
he first touched me. In between, I felt or thought about nothing. I was
gone.104
Further in the article he quotes another patient:

I also became aware o f the frequent tendency to separate m yself and to
become the observer. I really had to work at sticking with m yself and to feel
and to know what I was doing. I became aware that my head was separate
from my body . . . it was . . . some sort o f overseer making sure that
everything was alright but not involved.105

Abuse forces a dissociative breach between the mind and body on an abused person. The
inability to effect a physical escape from one’s tormentor triggers an internal escape from the
body.

In her article “Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal Identity”106 Susan Brison
explores the impact on identity o f trauma from the perspective o f a rape survivor and as a
philosopher. Her analysis incorporates not only her personal and physical expertise as a

104Jehu, supra note 99 at 231.
105Ibid.
l06Supra note 80.
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survivor of rape but also her theoretical knowledge o f the constructs o f identity. She
describes the aforementioned phenomenon of re-enacting trauma as being a sensory memory
as opposed to a narrative memory o f what happened. Re-enactment involves remembering
the smell of the abuser’s after-shave lotion, the texture of skin or hair, and other sensory
stimuli associated with the act o f abuse. The assault on the body results in an intrusion into
the physical memories that the body carries; it affects the abuse survivor’s subjective
perception of the world around her.

After being raped, Brison became aware that she perceived that her body had betrayed her
by being vulnerable to the rape. She found that her mind could not simply carry on
independently o f the new turmoil concerning her body. Her physiological reactions of
hyper-vigilance and physical stress were not psychological insomuch as physical.107 Brison
lost her sense o f ease and safety in the world and her sense of her own power vis-a-vis others
in her relational worlds diminished. Brison’s descriptions capture is the sense o f violence
and contravention o f will that accompanies abuse. Her description o f her body as betraying
her self gives a sense o f the separation between her will and her body’s ability to defend her
against the imposition o f will by the rapist. Her ability to identify with her body was
compromised. Her sense o f physical identity has therefore been shifted as a result o f the
rape.

(b) Child abuse

l07Supra note 80 at 16-17.
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* * *

He killed the animals to show me how easy it would be for him to kill my
younger brothers and sisters if I talked. I couldn’t live with the guilt,
knowing it would be my fault if he killed my family because I told on him .108

*

*

*

Child abuse victims have the additional challenge o f going through abuse in their formative
years. The psychoanalyst Shengold states that child abuse deprives the victim o f the ability
to feel joy and love as a separate person.109 The victim’s knowledge o f herself as capable of
having emotional experiences as an individual distinct from the abuser is compromised. The
abuser affects her basic ability to have experiences, over and above the control that the
abuser has over the meaning ofthose experiences. Shengold later states, “victims o f attempts
at soul murder...often cannot properly register what they want and what they feel, or what
they have done and what has been done to them” 110. An abused person cannot process or
give meaning to what has been done to her. Shengold quotes psychoanalyst Ferenczi:
“When the child recovers from [the adult’s sexual] attack, he feels enormously confused, in
fact, split - innocent and culpable at the same time - and the confidence in the testimony of
his own senses is broken”111. This confusion resulting from the violent act o f abuse can even
be filled with meaning by the abuser. The abuser may convince the abused person that she
is being loved and therefore the abuse is okay. In some situations the abuser may convince

wsSupra note 55 at 40.
l09Supra note 78 at 2.
110Supra note 78 at 3.
111Supra note 78 at 29.
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the abused person that she has special sexual skill that could be valuable to others who would
pay for it. Thus the abuser may cause the abused person to over-identify with her sexual
ability.
* *

*

He would keep pounding me so hard that I would be in a daze and not know
what the hell was going on. The scariest part of it all was not knowing what
caused him to go off.112
* *

*

But even where the abuser does not explain the abuse for the purpose or perpetrating the
abusive relationship, the lack of meaning for the abuse itself is damaging. Viktor Frankl, a
psychoanalyst who survived the Holocaust understood that the meaningless and arbitrariness
o f physical abuse creates a situation where the ability to find some meaning either within or
beyond the abusive experience is what sustains the will to survive.113
* *

*

He used various expressions and signs to make me go where he wanted, and
to control what I said or did. For instance, he’d make a coughing sound, or
clear his throat a certain way, to get my attention. Then he’d indicate with his
eyes where I was to go...114
By this time in my life I had no friends. When I went to school, I couldn’t
stop to talk to anybody because I had to get right home. My uncle timed
me
I never went anywhere unless my uncle was with me. He also had
codes for me with his eyes, as to where to go in the house, to satisfy his
needs, so no one could see the goings on I became a very skillful liar for
him. There was so much terror, sadness, loneliness and isolation, but I acted

1l2Supra note 55 at 48.
II3V. Frankl, M a n ’s Search fo r Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press,
1985).
u*Supra note 55 at 28
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as if things were fine and norm al.115
*

* *

On top o f the imposition of will upon the physical being o f another, the false privacy
imposed by the abuser perpetuates the damage to the abused person. In order for the abuser
to maintain the abusive relationship, he must create silence and privacy around the acts of
abuse. This prevents the abused person from accessing relationships beyond the abusive one
and thereby insulates the abused person from understanding what is going on and learning
about loving relationships116. It also prevents the abused person from developing meaning
for the abusive acts from other relationships. Because o f the false privacy117, the abused

115Supra note 55 at 56.
ll6For an important description and analysis o f the extreme privacy imposed by a
batterer upon a spouse see: K. Fischer, Neil Vidmar and Rene Ellis “Procedural Justice
Implications o f ADR in Specialized Contexts: The Culture o f Battering and the Role of
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases” (1993) 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 2117. In this article the
authors describe the relationship between batterers and their victims as involving
idiosyncratic communications that only have meaning to the two parties. They call this the
culture o f battering. This communication is a form o f private language and private culture
that insulates the victim o f abuse against intrusion. In this way, the abuser maintains control
over the victim. This article provide an effective argument against the use o f mediation in
situations where there is a culture o f abuse. They argue that the culture o f abuse is
incommensurable with the ideology o f mediation, based as it is upon the re-establishment
o f the relationship for the purpose o f reaching agreement.
Il7By false privacy I mean the privacy imposed by the abuser for the purpose of
protecting him self from outside censure and for the purpose o f m aintaining the abusive
relationship. Professor Campbell distinguishes the private from the personal, and the public
from the social in the following way:
“ 1. Public meaning: meaning accessible (knowable, interpretable) to others
2. Social meaning: meaning determined by shared rules, conventions, norms
and so on.
3. Private meaning: meaning inaccessible to others
4. Personal meaning: meaning not determined by shared rules, conventions,
norms and so on.” supra note 67 at 139.
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person may feel to blame for the abuse or she may not understand that there is an alternative
to the abusive relationship.

(c) Institutional child abuse

In an institutional setting, there is a further level o f privacy imposed upon the residents of
the institution. In institutions such as the Nova Scotia School for Boys118, the physical
isolation o f the school from the familial homes of the residents meant that the boys did not
have easy access to their pre-existing relationships.

Even where there were some

opportunities to communicate, speaking about abuse during brief visits would not have been
easy. Some residents o f the Nova Scotia Youth Training Centre may have faced additional
barriers to communication by virtue of being persons with disabilities.119 In addition,

118The Nova Scotia School for Boys (presently the Nova Scotia Youth Centre) was
located in Shelburne, Nova Scotia which is a small community about 2 to 2 A hours drive
from Halifax. On page 4 o f his report, Justice Stratton notes that the isolated nature of the
school made it difficult for parents to visit their sons: supra note 11 at 4.
119The Stratton Report describes the situation o f a resident o f the Dartmouth
Children’s Training Centre. The resident was a severely mentally and physically challenged
woman who is completely blind and has limited cognitive and verbal skills. There was
concern that this woman had been sexually abused. There was an extensive police
investigation but it was eventually terminated. As set out in the Stratton Report, the police
officer wrote:
Tracey Bartlett, unfortunately, is the perfect victim. If in fact she was
sexually assaulted, she would be unable to in any way, shape or form be able
to testify against any such person(s). Without the corroborating evidence of
an eye witness, a prosecution in this matter would be impossible.: supra note
11 at 67.
This quote indicates the difficulties associated with obtaining information and testimony
from persons with severe disabilities. Note that in this case, it was not at all clear that Ms
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emotionally troubled children may have required educational resources not available at the
institution. The resulting low level of literacy would have contributed to disenfranchisement
both while a resident o f the school and in later life.120

On a broader systemic level, the concept of abuse in institutions may not have registered on
the collective social psyche.

In an institutional environment, the concept o f abuse of

authority is less easy to grasp than in an environment where control is not socially
sanctioned. Institutional authorities are expected to have control over the residents in their
care. Institutions are designed so that the authorities are able, and in fact are required, to
impose their wills over the residents. In giving this power to authorities, there is already
social acceptance o f the imposition o f the will o f authorities over the residents. In an
institutional setting, part o f the privacy is imposed by the institution itself which controls the
rules o f conduct, communication, and fulfilment o f the physical needs o f the residents.121
People who are abused in an institutional setting may feel doubly disenfranchised: they are
isolated by the abuser who has authority over their well-being, and they are unlikely to be
listened to by virtue o f the stigma associated with institutionalization122. For someone to

Bartlett had been abused.
1“ Complainants in the Stratton Report made various comments on their lack of
education. For example “Y.T.C. 7 said that the only education she received was at the
Centre and she ‘did not leam anything there’. She added that today she finds it ‘very
difficult to read and write because of this’”: supra note 11 at 85. Stratton further notes that
there was a failure of the residents to complain o f the abuse to the authorities. If there was
a complaint, no corrective action was taken: supra note 11 at 86.
m Supra note 6 at 1-12.
l22Supra note 83 at 268.
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overcome abuse, they must break the privacy and reach out to speak o f their experiences.

(d) Summary o f Injuries

From this analysis, the following core injuries result from abuse:

1.

The violent imposition o f will upon the physical body of another causes some
objectification or fragmentation for the abused person. A person’s may dissociate
from the physical experience o f the abuse.

2.

There is an intrusion into the physical, sensory memories o f the abused person. This
affects their subjective perception o f the world around them.

3.

There may be a sense o f betrayal and a corresponding loss o f a sense o f ease and
safety in the world. The abused person has lost power vis a vis her relationships
with others in her relational matrix.

4.

The lack o f meaning may cause a feeling o f personal vulnerability. The imposition
o f abusive meaning to the acts can distort a person’s sense o f identity and
relationships.

5.

For children abused during their formative years, there is an inability to feel joy as
a separate person. The child does not leam to identify their own experience of joy
and love. Abusiveness supplants an understanding o f love.

6.

A child may not have the capacity to know or register what has happened. They
may find it hard to be responsible for their mental pictures of themselves and the
world around them.
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7.

Especially in an institutional setting, the imposition of a false privacy to maintain the
abusive relationship diminishes the ability o f the abused person to establish
empowering relationships.

What are the remedies for these types o f damages?

E. Remedies for damage to identity

Damages to identity are difficult to address, partly because they occur deeply within the
personal space of the abuse survivor. It is not easy for a third party such as a judge or a third
party to access this space and to address the subjective nature of the harm. For this reason,
a two-party process may be better suited to provide a remedy because the abuse survivor can
potentially exercise greater authority over the process,. However, before being able to
articulate her interests in shaping any process, the abused person needs to know herself.

(a) Identity formation

There are various substantive remedies that can contribute to the healing and well-being of
survivors o f abuse. The prime effect of abuse is to compromise a person’s sense of separate
identity from the abuser, and to effect a corresponding lack o f empowerment. This damage
is effected through a relationship with the abuser. In order to address these damages, a
dispute resolution process must include some way to assist the abuse survivors in asserting
a non-dominated identity in relation to the abuser with whom the survivor is dealing with,
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either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation. If the process can address this issue, then it
might be possible for a previously isolated and identity-compromised abuse survivor to
articulate and assert interests in the public realm that are distinct from the abuser.
*

*

*

There was a social worker at the home who had suspicions about the abuse
I had gone through and did something about it. Mrs. Muriel Baxter, God love
her, worked on me for quite a while and gradually gained my trust.123
*

*

*

Involvement with counselors and close relationships with loving people can help to
emotionally re-orient an abused person and teach them to be in loving relationships and to
identify with loving experiences. It is these acts o f love and new relationships that enable
an abused person to emerge from the silence and privacy o f the abusive situation. The
extension o f tendrils o f care from a loving person to an abused person provides the abused
person with a relationship that has a context outside o f the abusive relationship. Once a
person emerges from the false privacy o f the abusive experience, once he speaks to another
who recognizes him in his own capacity, there is the nucleus for undertaking personal
political action. Political action is the derivation o f strength from sharing experiences with
another person and manifesting inner reality by doing some act in the outer worlds.

The act itself can be minute in scope. An abused woman may, for the first time in her life,
buy a book without getting previous consent from her abusive husband. An abused child may
refuse to speak to the abuser. These are political acts o f resistance. This person has realized,

123Supra note 55 at 70.
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from watching or interacting or remembering a past loving relationship, that the abuse is not
who they are and they do not have to identify with it or accept the meaning provided by the
abuser. Although a person requires a relational existence to find meaning within collectively
developed constructs, she can choose orientation to relationships that give meaning to her
experiences. The act o f breaking out o f the status quo relationship with the abuser and
establishing a connection with an outsider124who can at least listen in a loving way, is an act
o f power125 and a political act. It is the seed o f political action.

If emotional re-orientation through involvement in loving relationships is the way to emerge
from the imposed privacy of abuse, then a procedural remedy must provide the time and
space to allow for the development of new, loving relationships. The emergence from the
abusive relationship is the necessary condition to being able to assert interests in a dispute
resolution environment. Without being able to define herself apart from the abuser, it would
be difficult for an abused person to identify the substantive remedy that is necessary for her
recovery. It would be difficult to assert power in the negotiation if she was still under the
influence o f the abuser.

(b) Assertion o f will

124The implications of bearing witness and giving testimony about one’s experiences
is explored in a later chapter.
125“Power is always, as we would say, a power potential and not an unchangeable,
measurable, and reliable entity like force or strength. While strength is a natural quality o f
an individual seen in isolation, power springs up between men when they act together and
vanishes the moment they disperse.” H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University
o f Chicago Press, 1958) at 200-201.
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*

*

*

In 1964, it was out o f the question to mention child sex abuse, let alone
discuss it openly. I felt I had one good thing going for me - the fact that I
would not allow anyone to feel they could ever take control o f m e.126
* * *

Abuse has the effect o f overcoming the will o f the abused person and leaving him with a
sense that there is no longer a seamless link between his sense o f self or will and his physical
being. There is a degree of objectification and fragmentation that occurs when the abuser
used the abused person’s body for the abuser’s purposes. The abused person becomes aware
o f his body as an object for another person. A person whose power and control over their
physical being has been taken away by force should be given an opportunity to recover that
power in order to become whole again. If there is recognition that persons who have been
abused have had power taken away from them at a core physical level then personal selfactualization and re-integration may be one goal o f the process. Further, as they were often
institutionalized initially because they were socially disenfranchised127, the development o f
social and political power within the broader web o f relationships may be another goal of
the process.

As stated earlier, identity exists in a relational matrix; therefore re-orientation in this matrix
is part o f the solution for identity formation. The relational matrix is constructed and
maintained by relationships o f power, on both inter-personal and broader societal levels.

126Supra note 55 at 74.
I27For a discussion o f the relationship between disenfranchised minority groups and
the institutionalization resulting from eugenics policies in Alberta, see infra note 215.
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In order for the abused person to re-configure identity on individual and societal levels, it is
necessary to exercise will and power in the relationship with the abuser, and with the actors
who maintain dominating discourses that re-enforce existing disenfranchising relationships.

(c) Survivor’s meaning fo r abusive experiences

Once a sense o f self is developed independently from the actors who maintain the false
privacy around the abuse survivor, she can find meaning for the experience o f abuse that
does not give a sense o f fragmentation. That is, if the meaning given to the experience of
abuse can be integrated into the person’s whole sense o f self without objectifying some part
o f being, then there is the possibility of recovering a sense of control over the self.

Meaning can best be developed among other people who have also experienced abuse. By
situating herself in a matrix o f people who can identify with her experience o f abuse, there
is greater chance o f being understood and o f developing a conceptual framework that will
make sense o f the experience. For example, if I try to explain to someone who has never had
a seizure, what it is like to have a seizure, I can only do so by trying to locate some
experience o f his that can approximate the feelings o f having a seizure. This attempt may
be entirely unsatisfactory because I may not be able to locate such analogous occurrences and
because the focus o f the meaning becomes more reliant on his experience than on mine. If
I am speaking to someone who has had the same type o f seizure128, then he knows o f what

128I recognize that this sounds somewhat circular as we will not know if we have the
same type o f seizure before the communication. What I am describing is the discovery of
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I speak because it corresponds to his bodily experience. Together we discover if our physical
sensations are similar and we can find some meaning in the experience o f having seizures.

For abuse survivors, it is preferable for meaning to be developed from among a group of
survivors who can identify with each other. That is, they can find a common meaning from
similar experiences of abuse that do not force them to describe the experiences in the terms
o f non-survivors. The survivors will therefore be able to define meaning based upon their
subjective experiences as opposed to having meaning imposed by an objectifying discourse
that may not correspond to their physical knowledge. In developing his own meaning among
fellow survivors, the individual survivor will have greater potential for control over the
meaning attributed to his experience o f abuse and will not succumb at this early stage to
objectification by non-survivors.

(d) A brief word about the truth

So far, the discussion has assumed the validity of the experience of abuse. There is,
however, the possibility that the abuse did not happen. I submit that at the stage in the
process when a person is first speaking about abuse but has not yet decided whether or not
to speak publicly, there should be no judgement about whether or not he is truthful. I

similarity between sensations felt in two people. If there is no corresponding sensation in
the other person, he will not know what I am describing. Thus I will have to wander farther
from a direct description of my sensation and I will have to try to find an analogy closer to
his experience.
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propose that the only relevant type o f truth determination that occurs before a party enters
the dispute resolution arena, is the internal validation provided within the group o f survivors.
External validation o f truth claims may become relevant once the parties are actually
engaged in speaking ‘publicly’ about their claims and when they are speaking for the purpose
o f asserting their interests. Members o f the group should expect tests of the legitimacy of
their claims once they speak in the public arena. The parties who are affected by the
allegations o f abuse will likely assert their own understanding o f the truth. Depending upon
the remedy and the goals o f the process as defined by the parties, different levels of
validation and truth-determination will be required. The issue o f validating public testimony
will be explored further in the next chapter.

F. Identity in judicial processes

In a judicial process, the parties are limited in their ability to control the process by at least
the following two things: 1) the existence o f binding precedents and legislation ; and 2) the
binding decision o f a third-party judge who interprets and applies these pre-existing doctrinal
rules. In a judicial process, the parties are limited in the exercise o f self-actualization and
recovery. If these activities occur, they happen outside the legal arena, and within other
disciplinary frameworks.

Although substantive remedies may symbolize societal recognition o f the re-integration of
selfhood, the negotiation process itself can be a vehicle for the recovery of self-actualization
and self-determination. Where two parties are engaged in dispute resolution efforts outside
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the boundaries o f a system o f pre-existing rules and authority, there is much greater
possibility for them to exercise power and control over the process. This can allow for space
for the development o f new meaning that is not captured by dominant discourses, thus
promoting recovery.

However, if the parties do not recognize the potential for allowing new meaning to emerge
in this space, then there is the possibility that pre-existing dominant meaning will prevail,
simply through lack o f attention in the design o f the process. Also, if the subjugated party
does not have the power to assert new meaning, then it will be difficult to maintain the
subjective nature o f their interests in the face o f the more powerful party.129

The legal system does not claim to promote identity formation. A person who wishes to
enter the legal arena must be prepared and be able to face opposition and prove his claim.
The legal system does, however, allow for procedural accommodation for psychological
condition o f a historic sexual abuse plaintiff.

In M. (K.) v. M. (H.)no, the issue was whether or not a victim o f child sexual abuse could
be statute barred from bringing her claim because the limitation period had expired. The
appellant had been abused by her father at a young age. Initially he fondled her. When she
turned 10 or 11, he initiated sexual intercourse with her. He used threats to maintain her

I29This point will be explored in more detail in chapter 4 where I discuss the
hegemony o f commodification with respect to monetary compensation.
i30[1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 [hereinafter “M (K.)”].
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silence and rewarded her with treats in order to secure her cooperation. Like the patient in
Jehu’s article, the appellant would dissociate while going through the abuse. As noted by
the Supreme Court of Canada, she would imagine herself as an inanimate object.131 The
appellant tried to break out o f the silence o f the false privacy by obliquely mentioning an
aspect o f the abuse to her mother. Her mother did not pick up on her cues or chose not to
pursue the matter. M. tried several other times to communicate about the abuse and finally,
when she was 16 years old, told a counselor at school who sent her to a psychologist.
M.stated at trial that she did not at that point know that abusive acts were wrong but only that
she did not like it. She felt that the psychologist did not believe her. In any event, her father
re-imposed his abusive privacy when he forced her to recant her story.

The appellant got married but soon experienced depression and sexual difficulties with her
husband. She sought therapy for her psychological difficulties but the new psychologist did
not encourage her to speak of her incest because it did not seem related to her current
problems. She subsequently became engaged to a new man and told him about her abusive
experiences.

After this disclosure she joined an incest victim self-help group.

Her

involvement with this group enabled her to see that she was not responsible for the abuse and
that her father was responsible. She continued therapy with a family therapist who later
testified at trial that M. only became aware o f the connection between her psychological
problems an the incest when she could recognize her father’s responsibility for his abusive
acts.

m Ibid. at 21.
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The trial judge found that the plaintiff was able to prove the legal elements o f her case.
However, she was barred from bringing her action because her claim was brought after the
statutory limitation period had expired.132 The Court o f Appeal o f Ontario dismissed her
appeal and she therefore appealed to the Supreme Court o f Canada. The Court decided that
limitations legislation does apply to sexual abuse cases but that the appellant’s claim only
arose when she was reasonably capable o f discovering the wrongful nature o f the abusive act
and the connection between the act and the harm. The Supreme Court recognized the patent
unfairness o f allowing the defendant to escape responsibility by virtue o f his own harmful
acts. As stated by the Court, if the claim were statute barred, “sexual abusers would be able
to take advantage o f the failure to report which they themselves, in many cases, caused” 133.

(a) Evaluation o f judicial process regarding identity form ation

132Note that since M. (K.), Nova Scotia has amended its limitations period legislation
to recognize the application o f the discoverability rule for child sexual abuse. Section 2 (5)
o f the Limitations o f Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258 as am. by S.N.S. 1993, c. 27, s. 1
provides the following:
In any action for assault, menace, battery or wounding based on sexual abuse o f a person,
(a) for the purpose o f subsection (1), the cause o f action does not arise until
the person becomes aware o f the injury or harm resulting from the sexual
abuse and discovers the causal relationship between the injury or harm and
the sexual abuse; and
(b) notwithstanding subsection (1), the limitation period referred to in clause
(a) of subsection (1) does not begin to run while that person is not reasonably
capable o f commencing a proceeding because o f that persons physical,
mental or psychological condition resulting from the sexual abuse.
133Supra note 130 at 32.
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In this case the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the appellant should be given the
time to develop an understanding o f herself, o f the acts she endured, and o f the harm to
herself, outside of the imposed privacy o f the abuser. It would therefore seem that a rightsbased judicial process can indeed recognize the need for historic child sexual abuse
survivors134 to form their own sense o f identity apart from the abuser.

This fact situation in M .’s case fits well with the description o f abuse provided earlier in this
chapter. M. was unable to know whether the abuse was wrong or not; nor was she able to
register what had happened. She was coerced into privacy by her father with threats and
rewards for her silence. Her abuser imposed a false privacy around the abusive relationship
in order to perpetuate the abuse. M.testified that she would imagine herself as an inanimate
object when the abuse occurred. Her sense of self was fragmented as she dissociated from
her body. As she tried to express what had happened to her, social silence on the issue o f
child abuse either contributed to her mother not to understanding or not hearing her account
o f what had happened to her. She did not as yet have access to a relationship matrix with
those who could provide meaning from the context o f empathetic or loving listeners. When
she again tried to speak with the school-referred therapist, her father used his parental
authority and abusive relationship to re-impose silence. A subsequent attempt by M. to
speak to another therapist was again unfruitful. The new therapist decided that itwas not
necessary to deal with the abuse that had occurred

134Although the ruling in M. (K.) referred specifically to incest survivors, it was
successfully used at trial in G.B.R. v. Hollett (1995), 143 N.S.R. (2d) 38 to apply the
discoverability rule to this institutional abuse case. Consequently, G.B.R.’s claim was not
statute barred.
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Both therapists were entrenched in a disciplinary discourse that did not fully recognize the
depth o f M .’s experience and needs. Time after time, her knowledge of the abusive
experience was not reflected in the discourse around her and she could therefore not find
speech that meaningfully expressed her experience.

Predominant conceptions o f the

legitimacy of male parental authority contributed to the school’s acceptance that her father
was more credible than M and that his authority was more legitimate than her disruptive
speech. The second therapist was also not able to recognize M .’s need to speak because he
let his expert opinion override her needs. As outlined in the model earlier in the chapter, she
was only able to be heard and develop the strength to form more loving relationships in her
support group once she had a sympathetic or loving listener. It was only upon telling her
fiance that she was able to begin to form supportive relationships with those who could help
her find the meaning and words to express what had happened to her.

What is striking about this case is the degree to which it fits within the established
understanding of abuse and recovery. Point by point, the fact situation outlined by the
Supreme Court describes a classic situation o f historic child sexual abuse as defined by the
contemporaneous dominant understandings o f abuse within psychotherapeutic discourse135.
Prior to this case, incest was not easily recognized in society or by the courts. In M. (K.)
LaForest J. states the following:
. . . one cannot ignore the larger social context that has prevented the problem
o f incest from coming to the fore. Until recently, powerful taboos

135The trial judge relied upon various child abuse experts in the psychotherapeutic
fields to describe the damages caused by incest: supra note 131 at 26-28.
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surrounding sexual abuse have conspired with the perpetrators o f incest to
silence victims and maintain a veil o f secrecy around the activity.136

Further, therapists’ understanding o f incest in earlier years did not accurately reflect the
abused person’s experiences. When M. did speak, therapists were not willing to accept her
account and they denied recognition o f the significance o f her experiences. Their ability to
recognize her experiences within their discourse was limited and the dominant understanding
of abusive experiences prevailed over her account o f the abusive experiences. If the then
dominant understanding o f incest had been accurate for her case, M’s experiences would not
have been minimized by the school authorities and therapists who failed to make the
connection between the incest and her injuries.

This point illustrates how dominant understandings o f abuse or other phenomena can enable
empowerment if one’s situation is reflected by discourse but can also be dominating if it is
not so reflected. Although the dominant knowledge o f experts was eventually able to
recognize the situation of incest victims, the knowledge o f psychologists at the time when
M. was seeking help did not capture her experiences. Therefore, it had the effect o f
suppressing or ignoring the importance to M. of her incestuous relationship with her father.

I would suggest that this form o f suppression may also exist with respect to current
phenomena that have not yet been widely recognized. For example, inter-resident sexual and
physical abuse in institutions is not widely recognized as compensable. Consequently, the

I36iSupra note 130 at 32.
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people affected remain excluded from the system. Though the abuse they suffered at the
hands o f fellow residents may have significant meaning for them, the issues surrounding
abusive acts perpetrated by persons who are themselves vulnerable137 have not been widely
addressed in discursive arenas.

The court system relies upon experts from other disciplines to articulate existing knowledge
within their disciplines.138 If existing knowledge does not accurately reflect a particular

l37Vulnerable people might include abuse victims, children, disenfranchised minority
members, battered women or others who are themselves victims o f abuse o f power. It is
difficult to deal with issues surrounding the responsibility and liability o f abused persons
who perpetrate abuse, partially because responsibility flows back to those who have
contributed to the disenfranchised position o f the vulnerable perpetrator. For example, white
condemnation of violence in African-American culture is complicated by the fact that it may
be that violent oppression by white Americans during the slave era and after contributed
heavily to the existence o f violence in African-American communities, see: R. T. Takaki,
Violence in the Black Imagination: Essays and Documents (New York: Capricorn Books,
1972).
138T w o Supreme Court o f Canada cases demonstrate a recent trend to limit the
circumstances in which expert evidence in sexual abuse cases can be admitted. In R. v. D.
D., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 [hereinafter “D. D.”] the Court considered the expert evidence o f a
psychologist who testified that a child’s delay in alleging sexual abuse does not support an
inference o f falsehood. The psychologist did not testify about the particular child in the case
but rather provided evidence that delay is not determinative o f truth or falsehood. At trial
the judge considered the test in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 for the admission o f expert
evidence. The test provides that the party seeking to admit expert evidence must establish
that the evidence is relevant, there is necessity for the evidence, there is a lack o f any other
exclusionary rule and that the expert be properly qualified. The trial judge determined that
all four criteria were met in this case. The Court o f Appeal, however, found that the
evidence o f the psychologist was neither relevant or necessary. The Court o f Appeal held
that the expert evidence was relevant to the complainant’s credibility and not to a fact in
issue; therefore it could not be admitted as it would result in oath-helping. The Court o f
Appeal also found that the evidence was not necessary as it dealt with a matter within the
ordinary knowledge o f the juror. Although the whole panel o f judges agreed that the appeal
should be dismissed in D. D . , McLachlin, L ’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ. dissented on
the merits. Writing for the majority, Major J. examined closely the dangers associated with
the admission of expert evidence. Primarily, his analysis focused on the dangers o f
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phenomenon, then it will not be accepted by the courts. Thus, M .’s ability to overcome the
limitations barrier was only possible after her experience o f abuse was understood by
experts. The experiences o f the appellant have been represented to the Court in terminology
that is accepted in dominant discourse and convincing to the decision-makers by virtue of
its congruence with dominant conceptions o f abuse survivors in psychotherapeutic discourse.
Further M. needed to depend upon the Court to give her the right to assert her claim. Thus,
the Court bestows power through rights only if she has enough existing power to establish
that her claim falls close to or within the bounds o f doctrine.139 For example, the doctrine

introducing extra-legal knowledge in a forum where it is not possible to evaluate that
knowledge. He noted that because experts have impressive credentials, the triers o f fact may
abdicate their role and attorn to the opinion o f the expert, despite the expert’s limitations.
He further noted that expert evidence can distort the fact-finding process because terms o f
art and scientific language can create impressions that the evidence is infallible. Also, expert
evidence is difficult to cross-examine; even if another expert cross-examines the first, the
evidence is difficult for the trier o f fact to evaluate. The expert from another discipline may
thus have inordinate influence on judicial proceedings than is actually warranted by their
actual expertise. The Court determined that as the statement o f principle given by the expert
in this case reflected the current state o f Canadian law, the trial judge should have included
it in the instruction to the jury. There was no need for the expert in this case.
In R. v. J.-L. J. (9 November 2000) file no. 26830 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court o f Canada
found that a new application o f an existing psychiatric tool is not a well-enough established
scientific method and therefore will tend to distort the fact-finding exercise. In this case, the
expert sought to use the penile plethysmograph, which is normally used for assessment, as
a forensic tool for the purpose o f determining whether the offence in question was probably
committed by the member o f a “distinctive group” o f individuals - pedophiles and
psychopaths. The expert evidence was not well-accepted as a matter for determining
disposition and tended to be strongly exculpatory. Thus the evidence hindered the fact
finding process more than it assisted. In this case, the Court was concerned that the
unproven application o f a scientific tool, wrapped in the cloak o f the discourse o f another
discipline, could result in a construction o f identity that distorts the fact-finding process.
l39Note that legal doctrine itself can preclude recognition o f particular phenomena.
For example at one time, the rape o f a woman by her husband was not recognized because
in law, a husband had the right to sexual access to his wife: supra note 83 at 268.
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o f discoverability was expanded to apply to her case, only after experts on child abuse could
establish that she could not be expected to discover the connection between her injuries and
the abusive acts until well after they had been inflicted. In M. (K.) LaForest J. states the
following:

in my view the only sensible application o f the discoverability rule in a case
such as this is one that establishes a prerequisite that the plaintiff have a
substantial awareness o f the harm and its likely cause before the limitation
period begins to toll. It is at the moment when the incest victim discovers the
connection between the harm she has suffered and her childhood history that
her cause of action crystallizes . . . What is more, I am satisfied that the
weight o f scientific evidence establishes that in most cases the victim o f
incest only comes to an awareness o f the connection between fault and
damage when she realizes who is truly responsible for her childhood abuse.140

Before the point when the effects o f abuse were recognized in scientific and
psychotherapeutic circles, child sexual abuse survivors would not have been able to rely
upon judicial authority to bring their claims forward years after the limitations period had
expired.

M.(K.) is a good example o f both the positive and negative aspects of expert discourse. On
the one hand, M. (K.) was able to access a dominant understanding o f abuse within
psychotherapeutic disciplines that reflected her experience. The Supreme Court recognized
the legitimacy o f her claim and awarded her damages. On the other hand, several incest
victims before her would not have been able to assert their claims because the state of
dominant discourse was such that incest was unrecognized or the particular nature o f their

l40Supra note 130 at 35. For further discussion on this topic see supra note 42 at 6370.
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injuries prevented them from bringing their claims forward in time141. In a judicial process
there is little room for the assertion o f meaning by the abused person that is not supported
or recognized by some type o f expert. This circular recognition o f power that already exists
does not allow for disenfranchised abused persons to contribute new meaning through
discourse. If M. had not been able to overcome the various barriers to her speech, then she
would not have been able to assert her claim.

I would now like to examine if the barriers to identity formation and speech are as
formidable in a non-judicial process where a disenfranchised group may initiate political
power without relying upon the other side or a third-party bestower o f rights.

141Prior to 1992 the majority o f civil proceedings involving child sexual abuse had
to do with custody and access, and child protection law. As stated by N. DesRosiers in
“Limitation Periods and Civil Remedies for Childhood Sexual Abuse” (1992) 9 C.F.L.Q. 43
at 43, “Few actions are brought by victims o f childhood sexual abuse, and even fewer are
met with success. In addition to the psychological and financial difficulties o f bringing such
an action, the most difficult legal obstacle preventing victims o f childhood sexual abuse from
suing their aggressor is the limitation period.”
Leading up to M. (K.) which is the key authority recognizing the effects o f child
abuse on discoverability and reporting, there were few cases o f plaintiffs seeking damages
for historic sexual abuse. It was only around 1991 and 1992 that courts started to recognize
the specific nature o f child sexual abuse and the delays in reporting that are typical. In one
case, Gray v. Reeves (1992), 64 B.C. L. R. 275 a plaintiffbrought an action for sexual abuse
suffered at the hands of her uncle. In that pre- M.(K.) case, the court found that it was
possible that the injuries suffered by the victim would not be recognized by the victim until
well after the assault had taken place. In the criminal arena, courts had found that “lengthy
delay in making accusations o f sexual abuse, while it may affect the likelihood o f conviction,
does not in itself lead to an unfair trial”: R. v. D. (E.) (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 758 (C.A.) at 76970. In R. v. L.(W. K.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 1091 the Supreme Court of Canada held that delay
in reporting sexual abuse does not contravene the accused’s right to a fair trial under ss. 7
and 11 (d) o f the Charter. The Court recognized that non-reporting, incomplete reporting and
delay in reporting are common in sexual abuse cases.
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G. Identity in non-judicial processes

In a non-judicial process there is a need for personal space or time in order for the person to
be able to establish her sense o f self and assert her interests. Once in the negotiations, it is
assumed that the parties are able to assert their interests. In a non-judicial process the need
to participate in identity formation can be articulated either before pre-negotiation process
discussions or during process discussions with the other side. The difference between a
judicial and non-judicial process is that the parties in a non-judicial process need not depend
upon a third party adjudicator for recognition o f their need to establish an identity. Further,
the identity that is eventually formed can be expressed in the negotiation process without
having been filtered through doctrine or disqualified by experts. The discounting o f new
identity and the survivors’ account o f the abusive experiences may eventually happen in the
negotiation arena. However in having the opportunity to develop a sense o f what is
meaningful at the outset, survivors will be better able to assert their interests in their
negotiations with the other party. They will not be limited in their initial articulation o f
interests by a third party adjudicator or by the other party.

Negotiation has the potential for allowing identity formation by the parties and it has enough
flexibility to allow for the recognition o f political power that is unmediated by doctrine or
the approval of a decision-maker. In institutional abuse cases governments may wish to
encourage the accurate articulation o f substantive interests in order to increase the political
legitimacy o f the remedies for all parties and the public, and to encourage the development
o f individual and collective remedies that cannot be obtained in a costly litigation process.
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Non-judicial processes do not operate within a legal vacuum. It could be said that the abuse
claimants in the Nova Scotia Program were able to engage the Nova Scotia government in
negotiations precisely because the ruling in M. (K.) established that historic sexual abuse
cases are not necessarily statute-barred by virtue o f limitation periods. Although the
negotiation process allows for the re-engagement in a relationship, it is situated within the
parameters o f a rights-based system. The strength of the ability to assert one’s rights in a
legal claim gives a party the ability to detach from the relationship. Thus, judicial and non
judicial systems are not entirely distinct but interact with each other. It also means that the
ability to assert identity in a negotiation process is dependent upon recognition within the
legal system o f the needs of abused persons. Although a non-judicial process can encompass
and recognize the importance o f identity formation, the actual engagement in the dispute
resolution relationship is dependent upon the same legitimated understanding of abused
persons as exists within the court system. What is different, then, with a non-judicial
process?

The difference is that although the government may choose to rely upon limitation periods
that reinforce dominant conceptions o f identity, they do so at the risk o f facing political
opposition in and around the negotiation environment. A judicial process is to some degree
protected from such influences and operates within a relatively fixed political environment.
A non-judicial process create an opening for the development o f a new understanding o f
what occurred in institutions, based upon the direct assertions o f the parties. In other words,
a non-judicial process provides the fluidity in the relational matrix or ‘world’ o f the parties
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such that a reconfiguration o f power is possible.

Where there are allegations o f institutional abuse in a particular jurisdiction, the use o f a
technical limitations period by a government or institutional authority might be seen as
morally and politically unacceptable. Consequently, institutional authorities may chose to
develop a pro-active program that allows still-silent abused persons to emerge from their
privacy. By not engaging in a civil litigation process, the government or other institutional
authority can exercise some control o f the process and the remedies. On their part, claimants
can assert the need for access to counseling as part o f the process in order to assist them with
identity formation and with coping with the process itself.

Whereas the parties in a judicial process must rely on a third party to interpret doctrine, a
process that need not rely upon authority can incorporate more pro-active mechanisms to
respond to subjective experiences and conceptions o f identity. Courts are bound by doctrinal
rules and procedures that embody existing dominant conceptions o f identity, whilst the
parties in a non-judicial process are not so bound.

If the claimants had been able to

effectively assert further aspects o f institutional abuse that are not yet widely recognized in
dominant discourse, then the parameters of the MOU might have captured these experiences.

(a) Evaluation o f a non-judicial process regarding identity formation

As briefly mentioned above, in the Nova Scotia Compensation Program, the MOU provided
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interim funds for counseling while the claimants’ cases were being assessed.142 In doing so,
the government provided assistance in identity formation at the outset, as long as a person
identified himself as abused. The government also provided assistance through the Family
Services Association, an arm ’s length organization that helped find appropriate counselors
for the claimants.143 This aspect o f the Nova Scotia Program could be said to be well
designed to meet the needs o f abused persons to access non-abusive, safe relationships.

Without this assistance and recognition, the process of finding a sympathetic listener can be
discouraging and difficult. Recall that in M. (K.) the appellant did not receive the validation
she needed either from her m other144 who could or would not understand her new speech or
from expert therapists whose dominant conceptions of abuse victims crowded out her speech.
If the process is initially designed so that there is maximum opportunity for allowing
testimony about all experiences related to abuse, then there is a much greater chance that a
new understanding of abuse can be developed that challenges the discursive status quo. In
M. (K). this new speech was only articulated when she encountered sympathetic non
experts145 in her incest survivor self-help group.

]A2Supra note 30 at paras. 28, 29.
143Supra note 28.
I44For her mother, M .’s disclosure o f abuse may have been so disruptive to the status
quo o f her relationship with her husband that she could not listen or hear about the abuse.
This is a microcosm o f the broader social inability to hear difficult, disruptive accounts of
experiences.
145When I use the term “non-expert” to refer to self-help group members I am not
intending to derogate from their basic expertise as survivors. I am only referring to the fact
that the knowledge they carry is what Foucault would refer to as “low-ranking knowledge”
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H. Conclusions

In this chapter I have asserted that a person forms a sense of identity by finding meaning and
significance for certain experiences. I argued that identity itself is relational in nature.
Although the person can choose meaning, meaning and thus identity is only available from
within the matrices o f relationships or ‘worlds’ in which the person exists. Based on
evidence provided by abused persons both on their own behalf and through psychoanalysts
and therapists,146 I have outlined various effects that abuse has on identity. The abused
person may not be able to process what is happening to him. As a consequence he may
dissociate or become fragmented from his bodies. Meaning for the abusive acts may be
imposed by the abuser. Further, the abuser will impose a false privacy around the abusive
relationship so that the abused person cannot derive meaning from a context outside the
abusive relationship. In order to overcome the effects on identity, I have argued that a person
must be able to derive meaning from relationships outside the abusive one. I suggest that
exposure to a listener in a loving relationship may enable an abused person to break the
silence o f abuse. Forming new relationships with other survivors o f abuse will allow for the
development of an identity separate from the abuser. Identity would be formed among others
who, having experienced abuse, would be best able to help the abused person find accurate
meaning for his experiences.

or “popular knowledge” that is subjugated by the dominant discourse: supra note 54 at 82.
146These experts may derive their theoretical understanding from a dominant
discourse but in conveying the effects o f abuse in the words o f the survivor, they are not
dominating and subjugating the knowledge o f the abused persons.
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I have argued that both judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution processes may
acknowledge the need o f an abused person to develop identity separate from the abuser. In
M. (K.), the Supreme Court acknowledged that it would have been impossible for the
appellant to have brought her claim before knowing that the abuser and not she was
responsible for the abuse. The difference between the two processes is the fact that judicial
processes require a third party to affirm the meaning o f the abused person’s experiences, and
in so doing, may possibly exclude facets o f the abusive experience that are significant to the
abused person. A two-party process can allow for the emergence o f meaning based upon the
fullest understanding that the abused person has of her experience. In a non-judicial process
involving several individual claimants and the government, the claimants may either undergo
identity formation in the personal space that they devise, or once the commitment to
negotiate is made they can assert the need for time and space for identity formation before
negotiations commence. If the government wants to be able to respond to the needs o f abuse
claimants, it will either acknowledge or initiate this creation o f space so that the claims may
be dealt with comprehensively.

To recap, judicial processes allow abuse survivors to assert the required space and time
necessary to establish an identity apart from the abuser. This space, however, is only won
if the survivor can establish legitimacy within an existing discourse and can convince a third
party adjudicator who is bound by disciplinary rules that reinforce dominant discourse, of
the legitimacy of her claims. A claimant in a non-judicial process also requires a certain
amount of legal power in order to engage the abusive party in the negotiation process. The
difference is that the players in a non-judicial process are not bound by existing rules and
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concepts o f identity. Parties can assert the significance o f experiences in an arena where the
disruptive force o f new speech can lead to the establishment o f political and negotiating
power. Further, in the interests o f dealing with all possible claimants, a government may
decide to encourage identity formation in those who have not yet completely broken the
privacy imposed by the abuser and reinforced by society.

I. Recommendations

Where a government or any institutional organization is committed to entering a non-judicial
dispute resolution process, space for identity formation should be provided. Survivors o f
abuse should assert the need to establish the significance o f the abusive acts among
themselves or among others who have experienced abuse. The emerging sense o f identity
should not be fettered by external agents or by doctrines at this stage. Validation will occur
later once the interests o f survivors are asserted against the other party in the public space
o f the dispute resolution arena.

Therefore at the preliminary stage when there is a

commitment on the part o f institutional authorities or governments to engage in a dispute
resolution process, the abuse claimants should assert the following:

•

the need for assistance to access therapists who can listen to the accounts o f abuse
as they emerge;

•

the need for survivors to meet with each other to arrive at some meaning for their
experiences;

•

allow time before the dispute resolution process is commenced for the abused
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persons to understand what has happened to them; and,
funds to provide for counseling for the period o f time before survivors o f abuse form
a political body.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 3 - EMPOWERMENT

The power. We are a natural part of the earth. We are an extension o f the
earth; we are not separate from it. We are part o f it. The earth is our mother.
The earth is a spirit, and we are an extension of that spirit. We are spirit. We
are power. They want us to believe that we have to believe in them, that we
have to assume these consumer identities and these racial identities. They
want to separate us from our power. They want to separate us from who we
are. Genocide
We must not become confused. We must not become
confused and deceived by their illusions.147

The bourgeoisie is interested in power, not in madness, in the system of
control of infantile sexuality, not in the phenomenon itself. The bourgeoisie
could not care less about delinquents, about their punishment and
rehabilitation, which economically have little importance, but it is concerned
about the complex o f mechanisms with which delinquency is controlled,
pursued, punished and reform ed.. . . 148

A. Introduction

In the previous chapter I concluded that judicial process does recognize the need for historic
child abuse survivors to form an identity and speech separate from their abusers. The only
problem is that the new speech must first be recognized within a dominant discourse and
then it must be accepted by a third party adjudicator who makes a decision outside the
control o f the parties. A non-judicial dispute resolution process has the space for identity

I47John Trudell, “Statement o f John Trudell, Last National Chairman o f the American
Indian Movement, at the Black Hills International Survival Gathering” in International
Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, Document 62: Critical Issues in Native North
America (Copenhagen: Ward Churchill International Secretariat, 1989) at ii.
148Supra note 54 at 102.
81
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formation within the parameters o f an alternative process. It allows the parties to have
control over the development o f identity and to assert their sense o f what is significant
without obtaining the approval o f a third party. However, with the freedom to assert identity
without first obtaining third party recognition, there is a risk that the survivors of abuse will
be overpowered by the other party. There is also the risk that pre-existing notions within
dominant discourses will overwhelm the new identity o f the survivors which is based on the
meaning they attribute to the abusive experiences. In addition, the new knowledge of
survivors is at risk of being subjugated by other forms o f knowledge that are considered to
be more legitimate within dominant discourses.149 Although dominant discourses can
empower survivors by providing an initial recognition o f experiences, survivors must be
aware o f the possibility that survivor speech will relent to the normalizing pressures o f the
status quo. Testimonials o f abuse are never easy to listen to and they are frequently
accompanied by and evoke emotions that are difficult to manage. People who accept
dominant knowledge about abuse and discourse derive stability from the relationships that
reinforce that understanding; these people are less likely to want to hear about abuse150.

Public speech or testimony is necessary in order for parties in a dispute resolution
relationship to articulate their interests and goals. In this chapter I argue that once speech

149Recall that when M. disclosed to the second psychotherapist that she had been a
victim o f incest, the therapists’ theoretical knowledge overwhelmed M .’s own sense o f the
importance o f the incest. His expert knowledge about her experience was considered more
legitimate than her sense o f the impact o f the abuse on her life.
IS0Again, recall M.’s mother who could not or would not listen to M ’s claim that she
had been sexually abused by her father. As noted before, if the mother listened to M. then
she would have allowed the disruption o f her relationship with her husband.
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enters into the public space it falls within a particular category o f testimony, depending upon
the identity of the listener and depending upon its purpose. The speaker loses a degree o f
control over the testimony and must contend with the power o f other stakeholders in the
testimonial arena. I will describe the disciplinary categories o f testimony that are used in the
context of a judicial process and within the context o f a non-judicial process. Each form o f
testimony requires a different level o f validation in order to be considered legitimate within
the environment in which it is given. I will note that in the Nova Scotia Program, testimonial
purpose changed in a way that perhaps reflected a change in the goals o f the Program
itself.151

Also, I will suggest that if survivors o f abuse form a group that can assert common interests
based upon their identity, they will be better able to assert the power required to resist
pressure from other parties and other discourses to normalize or negate the speech o f their
members. They will also be able to develop a consistent purpose152 or interests with the
knowledge that if these interests are to be met, a certain level o f validation must be achieved.

I51In this paper I am not concerned with the ability o f the institutional authority to
develop a consistent purpose. However, all parties in a process benefit from consolidating
goals and interests before entering the process. Before any government action is taken, there
are many internal stakeholders to be consulted and many different policy choices to be made.
Like private parties, before coming to the negotiating table, governments and other
organizations should be clear on their legal parameters and their most significant interests.
152Although the individual claimants in Nova Scotia may have had very strong
advocates who could promote certain interests, these advocates could not claim to be
promoting the collective interests o f a single group as there was no single group; there were
only a number o f individuals bringing similar claims. If they had joined together to
determine and assert claims as a group, then they might have been able to establish a new
form o f knowledge that is internally validated by the group members.
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If the survivors have the power to assert the interests o f its members on its own behalf, any
government dealing with claims may have be more able to assert its interests and define the
limitations o f possible remedies.

I argue that the formation o f a group o f people who have experienced institutional abuse and
who can develop a common purpose, will be better able to articulate interests in a non
judicial process than if each member acts alone. I will argue that in order for the subjective
aspect of speech to be protected, the survivor should affiliate himself with others who have
common goals before engaging with the other party in a process to develop remedies. If this
does not happen, the individual may not be able to resist the pressure from status quo
advocates who wish to resist the potency o f the new speech. If a political group is formed,
it can create the space for the assertion o f individual testimony in the public arena. It can
also provide the structure for the development o f interests to be asserted in the negotiation
arena. Depending upon the goals of the survivors and their ability to assert the importance
o f their interests, a method o f validation for testimony can be agreed upon by the parties in
the negotiation.

The problem arises o f how this group can assert itself politically against the status quo while
maintaining the subjective core and integrity o f the testimony. That is, how can a political
group assert its legitimacy without having to obtain approval from those status quo actors
who are challenged by the testimony arising from the group of abuse survivors? The
problem with popular political testimony is that it can easily be undermined and invalidated
by experts within disciplines whose knowledge has higher ranking in the hierarchy of
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knowledge and discourse. For example later in this chapter I will explore how David Stoll,
a social scientist,153has attempted to invalidate the testimony o f Rigoberta Menchu, a popular
political leader of the Indigenous movement in Guatamala. I will argue that legitimation of
political speech should receive validation from within the political group. Popular political
knowledge should not require external validation when other discursive forms o f knowledge
are validated from within their respective disciplines154. I will argue that internal political
invalidation is not likely to be any less effective than external political validation. Further
it will not allow for upholders o f the status quo to resist or normalize the popular knowledge

153I would be interested in exploring the question o f whether pure science can truly
claim to be distinct in character from arts. Although I cannot pursue this question within the
scope o f this thesis, I find Thomas Kuhn’s “Comments on the Relations o f Science to Art”
at page 341 in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and
Change (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1977) interesting and on point. In the
hierarchy o f knowledge, scientific claims have more power than political ones because of the
assumption of objectivity. In asserting that the study o f social phenomena is scientific and
rooted in objectivity, the social scientist places his legitimacy closer to that of the pure
scientist who is assumed to be relatively free from subjective bias, and consequently higher
on the hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, the social scientist asserts truth claims that will
subjugate claims derived from lower knowledge forms such as those rooted in physical
experience. Stoll’s claim to legitimacy rests upon his qualifications as a social scientist who
is able to objectively view a political situation. What he does not acknowledge is the
political content of his so-called scientific assertions.
154 For each type o f truth claim, there is an internal method o f validation established
within the discipline. The strength o f scientific discourse is provided by its apparent
openness to new truth and the ability o f the scientist to shift from a status quo position.
Science seeks to challenge existing understandings o f the world whereas other disciplines
examine pre-existing ideas. However, in claiming to be scientists, other disciplines seek to
establish that they can objectify their area of study for the purpose o f establishing truth apart
from their pre-conceptions and political stance. See M. Foucault, “Discipline and Punish”in
P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) at 237: N.
Tomes, “Feminist Histories o f Psychiatry” in M. Micale and R. Porter, eds. Discovering the
History o f Psychiatry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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o f the group o f abused persons through invalidation o f its membership. Only in being able
to resist normalization by maintaining the integrity o f this speech will the formerly
disenfranchised group be able to take a place within the discursive arena and manifest its
power. Beyond the political purpose o f speech, however, external validation will become
relevant.

B. Pre-testimony survivor speech

Lugones states:

. . .merely remembering ourselves in other worlds and coming to
understanding ourselves as multiplicitous is not enough for liberation:
collective struggle in the reconstruction and transformation o f structures is
fundamental.155

By itself, having the strength to speak about one’s experiences does not ensure that the words
will be accepted and absorbed into common knowledge. Before her words are accepted, a
survivor of abuse o f power may go through several instances o f describing the event o f abuse
where she is disbelieved, discounted, ignored or even silenced. These are methods that
effectively keep the subjective experiences o f the survivor internal and invisible to those
around her and to those who operate within the dominant discourse156.

lssSupra note 70 at 507.
156In their article previously mentioned, A lcoff and Gray applied a Foucaultian
analysis to modern-day uses o f confessions and experts in talk-shows. They describe the
situation of survivors o f trauma who confess their experiences in a talk-show format with the
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the privacy barrier o f abuse is only overcome once
someone listens in a loving or empathetic way to the abused person. As a bridge forms
through the interaction o f the speaker and the empathetic listener, the speech o f the abused
person enters an external safe space that is outside the safety o f silence. This listener may
not fully comprehend the meaning o f the abuse, but he is prepared to hear the account and
provide encouragement and support for the purpose o f acknowledging the inherent
legitimacy o f the subjective experience. Slowly, the abused person is taking steps to fully
enter the public realm where political action and negotiation can take place. Once a person
breaks the privacy o f the abusive relationship, it may take years o f establishing a safe
personal space with sympathetic, non-judgmental listeners before he is willing or ready to
enter a dispute resolution process for the purpose of obtaining a remedy from those
responsible for the abuse. As noted in the previous chapter, establishing the truth o f speech
is not important at this stage. It is only when speech enters the public realm for a particular
purpose that truth and validation become important. Even then, the level o f validation will
depend upon the purpose o f the speech and the truth-claim being asserted.

The safety in speaking to an empathetic listener comes from the control that the abused
person has over the fate o f the speech. Although this new personal space is not private, it is

later involvement of an expert at the end of the show. The expert is in the dominant position
and has the power to validate or invalidate the survivor’s testimony or confession. The
expert is the gate-keeper who determines whether or not the survivor’s speech is absorbed
into the hegemonic dominant discourse. The expert transforms the survivor’s testimony
from a subjective, experiential description to an objectified exhibition that serves to reinforce
their power as an expert: supra note 83 at 275. Speech, as Foucault has said, is itself the site
and object o f conflict and power struggles Ibid. at 260.
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not yet entirely public either. Although not completely assured o f confidentiality, the
empathetic listener generally gains their position of trust through compliance with conditions
set out by the speaker. Thus, the speech to an empathetic listener is not truly in the public
arena. In order to assert one’s interests - based on one’s sense o f what is meaningful - it is
necessary to speak in the public realm.

But it is not enough to speak. In order to break the silence about abuse in the public arena
it is necessary to be heard. Power is required in order to be heard in an environment where
pre-existing meaning dominates discourse. However, if an abused person decides to speak
outside this personal space, she loses a sense of control over the fate o f the speech. Once in
the public realm, the intent of the listener and the intent of the speaker determine the type
o f testimony and the disciplinary framework that will guide its path.

(a) Normalization o f survivor speech

In “Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?”157Gray and A lcoff inquire whether
survivor discourse158 is co-opted and used in a manner that diminishes its subversive impact.
By subversive, the authors are referring to the assertion o f a non-dominant discourse that

157Supra note 83.
158By survivor speech the authors are referring to the discourse o f those who have
survived rape, incest, and sexual assault: Ibid. at 261.
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dismantles constructions that exist within dominant discourse.159 Alcoff and Gray assert that
the empowering capabilities of speaking o f abusive experiences can be co-opted, subverted
or recuperated by the dominant discourse through subj ugation of the disruptive aspect o f the
testimony. According to the authors, one way in which disruptive speech is neutralized is
by experts who legitimate or ignore those aspects o f speech which do not fit well within the
existing discursive framework.160 That is, experts define the language and conceptual
framework that are available for providing meaning for abusive experiences. Alcoff and

l59For example, in D. D. the Court considered the expert evidence o f a psychologist
who testified that a child’s delay in alleging sexual abuse does not support an inference o f
falsehood. The Supreme Court did not see the need for the dismantling o f a myth because
they felt that the myth about late disclosure had already been dismantled in legal discursive
arenas. But this dismantling only occurred because experts, who themselves are entrenched
within a dominant discourse within their own professions, used their voices to legitimate the
experience o f alleged abuse victims. This case describes the test that is used to determine
when experts are to be called upon to assist the court. It outlines that experts are required
when there is new accepted knowledge within their discourse; they are not required to
confirm existing knowledge. The Court does not go so far as to say that experts are not
required where the testimony o f the abuse victim challenges status quo knowledge. It
appears that in those cases, experts entrenched within a dominant discourse are required to
legitimate the new speech o f the survivor. Although the expert in D. D. was not dominating,
the test outlined by the Supreme Court does not recognize the ability o f survivor testimony
to stand alone when it challenges existing conceptions o f abuse: supra note 138.
160Alcoff and Gray describe the confessional format used by television talk show
hosts. They describe an actual interview with a rape survivor who was attempting to
emphasize a particular aspect o f the experience that had meaning for her. Her goal was to
focus on the normality o f the situation prior to the assault and to say something useful for
other women who may not know what to do in a similar situation. The host o f the show
wanted to focus on the act o f rape itself and wanted to know if she had provoked the rapist.
The survivor attempted to refocus her response to focus on men’s responsibility for rape but
again the host o f the show emphasized women’s responsibility to avoid rape. At this point
an expert on ‘rape prevention counseling’ was brought in to re-iterate the host’s focus on
female responsibility for male violence. In this case, the speech of the rape survivor was too
disruptive for the television host who wanted to maintain pre-existing concepts about rape.
The survivor was circumvented and the expert legitimated existing discursive frameworks:
supra note 83 at 275-6.
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Gray do not deny the usefulness o f theoretical knowledge that is held by experts. Their main
concern is with theoretical experts who override and undermine the words o f those who have
undergone the traumatic experience. Ideally, those who help the abused person find meaning
are those people who have experienced abuse and who have theoretical knowledge o f the
phenomena surrounding the trauma.

I would argue, therefore, that when listening to new speech at the identity-formation stage,
the listener161 should not judge or validate the emerging speech. Their purpose at this stage
is to simply act as a loving person, thereby re-orienting the abused person within a new
relationship matrix. At this point, the speech is not public, it exists within a personal space
between two people.

However, when the abused person seeks to find meaning for their experiences, they will most
easily be able to do so within a matrix of people who have also experienced abuse. Other
abused persons will know what has been experienced and will best be able to help find the
concepts that accurately reflect the experience o f abuse. At this stage, the membership o f the
group o f survivors will be determined by whether or not the members can identify with each
other. This type of group is akin to the incest survivor self-help group that M. joined in her
search to bring some meaning to her experiences o f incest. Through her connection with her
group, she was able to speak to others who could provide her with a sense o f a new world
or construct defined by survivors.

I61The listener could be a counselor, a friend, a close relative, a lover or any other
person who can allow the abused person to speak.
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This type of group only exists insofar as the members share experiences and meaning. It will
cease to exist as a group o f survivors if its members have no commonality of experience and
meaning. At this point, the primary purpose o f the group is to assist its members find
meaning. It does not have a further political goal of asserting this meaning in the world
outside o f the one it has constructed. When a group forms in order to assert meaning in the
world for the purpose o f achieving a goal, the speech of its members will be subject to some
level o f validation, depending upon the goal o f the group. The goal could be simply to assert
their understanding o f abuse in dominant discursive arenas. In asserting a sense o f what
happened according to them, there is no need to validate their claims. It is clearly based upon
a subjective understanding o f their experiences and is only asserted with that understanding.

When the group asserts interests and justifies the legitimacy o f those interests with claims
o f truth, then there will be a need for some form o f validation, as agreed upon by the parties.
The level of validation required depends upon the interests affected by the claims. For
example, if they are seeking remedies based on injury, then the validation standard agreed
upon by the parties may more closely approximate legal validation methods, if both parties
agree that the interests o f the alleged abuser are important. Because validation methods are
agreed to by the parties, as the testimony o f the claimants moves towards affecting the
interests o f others, the ability o f the group to assert the importance of its claims becomes
more important If the survivor’s group is able to assert the importance o f its interests in the
negotiation arena where other interests are represented, then it will more able to agree upon
a validation method that recognizes the significance of its members’ claims.
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C. Political empowerment

Foucault defines the relationship between power and discourse:

in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold
relations o f power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social
body, and these relations o f power cannot themselves be established,
consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation,
circulation and functioning o f a discourse.162

Further he advises that we must study power at the point “where it installs itself and produces
its real effects”163.

In a dispute concerning institutional abuse, power manifests in two ways: it forms the subject
matter o f the conflict as it was exercised abusively against residents o f institutions who are
now seeking redress, and it operates in the negotiation to perpetuate an existing discourse
that excludes the abused persons or maintains them in a position of subjugation. In order to
re-configure the power relationship in the dispute resolution environment so that the initial
abuse can be addressed and so that the existing power imbalance does not perpetuate itself,
it is essential that the abuse survivor be able to assert a voice and contribute to discourse.
Silence only perpetuates isolation within a space defined by the abuser.164 Testimony, or

162Supra note 54 at 93.
163Ibid. at 97.
164If the abused person has enough strength to detach from the relationship without
using detachment for communicating the effect o f the abuse upon her, then she has much
strength but not much political power. In her act of detachment, she is not communicating
her interests for the purpose o f achieving a goal such as the re-configuration o f her
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public speech, is an important way through which a person conveys her sense o f what is
important to the rest o f the world.

By political power I do not mean to imply the involvement o f formal political organizations
in the negotiation process. It means the power that a group has to bring their experiences165
into the public realm.166 Further, it means the power to assert the meaning o f those
experiences, and the material interests that flow from these experiences, in the domain o f the
negotiation process. Speaking about one’s experiences to another person or to a group of
people who have had the same experience creates a form o f consciousness o f commonality.
If the members o f the group derive similar meaning from their experiences, then that group
has an identity. If the group wishes to act together to achieve a common goal, then the group
has a political aspect. Speech that is intended to further its goals, as they arise from their
common experience, is political testimony.

relationship with the abuser. Rather, she is disengaging from the relationship entirely. This
may be entirely appropriate and it may contribute to the eventual political power o f the
survivor. However it is not material for the purposes o f discussing the re-configuration o f
power relationships that is possible when a dispute resolution process is engaged.
I65The act o f bringing experiences into the public realm can also be seen as an act o f
self-assertion. At any given moment, a person may identify themselves with a particular
experience. In bringing an experience into the public consciousness, the person creates a
particular socially constructed identity based on the experience. For example, the experience
o f pain may be constructed as a particular culturally constructed syndrome in order for the
person to identify with their bodily experience in a socially accepted way: see supra note
82.
l66Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 formally recognizes the
difficulty experienced by victims or survivors o f abuse who are required to testify in court.
This section facilitates the emergence o f a private experience into the public realm. This
section is discussed in L.(D.O.), infra note 169.
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In a non-judicial dispute resolution process, the operation o f political testimony is not
restricted within the parameters of the explicit process set out by the parties or the remedies
sought by the parties. If the parties are politically organized, political testimony operates
before the negotiation takes place: it permeates the negotiation process itself, and it operates
after the negotiation and remedies are concluded. As long as there is an identifiable group
whose members share a common experience, political testimony has a role. Insofar as a
negotiation process leads to the development o f the group, the negotiation itself is part o f the
empowerment process. Empowerment, however, is a much broader and more dynamic event
than the particular negotiation process that may have served as a catalyst.

D. Types of testimony

In a dispute, testimony serves a variety of purposes for the speaker: it is a form of
communication for therapeutic assistance before and during the process; it is the tool
through which the group can articulate the interests o f its members to the other parties in a
negotiation; it provides a record of the events that occurred; and in a judicial proceeding it
allows the speaker to present his account o f the abuse before a decision-maker. However,
these various fora for testimony are not simply for the speaker; they are also designed to
achieve particular disciplinary goals.

Within disciplines, testimony has different meanings and is used for different purposes.
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T estimony167is a term o f art for legal practitioners; the use o f testimony in legal proceedings
is bound by statutory and common law rules o f evidence. Its purpose in the legal arena is
to assist the decision-maker with establishing as true a picture as possible in order to reach
a just decision.

(a) Testimony in a judicial proceeding

Within the courtroom testimony serves the purposes o f the justice system. The fundamental
goals o f the law of evidence are the search for truth, efficiency in the trial process, and
fairness in the trial process.168 Common law rules have developed incrementally over the
years to produce fundamental values o f justice. Evidentiary rules however, can be applied
in a flexible, principled way to accommodate the particularities of each case.

In theSupreme Court o f Canada case R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 [hereinafter
“Z.(Z>.0./’]169, Justice L’Heureux-Dube considered the rules of evidence regarding the

l67For the purposes o f this thesis, I will use the term “legal testimony” to refer to the
act o f providing sworn testimony in a court of law. I will use the term “testimonial
statement” and “testimony” to refer to the act o f speaking of one’s experiences to another
person for non-legal, as well as legal, purposes.
168J. Sopinka, S. Lederman, A. Bryant, eds., Law o f Evidence in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1999) at 3-5.
169Although this case deals with the criminal law, it is being used to outline the basic
rules of evidence in adversarial, judicial proceedings. The author recognizes that criminal
rules o f evidence operate within a context where the court is seeking to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt for allegations of public wrongdoing, and that civil actions engage in fact
finding for the purpose of assessing pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for private
wrongs. However, in the context o f discussing the nature of legal testimony in judicial

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
testimony o f children in child sexual abuse cases. She examined section 715.1 o f the
Criminal Code which is designed to accommodate the needs o f young victims o f sexual
abuse. In particular, the section provides that early videotaped evidence can be adduced in
court so that trauma is reduced for adolescent complainants while at the same time
maintaining the integrity o f evidence.

L’Heureux-Dube J. considered the accused’s

arguments that the admission o f videotaped evidence offends the right o f the accused to a fair
trial because it limits the right to cross-examination and admits hearsay evidence. The main
argument in support o f this position was stated by the judge at the Manitoba Court o f Appeal
in the decision below:

Section715.1 clearly offends the common law evidentiary rule that precludes
the admission in evidence o f previous consistent statements. . . . The
legislation ignores two fundamental elements o f the criminal trial process
which have developed in our judicial system over the centuries:
1) the general principle that evidence must be presented in a
public courtroom, in the presence o f the accused,
accompanied by some formality; and
2) the right o f a accused to be present when evidence is
presented or recorded in order to have the opportunity to test
the evidence by cross-examination o f the witness.170

L’Heureux-Dube J,. for the majority, found that section 715.1 did not offend these long

proceedings as opposed to non-judicial proceedings, the difference between civil and
criminal evidentiary rules is not material.
170

Ibid. at 433-434
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standing common law rules because “truth cannot be attained in a vacuum” 171. Rather, she
advocated a contextual approach. Particularly she found that “the innate power imbalance
between the numerous young women and girls who are the victims o f sexual abuse at the
hands o f almost exclusively male perpetrators cannot be underestimated when ‘truth’ is being
sought before a male-defined criminal justice system”172. She aptly quoted another legal
scholar who stated, “(t)he fundamental question remains: how can ‘truth’ be an outcome o f
a process which restricts and actively denies the experiences o f one o f the major players?” 173
L ’Heureux-Dube found that section 715.1 preserves evidence in such a way as to assist in
the discovery o f truth in the trial process by allowing for the inclusion o f the evidence of a
crucial party.

In this case, the Supreme Court gave serious consideration to changing the rules of
testimonial evidence in order to facilitate truth determination while recognizing the need for
contextuality. Goals o f legal testimony remain intact to ensure that the court can determine
the legitimacy o f truth-claims made by the parties. Fact-finding, and the pursuit o f truth
regarding a series o f past events remain at the core o f the judicial process. Experts from
within the dominant discourse were relied upon by the Supreme Court in a manner which
enabled the speech o f a non-dominant actor to be heard. The rules o f legal discourse proved
to be flexible enough to accommodate the influence o f another dominant discourse.

l7'lbid. at 446.
172Ibid. at 441.
™Ibid. at 444.
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(b) Non-legal forms o f testimony

In an historical174 setting, the giving o f testimony is for the purpose o f establishing an
accurate record o f events, according to the personal experiences o f the people who witnessed
or were involved in the events. Historians175 and other social scientists insist upon

174Given the historic nature of institutional abuse, I wonder if historians may have the
appropriate skills and methodology to determine the facts around events that would have
occurred between 10 and 60 years ago. However, with historic testimony there is the same
problem o f particular discourses dominating over others.
For example, written
documentation often provides historians with the factual foundation. However those with
oral traditions or who do not have access to records will be excluded from the historical
account. Although in R. v. Delgamuu/cw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 the Supreme Court of
Canada recognizes that oral histories are admissible for the purposes o f determining the
intentions o f Aboriginal treaties, Canadian courts would not necessarily recognize the oral
history o f parties with no cultural or traditional practice o f establishing an oral history. Also,
those who dominate often control the historical account provided for posterity. As stated by
Edward Said “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging,
is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections
between them”: E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1994) atxiii.
O f further interest, a researcher for the United Church has done an historical study o f Indian
residential schools and asserts that the schools were not as detrimental as claimed by many
Aboriginal people. In effect he is using historical validation methods to delegitimate the
claims made by former residents of the schools. Quaere whether his historical method and
research was geared towards reaching his conclusion or whether it was open to discovering
the opposite conclusion: see R. Foot, “Researcher Defends Residential Schools” The
National Post (17 March 2001).
175With respect to historical testimony, the Reconciliation agreement between the
primary victims o f George Epoch and the Jesuit Fathers o f Upper Canada provided for a
recorders report o f the abusive events. The recorder states that the purpose o f the report is
the following:
to ‘outline the relevant history o f the Epoch abuse’. It is to make known
people’s ‘ observations of the impact o f Epoch’s abuse, upon the victims
themselves and upon the community as a whole’.
The provision o f a recorder serves a therapeutic and historic function. It is therapeutic
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verifiability in order to lend credibility to the stories provided through testimonies.176 In the
psychoanalytic environment, testimony o f trauma given by the analysand and heard by the
analyst enable the analysand to re-extemalize the event and thus commence to therapeutic
process.177 In this arena there is an acknowledgment of the highly subjective nature o f the
testimony. Unlike where testimony is given for historical purposes, in a therapeutic setting
the fact o f the testimony itself is significant as opposed to the verifiability of the facts
represented by the testimony.178 The health professional is not placed to doubt the patient’s
account of events but rather to deal with sequelae that arise from the subject’s reaction or
involvement in the reported events179. In the political environment, testimony is used for
political mobilization and consciousness raising to establish a common group identity and
group cohesion. A person who recounts a significant personal experience can, in the act of
sharing it with others, contribute to political conviction and activism. Again, external

because the act o f testifying about one’s own trauma before a witness for the purpose of
making it public allows for the significant personal experience o f abuse to be acknowledged
and legitimated by broader society. It is historic in that is establishes a record of a significant
societal event in the words o f the survivors: see Marion L. Mussell, “Recorder’s Report
Written for the Survivors: ‘In the Spirit o f Healing’” (Reconciliation Implementation
Committee: October 1995) at 1.
176S. Felman and D. Laub, Testimony: Crisis o f Witnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 61.
117Ibid. at 69.
ll8Ibid. 62.
179Although Shengold states the following: “ I believe patient and analyst must strive
for both narrative and historical truth - falling back on narrative when the historical recedes,
but a narrative supplied whenever possible by the patient, not the analyst”: supra note 78 at
35.
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verifiability180 is not essential as it is within the legal or historical arenas because the
subjective experience and its relevance to the collective reality o f a group is what lends
legitimacy and force to political empowerment181.

E. Conflicting Testimonial Purposes

So far, I have tracked survivor speech from its emergence from the imposed privacy of the
abuser, through the safe, non-judgmental, personal space of the listener, to its eventual
development into a form o f testimony. I have argued that once a group has a purpose, it
becomes political in nature. The speech o f the group and its members is political testimony.
I have argued that all forms o f public speech or testimony require some degree o f validation,
depending upon its purpose. Political speech that is for the purpose o f the establishment of
the group requires validation from within the group. This form o f testimony is necessary for
defining group identity before the assertion o f interests in a negotiation to develop remedies
for abuse. If the testimony o f group members is asserted outside the group for the purpose
o f obtaining a remedy, then the level o f validation may be different, depending upon the
other interests o f other parties who are affected by the claims. I have examined the treatment
o f testimony in the legal arena and the ability o f the court to change its rules while still

180By external verifiability, I mean the verification ofpolitical testimony from outside
the group which is represented by the testimony. Political testimony requires verification
from within the group but not beyond it.
181bell hooks, Talking back, thinking feminist, thinking black (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 1988). hooks notes that confession and memory enable men and women to talk about
personal experience as part o f a process o f politicization. She notes the importance of
theorizing personal experience so as to place it within the context o f a collective reality.
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maintaining justice goals. I have also set out the various testimonial types depending upon
the purposes o f the listener and the speaker. In the next section, I will explore some o f the
difficulties that can occur when there are two purposes for the same testimony.

(a) Therapeutic and Historical Testimony

Different testimonial purposes operating in the same space sometimes conflict in a manner
that creates doubt about the legitimacy o f the testimony.

For example, a witness of

Holocaust events whose testimony is viewed by historians and psychoanalysts creates
completely different impressions upon these two types o f professionals. Psychoanalyst Dori
Laub describes a Holocaust witness testifying about a prisoner revolt at Auschwitz.182 The
witness recalled a significant event where prisoners had blown up part o f the Auschwitz
prison camp. In her testimony she stated that four chimney stacks had been blown up when
in fact only one had been blown up. The historians who reviewed the case felt that the
discrepancy made her eye-witness account hopelessly incomplete - in other words,
unreliable. A psychoanalyst who reviewed the case felt that the woman was testifying to a
more radical event - the reality of the unimaginable event o f a prisoners’ revolt that broke
the status quo framework o f life at Auschwitz. The exaggeration or mistake in her testimony
did not invalidate her testimony. Rather,the discovery o f the knowledge o f the patient was
an event in its own right. As Laub states, it was “the very process of her bearing witness to

lilSupra note 176 at 59-63.
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the trauma she had lived through, that helped her now come to know the event” 183. The
difference between disciplinary approaches and norms is noticeable in this instance. Where
actors in one discipline discounted the testimony, actors in another discipline accepted and
legitimated her account.

(b) Therapeutic and legal testimonies in non-judicial processes

This type o f conflict about the meaning and import o f testimony will likely arise in dispute
resolution arenas where there is lack o f clarity about the purpose o f the process. In a judicial
decision-making process, only legal testimony is admissible for the purposes o f resolving the
dispute. The legal decision relies on the judge’s determination of the appropriate legal
doctrine or standard to be applied and the correct application o f that doctrine given the
specific circumstances o f the case. In a negotiation process, however, there is room for the
parties to have goals other than the achievement o f justice. Persons can “testify” about their
experiences for a variety o f purposes. As negotiation processes may be specifically agreed
upon by the parties for the particular dispute at hand, the use and meaning o f testimony can
be tailored to the needs o f the parties.

In a negotiation, justice is not the only goal and may not be paramount over other goals such
as healing or the establishment o f a record o f events. The various parties seek an agreement
that is advantageous to their interests. In a non-judicial conflict resolution setting, both the

m Ibid. at 62.
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rules for admission o f evidence to support truth-claims, facts, and the norms used to reach
agreement are potentially much more varied and less rule-bound. Precedents do not bind the
parties as the rules have been previously agreed upon by the parties for the specific program.
Conflict resolution programs potentially also allow for the interplay and involvement o f
various disciplinary discourses184 in a manner agreed to by the parties.185 Thus, the
contribution o f psychotherapists or social historians can have a broader impact on the
program than would be the case within judicial proceedings where their information would
have to meet the strict requirements o f expert testimony in order to be admissible.

Before the Compensation Program was negotiated, complainants had a chance to tell their
stories o f abuse to Justice Stratton and his investigators. One o f the stated purposes of the
Stratton Inquiry was to investigate incidents of sexual or physical abuse o f residents o f
provincial institutions.186 Stratton states that he and his investigators had very little
opportunity to test the credibility of what was being told, testimony was not sworn, there was
little corroborative evidence and the investigators did not use adversarial methods o f crossexamination. Nevertheless he was prepared to generally accept the reliability o f what he was

184As Foucault states “disciplines have their own discourse. They engender . . .
apparatuses for knowledge (savoir) and a multiplicity o f new domains of understanding” :
supra note 54 at 106.
I85The conflict between a system o f dispute resolution that is highly rule bound by
normative rules versus a system that allows for rules to be developed and based on
sociological fact is discussed at a philosophical level by Jurgen Habermas in Between Facts
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory o f Law and Democracy, trans. William
Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
186iSupra note 11 at iv.
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told.187 In describing their statement taking methods he states,

we adopted the practice o f taking down in long-hand and in their own words,
the statement o f those who came forward to speak to us....residents should
feel encouraged to tell fully their stories ...in their own words...without
intimidation and without any fear that we would try to shape or colour that
which they wished to report.188

In addition, he states later in the Report that he wants the complainants to know that, “we
have listened with care to their stories and have sympathy for them” 189. Further, in order to
encourage the complainants to speak, they were promised that their stories would be kept
confidential and their names not disclosed. Thus, there was some privacy or personal space
for the complainant and the testimonial statements provided at this stage were not fully
public.

The amount o f control over the statement-taking process, the lack o f challenge or verification
o f testimony, and the promise o f privacy point to the conclusion that Justice Stratton was
closer to being a sympathetic listener than an evaluator of testimony. This may have been
appropriate at this state given that the government wanted complainants to come forward so
the possible extent of the abuse could be determined.

Once the Compensation Program was set up, the same investigators who had assisted Justice

181Ibid. at at 100.
l88Ibid. at 99.
imIbid. at 103.
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Stratton were hired to take statements for the Compensation Program. Initially the Program
seemed geared toward providing the abuse claimants with an opportunity to heal. In one o f
the first press releases the Minister stated the following:

The ADR process has been carefully chosen because it is designed to protect
the privacy o f the victim. The process is an alternative to civil litigation. It is
driven by a victims' advocacy group190. It empowers survivors by giving them
control~an essential component o f the healing process~by giving them an
opportunity for input into the negotiation of the framework agreement.191

In addition, one o f the MOU’s stated goals was “to assist the Survivors, in a tangible way,
with the healing process”192. This is consistent with the head o f the Victims’ Services office
o f the Department o f Justice being responsible for running the Program. As further evidence
o f recognition within the Program for the need for therapeutic healing, the government
provided interim counseling awards to enable claimants to obtain therapy before their claims
were assessed and the government provided a set counseling amount over and above the
amount o f the compensation award, depending upon the category o f the compensation193.
The Program itself, though, arose within the parameters o f the civil tort system.

190Although the initial intention as stated by this press release was to have a single
advocacy group, in actuality the negotiations were between the lawyers retained by
individual claimants, and government officials. Although the claimants’ lawyers may have
worked together, the claimants themselves did not form a single advocacy group.
m Supra note 28.
I92See the preamble section o f the MOU: supra note 30.
193Please see, schedule A o f the MOU for the counseling amounts that were provided
once the claims were assessed: supra note 30.
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After being in operation for six months, the Program was suspended by the Minister of
Justice on October 31, 1996194. When the Program resumed195 several changes had been
made unilaterally and announced by the government. O f particular interest the following
changes were outlined in the press release:

•

the internal investigation unit (UU) was to expand its investigation from discipline
o f current employees to investigation of compensation claims;

•

a statement protocol was to be developed between the RCMP, IIU and Facts Probe
Inc. (the independent investigation firm hired to obtain statements from victims for
the Stratton Report). All three organizations were to share information, and
investigations were to be coordinated, recognizing the independence o f police
investigations; and,

•

victims were now to be advised that all statements provided for the purpose of
compensation would be used for investigative purposes (whether criminal or
disciplinary) or the Child Abuse Registry.196

The Minister stated in his press release that “(w)e understand it has been difficult for people
to come forward, and their wish for confidentiality, but we have a moral and legal obligation

w Supra note 23.
195Supra note 31.
l96Supra note 31.
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to bring perpetrators o f abuse to justice . . .”197

After December 6, 1996 the primary goal was no longer therapeutic. It seems that justice
goals became paramount and the method for taking claimant statements changed to
accommodate the new goals. Also, the testimonial audience changed from being the Stratton
investigators to now being the RCMP and the Internal Investigation Unit officials. The
problem, o f course, is that the claimants themselves may not have foreseen the shift in
approaches at the time o f the initial negotiation. Earlier testimony was taken for therapeutic
purposes, and hence the interviewer may not have challenged or tested the testimony against
the accounts o f those who were alleged to have committed the abuse. They also may not
have taken the testimony in accordance with the methodology o f legal investigators. That
is, the original statement would not have been subject to the validation required for a
statement in a legal or quasi-Iegal process. The change in testimonial purpose would lead
the later testimonial audience to wonder whether their need to establish the reliability o f the
statements was addressed by the original statement-taker.

If there had been a bifurcation o f the therapeutic aspect o f the program from the other forms
o f redress, then the different levels o f validation required at each stage would have been
understood at the outset. If the survivors had known that their claims would be subjected to
higher scrutiny as they affected the interests o f others, then the parties would not have

191Ibid.
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confused the validation required at different stages in the process. Beyond that, if the
claimants’ had formed a group that could have asserted the importance of their interests with
a sufficient degree o f political power, the government may have been more able to assert its
own interests and limitations at the outset. The validation method for assessing testimony
could therefore have more accurately reflected the real interests o f the parties.198

As it is, there is still controversy over the design and implementation o f the Program, as
evidenced by the establishment of the Institutional Abuse Response Inquiry. Perhaps the
confusion around the validation method and the purposes o f testimony contributed to the
existing controversy and questions about the legitimacy o f the Program..

In the Grandview Agreement in Ontario, the survivors did form a group which attended the
negotiations.

The agreement to compensate was ratified by 80% o f the group’s

membership.199 A validation method that served the interests o f all parties was included in
the agreement. This agreement and the resulting program did not seem to create the same
degree of controversy with the parties or the public as the Compensation Program did in
Nova Scotia. Although there are probably many reasons for this, I would suggest that the

198In any process where the government is a party, it is important for the government
to clearly articulate the full extent of limitations upon its ability to negotiate. For example,
there is some argument to be made that any compensation program administered by a
government automatically falls within the parameters o f administrative law. Therefore the
government is not like a private party who is free to negotiate a legal contract; rather there
are public law considerations to be taken into account.
199Supra note 5 at 129-130.
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formation o f apolitical group that had significant input into the design o f the process played
a role in developing an enduring solution through a process that was clear and consistent for
all the parties involved.

I further suggest that if the claimants in Nova Scotia had formed a political group before the
negotiations and had been given a chance to develop political testimony, they may have been
able to establish their interests and negotiate the requisite level o f validation required to
assert these interests in the public, negotiation arena. For example, if they wanted to pursue
a purely therapeutic goal in the negotiation with the government, they could assert a
relatively low validation level commensurate with that goal. This level o f validation may
more easily be accepted by the other party as the subjective nature o f the claims affect them
less than legal claims. If they wanted to seek monetary compensation, then they may have
faced a validation level proposed by the other party that establishes a level o f truth
commensurate with their interests. If they wanted to develop a restorative process or
establish quasi-criminal guilt, then a higher level o f validation may result from the fact that
criminal sanctions are considered to seriously affect the interests o f alleged abusers. As the
goal affects the interests of others in more invasive ways, the level of validation increases.
In consistently promoting the formation o f a political group that could define its own
interests, it would be easier for any government to consolidate and represent its own interests
and limitations.

(c) Summary
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Public speech about one’s experiences is characterized by the intent or purpose of the speech,
the type o f process and the nature o f the listener. Testimony in the legal arena is for one
particular purpose, it is heard within the bound o f specific rules and is verified through
established procedures. Other forms o f testimony m ay be admitted, but only within the
bounds o f legal rules that ensure that the goal o f justice remain paramount. In a negotiation
environment, there is room for other forms of testimony depending upon the goals articulated
by the parties. However, if these goals are not clearly articulated, the parties will be
confused about the type o f testimony that is being provided. The speaker may intend for
testimony to be closer to therapeutic testimony. However, since the process still exists
within the legal discourse, the testimonial form within the process may become more legal.
Therefore, confusion about the goals of the process can have the negative effect of confusing
or invalidating the testimony provided by claimants once they are in the process.

In the legal arena, at least the parameters that limit testimony are clear from the outset. In a
non-judicial dispute resolution process designed by the parties, it is easier for survivor speech
to be shut down if the goals o f the process are not clear, and the limitations inherent in the
process are also not clear. Although it is not always possible to prevent a unilateral shift in
the goals o f a particular process200, the parties should at least ensure that their goals are
clearly defined before they design the process.

200Lawyers for the claimants did bring a mandamus application to compel the Nova
Scotia government to comply with the terms o f the original MOU. This application was
dropped before going to court. See: D.K.A. et al v. The M inister ofJustice fo r the Province
o f Nova Scotia (April, 1997), Halifax S.H. 137031(N.S.S.C.).
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In a case like the one in Nova Scotia, where there were many individual claimants, the
formation o f a group that can develop common interests before the negotiation may be the
only way to effectively assert survivor speech and validation methods against dominant
discourses. It is therefore important that the survivor speech be articulated in a public forum
where its subjective nature is legitimated by others who share the same purpose. This form
o f speech is political testimony.

F. Pre-negotiation testimony

Throughout my thesis, my concern is primarily with the events around an actual dispute
resolution process - both the preparation for the process and the conceptualization o f the
remedy. In the previous section of this chapter, I described some o f the ways in which the
Nova Scotia Program operated. I did so for the purpose o f illustrating the importance of
having clear goals for the process so that the testimony o f the claimants is not undermined.
For a previously disenfranchised group, testifying about traumatic experiences may result
in a window o f opportunity that allows for the exercise o f political power.

However this window is created among the long-standing and pre-existing knowledge o f the
dominant discourse. Society may only be willing to listen to parts o f the group’s experience;
only certain voices will be acceptable and only certain testimony will be understood. Within
this small window o f opportunity, a disenfranchised group is faced with the daunting task
o f exercising power in such a way that it is preserved. If the power o f the group is preserved,
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the interests o f the group can be asserted so that their collective experiences can enter the
knowledge base of society. Thus, the previously disenfranchised group can contribute a
popular form ofknowledge to the already accepted forms ofknowledge within the discursive
arena.

G. Political testimony

The problem o f asserting political testimony is described by Foucault’s description of
popular or disqualified, low-ranking knowledge which is incapable of unanimity and which
“owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding
it”201. He places the local knowledge o f psychiatric patients, delinquents and others in this
category o f disqualified knowledges. Foucault argues that in establishing an historical record
o f these subjugated knowledges he does the following:

entertain(s) the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified,
illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which
would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name o f some true knowledge
and some arbitrary idea o f what constitutes a science and its objects.202

Foucault is questioning the tendency o f non-scientific knowledge forms to absorb subjugated
knowledges and then characterize themselves as scientific or pseudo-scientific203 in order to

m Supra note 54 at 82.
202Supra note 54 at 83.
203In “Feminist Histories o f Psychiatry”, Nancy Tomes states the following: “to
justify this process o f expulsion (removal o f the disturbing presence of the mentally ill from
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appropriate some o f the power lent by appearances o f scientific objectivity.

The physical knowledge o f persons who have been abused in institutions is precisely a form
o f subjugated knowledge which potentially becomes suppressed by disciplinary discourses
that use scientific method to objectify and re-interpret the experiences o f abuse. In order for
abused persons to assert a new knowledge form based on theirphysical experiences o f abuse,
it is important that they do not become lost under the objectifying discourses o f experts.
That is, their knowledge o f what occurred should not be overridden by the theoretical
knowledge of experts who ignore those who have experienced abuse. Where the abuser once
took control o f the abused person and imposed meaning within a false private space, it is
within the capacity o f experts to use a dominating discourse to maintain the privacy o f the
abusive experience by not hearing the speech o f the abused person. Experts who do not
recognize the validity o f experience can perpetuate a form of subjugation upon abused
persons who are attempting to create new meaning for their experiences.

For example, recall the psychologist to whom M. first disclosed her incestuous relationship
with her father. His disciplinary training either prevented him from hearing the significance
o f her speech or from understanding the new meaning that she was trying to convey. If he

the community) psychiatry has obligingly provided a “medical model” o f insanity, which
gave its practitioners tremendous power and social rewards. But, in fact, as the labeling
theorists were determined to show, the psychiatric ‘science’ o f diagnosing and treating
mental illness was a thinly disguised form o f social control.”: see N. Tomes, supra note 154
at 354. This statement affirms Foucault’s view o f the dominating effect o f scientific
discourse.
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had been able to recognize, prima facie, that as someone who had experienced incest, she
was an expert with respect to the effects o f the abuse on her physical and emotional self, then
he might have been able to hear the import o f her speech. As it was, his lack o f attention to
the significance o f her speech served to acquiesce to her father’s re-imposition o f privacy
around the abusive relationship.

(a) Nova Scotia

In the Nova Scotia Program, the testimonials o f abuse provided to the Stratton Inquiry, along
with the criminal and civil cases that had already been concluded, opened up a brief window
or space in the web o f dominant knowledge about institutions in Nova Scotia. During the
period when testimonies were heard, the claimants negotiated with the government to
develop a compensation scheme. As noted earlier in this paper, the employees who were
affected by the allegations of abuse made claims in the media that the level o f validation was
not sufficient to protect their interests. At this point in time, there is great uncertainty about
both the legitimacy o f the testimonials and the legitimacy o f the employees’ protests of
innocence.

As seen in the Nova Scotia Program, new disruptive speech, coming from a disenfranchised
person who is speaking about the conditions o f disenfranchisement, is almost certainly going
to produce some form o f resistance from those who are entrenched in a social world steeped
in dominant discourse. The claimants’ stories seem to have been initially accepted as being
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true.

The existing fabric o f knowledge in the world was initially unsettled by new

knowledge with the latent political power that exists in proportion to the degree to which it
was repressed. When former employees asserted that there was no possibility that the abuse
was as widespread as alleged, public opinion seemed to shift toward believing the claims of
hard-working counselors and former counselors who had been care-givers for sometimes
difficult children. Both claims are as yet unsubstantiated or validated according to a
mutually accepted standard.

If the disruptive claims o f abuse survivors are asserted through a political group, then there
is at least some political power to provide the space for the assertion o f the new speech.
However, even with the protection o f a group, there is still the risk that the group itself will
be challenged as to its validity. That is, in its attempt to achieve social empowerment by re
configuring the relationship o f the group to other groups in society, a political group will face
pressure to conform to the pre-existing situation o f powerlessness. How can a political group
deal with pressure from status quo actors who carry pre-existing legitimacy?

H. Validate political testimony

The difficulty in asserting a popular political form o f testimony against the status quo may
be explored through the controversy surrounding Rigoberta Menchu’s testimonial account
o f her political struggles and the efforts to invalidate her testimony by social anthropologist,
David Stoll.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
Menchu won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for raising awareness o f human rights abuses
in Guatamala. In 1983, when Menchu was 23 years old, she dictated her experiences to a
writer who transcribed the tapes into the book, IRigoberta Menchu204. The book chronicled
her life from a very young age and described a series o f tragic events in her life such as the
murder o f her brother, father and mother. The testimonial nature of the account in her book
contributed to her political cause and also gave her a political profile that enabled her to
become a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1999 an American anthropologist by the
name of David Stoll published a book outlining the results o f his investigation into the
veracity o f the testimony in I, Rigoberta Menchu. Stoll claims that although the extent of
abuse by the Guatamalan regime is very real, some crucial personal accounts provided by
Menchu are not. Stoll believes that Menchu’s book carries more authority than is warranted
on the issues of why the killings began and the nature of the popular struggle in Guatamala.
As he states:

(I)n 1982 she presented herself as an eyewitness to the mobilization o f her
people. There is not a stronger claim to authority. . . . Rigoberta told her
story well enough that it became invested with all the authority that a story
o f terrible suffering can assume. From the unquestionable atrocities of the
Guatamalan army, her credibility stretched farther than it should have, into
the murkier background question o f why the violence occurred. The result
was to mystify the conditions facing peasants, what they thought their
problems were, how the killing started, and how they reacted to it.
(The problem )... .also extends into the international apparatus for reporting
human rights violations, reacting to them, and interpreting their implications
for the future...(H)ow do the gatekeepers o f communication deal with the
204R. Menchu, E.Burgos-Debray, I Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in
Guatamala, trans. Ann Wright (London: Verso, 1984).
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mixture o f truth and falsehood in any movement’s portrayal o f itself,
including those we feel morally obliged to support?205

Stoll cannot easily be dismissed as a reactionary with a racist agenda. He is a serious scholar
who is grappling with his role as a social scientist in the face o f post-modern skepticism
about the possibility of objective knowledge206. He understands the effect o f colonialist
thought upon peoples who are studied by anthropologists and sees the reasoning behind
deferring to the perspective of those same peoples. What Stoll is trying to wrestle with is
how to defer to the perspective o f subordinate peoples without mythologizing particular
voices at the expense of others. He questions the role of academics who choose to privilege
voices that are more compelling and attractive than the voices of others which, although
genuine, lose the battle for the academic or popular stage.

He relies on the empirical and scientific method located within his social-scientific discourse
to bolster his version of the truth. He plays the role o f the legitimating expert who objectifies
the experience o f survivors o f trauma. He has the authority o f credentials that are rooted in
a dominant discourse to back his claims. But Stoll’s critique is based on the assumption that
Menchu is attempting to represent the truth through an objective discourse when she is in
fact representing her subjective experiences as a member o f a group.207 The key supporting

205D. Stoll, Rigoberta Menchu and the story o f all poor Guatamalans (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1999) at x.
206Ibid. at 12.
207This is not to say that her subjective account is not truthful; only that she is
claiming validity based on her actual experiences and the experiences o f her people as
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statement whereby she provides the intention o f her speech is as follows:

This is my testimony. I didn’t learn it from a book and I didn’t leam it alone.
I’d like to stress that it’s not only my life, it’s also the testimony o f my
people. It’s hard for me to remember everything that’s happened to me in my
life since there have been many very bad times but yes, moments o f joy as
well. The important thing is that what has happened to me has happened to
many other people too: My story is the story of all poor Guatamalans. My
personal experience is the reality o f a whole people.208

Her method o f speech brings more focus upon the intent o f the speaker as opposed to the
intent o f the listener. Menchu establishes in this statement that through her speech, she is
representing the experiences o f many other people in her group.

Not only does he claim that Menchu’s version o f events is untrue. He also claims that she
misrepresented the political concerns o f her people. According to Stoll, peasants saw
guerillas and soldiers as enemies whereas Menchu characterizes guerillas as freedom fighters
who had the support o f peasants. He asserts that the prewar conditions described by Menchu
were not the same as the conditions described by the peasants. According to Stoll, leftist
guerillas were responsible for igniting violence against the peasants209. In other words, he
claims that Menchu distorted her testimony in order to gain the political stage.

opposed to relying upon the external validation provided by external corroboration.
208Supra note 204 at 1.
209Supra note 205 at 9.
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Stoll does not recognize the inherently political nature o f the testimonies that he collects to
challenge Menchu’s story. Menchu and her group were asserting their subjective account
o f what occurred in Guatamala against the existing knowledge, or lack of knowledge, o f the
impact o f the government’s action upon her people. Their knowledge, based upon physical
experiences o f oppression, cannot automatically be negated by another group whose truthclaims have no higher source than physical experience.

But Stoll does interview other Guatamalans who claim that Menchu’s account o f her
physical experiences were not accurate. It is not clear, however, why he assumes that the
“peasants” that he interviews have no political affiliation and do not benefit from
propogating a particular version o f events. Stoll sought out testimonies of people who, even
if they had no political agenda, had only one perspective within the group. Why does he
believe that their political perspective on the cause o f violence and the nature o f the enemy
has more credence than Menchu? Stoll’s position as a social scientist illustrates my earlier
point about non-scientific disciplines that adopt the trappings of scientific discourse to
validate their truth-claims. I would argue that Stoll’s claim to political neutrality is false as
his action have the political impact o f validating status quo understandings o f the limited
legitimacy o f popular political groups.

Stoll is attempting to undermine Menchu’s political legitimacy from outside the political
group. His words have the effect o f exerting pressure from the arena of dominant discourse
upon the political group that supports Menchu. I would argue that Stoll is a member o f a
dominant group, not only by virtue o f the fact that he is a North American and thereby
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economically and politically privileged, but also by virtue o f his academic credentials and
position. His academic peer group and his collective group have helped to establish his
legitimacy as a scholar. Perhaps he would not easily accept attacks on his expertise easily
from people outside o f his peer group or his cultural milieu.

If Menchu truly does not reflect the experiences or the identity o f the group, then it is up to
the group to invalidate her speech. Claims that Menchu’s testimony does not reflect the
genuine experience o f the people she says she represents can only really be made by the
people themselves. They are the only ones who truly know the significance and meaning o f
their own experience and whether it is reflected by the individual speaker. I argue that it is
up to the group to decide whether Menchu accurately portrayed the collective experience o f
the group with her political testimony. It is not up to some from an external group, who may
have dominant status, to decide whether or not her testimony is legitimate.

Popular

knowledge should not be subject to external validation when academic disciplines such as
anthropology do not require external legitimation. The knowledge derived from the physical
experience of having lived through oppression in Guatamala should be recognized as a form
o f expertise for the purpose o f validating the testimony of a member or leader of the group.
I would suggest that it is more daunting to make false claims o f oppression where one must
receive validation from people who have experienced abuse o f power than it is to make false
claims to someone who has not.

Menchu and the Auschwitz survivor were recounting subjective accounts o f significant
events; these acts o f oppression happened. For the Auschwitz survivor, the meaning o f the

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121
experience was very personal; the act o f giving therapeutic testimony was important in itself
for the purpose of survival210 and did not require verification. For Menchu, speaking o f her
experiences o f abuse by the Guatamalan regime brought significant personal events into the
collective psyche for the survival o f the political group. Her political testimony requires
verification, but only within the group that she represents.

Speaking o f her personal

experiences o f trauma brings them into the collective psyche and demands recognition within
the dominant discourse. Within the political arena, an intentional liar will only discredit the
legitimacy o f the political group insofar as it is unrepresentative o f the experiences o f the
collective.211 Presumably if the group does not have members who derive meaning from a
common experience, then the group will have no cohesion.

I. Conclusions

2l0Supra note 176 at 78.
21‘The problem inherent in validating political speech is the fact that internal political
struggles will influence which speakers will be privileged with the right to represent the
group. I would suggest that if the speaker who represents the group does not adequately
represent the political interests o f the individual, then that individual will have to assess
whether it is worth trying to form another group that more closely reflects the meaning of her
experiences. The downside o f course is the weakening o f political power through
fragmentation of the group. Stoll seems to be doubting the extent o f Menchu’s support
within her group. I would still assert, however, that it is up to the group members to extract
themselves from the political group rather than having an outsider correct the power base and
membership. In the Scotia situation, the group o f claimants was not homogeneous. Both
males and females claimed abuse, claimants came from various geographic communities as
well as racial groups, there were claimants with disabilities, and claimants who had resided
in different institutions. Although they may have had different experiences, various
claimants could still have formed groups to assert their respective interests. See J. Packer,
“On the Content of Minority Rights” in J. Raikka, ed., Do We Need Minority Rights?
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996).
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Once an abused person decides to bring her experiences into the public realm, she will lose
some control over the fate o f her testimony. Her speech will fall within a particular
disciplinary realm where the rules and methods of the listener will attribute meaning to her
speech. The meaning that the speaker intends, will be mediated by the listener’s disciplinary
filter. For example, in the legal arena, testimony has meaning only insofar as it furthers the
purposes o f the justice system. Although courts may be willing to accommodate the needs
o f the witness, as legitimated through another disciplinary discourse, the goals and principles
o f justice remain paramount and testimony must exist within those parameters. In a non
judicial dispute resolution process, there may be a multiplicity o f goals that are related to
different disciplines.

One problem with having various goals within one process is that there is a risk that the
nature o f the testimony and the required level of validation will not be clear. To illustrate
this assertion, I examined the shift in statement-taking protocols and purposes in the Nova
Scotia Compensation Program as described by the government in its press releases. I suggest
that lack of clarity in the program design jeopardized its legitimacy. The lack o f legitimacy
o f the process also leads to loss o f legitimacy of the testimony in the process. So conflicting
purposes in a process can lead to challenges to the testimony o f claimants.

In order to protect survivor speech, there needs to be a new form o f validating discourse that
can retain the subjective nature o f speech. The best way for this to be done is through a
group o f survivors where the members validate the testimony through their own “expertise”.
Once in the more public space o f the dispute resolution process, different validation levels
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will reflect the relative importance o f the interests forwarded by the parties. The ability o f
the parties to assert the importance o f their interests will influence the degree to which they
can assert a validation method for their testimony. A group o f survivors that can create space
for individual testimony and that can use the power o f the group to assert the importance of
testimony will be better able to contribute to the determination o f validation methods in the
negotiation arena.

However, even when a group forms and asserts its voice, its popular political nature will be
challenged by disciplines which are more highly situated in the hierarchy of knowledge than
the subjugated group within the dominant discourse. To illustrate this point, I examined the
controversy surrounding the legitimacy o f Rigoberta Menchu’s testimonial account o f
oppression in Guatamala. Stoll, an anthropologist, situated in a discourse with its own
methodology and validation techniques, questions the legitimacy o f Menchu’s account o f her
experiences. He also doubts her political legitimacy within her group. I argue that Menchu’s
legitimacy as a political speaker should not be determined by experts from a discourse
external to her own. In the same way that Stoll gained legitimacy as an anthropologist from
others within his discipline, so too should Menchu be able to gain legitimacy from within her
own group of “experts”. Only in this way will the group retain legitimacy and integrity with
its membership. In maintaining connection to the subjective experiences o f the individuals
in the group, the group itself will be able to protect survivor speech while resisting pressure
from dominating discourses.

J. Recommendations
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1) When the person has been able to reach beyond the imposed privacy o f the abusive
relationship and is speaking to a loving or sympathetic listener about the experience o f abuse,
the role o f the listener is to listen and not to judge.

•

The best way to ensure that the abused person’s account o f his experience is provided
with non-dominant meaning is for the listener to have survived abuse herself. This
way, there will be greater likelihood of the abused person being able to establish a
non-dominant and disruptive meaning that closely corresponds to his experience.

•

After an abused person has entered into the public arena for the purpose o f seeking
a remedy for abuse, her testimony should be heard within a group o f fellow survivors
who share the common purpose o f seeking a remedy. At the point before there is
engagement with the other party in the dispute resolution arena, her testimony should
be validated by her peers within the group to see if she has had similar experiences
and has derived similar meaning from them. If there is groups cohesion based on
common experience and meaning, then the members o f the group can together
develop the interests that they will pursue in the dispute resolution arena. These
interests will be derived from the needs arising from the individual experiences o f
abuse within the group.

•

In the dispute resolution arena, the parties should assert the importance of their
testimony and negotiate a validation method that reflect that importance. Although
a survivor group m ay have to recognize the interests o f other parties and have
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testimony subjected to a higher level o f validation, at least they will have articulated
the significance o f their experiences in the negotiation arena. Where the other party
is powerful, it is in that party’s political interests to face an empowered opponent.
In facing a party who has enough power to assert their interests effectively, a
government benefits from greater political approval and legitimacy when it asserts
its interests in the negotiation.

In other words, a government will not look like a

bully when it puts forward its legitimate interests and expectations against the
interests o f a powerful group.
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CHAPTER 4 - MONETARY COMPENSATION

. . . is power always in a subordinate position relative to the economy? Is
it always in the service of, and ultimately answerable to, the economy? Is its
essential end and purpose to serve the economy? Is it destined to realise,
consolidate, maintain and reproduce the relations appropriate to the economy
and essential to its functioning? . . .
is power modelled upon the
economy?212

A. Introduction

Institutional abuse cases involve significant personal injuries both at the psychological level
and at the physical level. These cases are difficult to address through a judicial process or
a negotiated process because any remedy must try to respond to injuries that are highly
personal and not easily commodifiable for the purposes of awarding monetary damages213.
As I have argued in the previous chapters, the preparation before a process plays a vital role
in empowering a survivors o f abuse so that they can assert their identity in the negotiation
process. In developing a sense o f who they are, and what is significant to them, survivors
can enter a dispute resolution process knowing what they want to achieve. In many cases,
monetary compensation is a significant remedy for the survivors o f abuse. In this chapter
I will assert that the actual significance o f monetary remedies must be articulated by the
survivors of abuse. In the absence o f such articulation, the existing conception of monetary

2i2Supra note 54 at 89.
213They are also difficult cases because there are usually a large number of injured
persons as well as a significant period o f time between the act or acts that caused the injury
and the claim for damages.
126
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compensation is heavily influenced by an economic paradigm in both judicial decisions and
negotiated compensation programs.

A conception o f compensation that relies upon

commodification o f all aspects o f human personality threatens to become the only way we
understand compensation, especially where no alternative conception is provided. Further,
a conception o f compensation that relies upon commodification runs the risk o f fragmenting
the identity o f abuse victims. This can be especially problematic for institutional abuse cases
where the fragmentation o f identity is one result of the injuries suffered by the survivor of
abuse. Dispute resolution o f deep personal injuries requires congruence in the process as
well as the outcome o f the process.

Where the process is designed to remedy the

fragmentation and injury suffered by survivors of abuse, the compensation awarded should
also be conceived such that fragmentation o f personal identity is not perpetrated upon the
survivors.

In this chapter I intend to explore some o f difficulties that arise when an overarching and
highly commodified view o f compensation is used to address the injuries of persons who
have suffered from institutional abuse. In exploring compensation for abuse, I will highlight
a fundamental inconsistency that exists within a conception o f personhood that is overly
objectifying. Briefly, this inconsistency lies in the fact that radical commodification results
in every aspect o f personhood being alienated and defined by monetary values. This narrows
the scope of self-definition to the limited meanings attached to money. So instead of creating
freedom for self-actualization, commodification results in a narrowing of the meanings that
can possibly be attributed to the self.
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First I will provide a brief summary o f the points from previous chapters that will be relevant
to this analysis. I will describe the difficulty in awarding monetary compensation for
subjective personal harms such as the psychological injury that results from institutional
abuse. I will then describe how institutional abuse has been remedied by the courts by
examining Muir. v. Alberta2' 4, a case involving a woman who had been sterilized by the
Alberta Eugenics Board. I will also examine how the Nova Scotia Compensation Program
distributed its monetary awards through a grid or scalar system. After evaluating how the
two systems deal with monetary damages, I will make some recommendations for
overcoming the hegemonic effect o f commodification when monetary awards are used to
address damages arising from institutional abuse.

B. Summary - identity and empowerment

In the second chapter, I established that one o f the key harms inflicted upon a person when
he is physically or sexually abused, is a fragmented sense o f identity and loss o f control over
identity formation. That is, the abuser imposes his own physical needs upon the person; this
imposition subdues the abused person’s sense o f having control over his body. The abuser
also affects the meaning o f the experiences. The abused person may believe that the abuse
is an expression o f love, or he may not be able to attribute any meaning to random acts of
violence or sexual predation. Thus, his sense o f identity is controlled by the abuser. Abuse
fragments a person’s will or agency from his body. Things are being done to him that he

2l4(1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 695 [hereinafter “Muir"].
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cannot control. Survival o f his psyche may rely upon his ability to separate himself from his
body. In the chapter on identity I argued that a dispute resolution process must provide space
for identity formation to be initiated by the abused person. Only when a person can connect
with others who can provide him with a loving relationship m atrix can he begin to assert an
integrated sense o f self that is not defined by the abuser.

In the chapter on empowerment, I asserted that this new identity and sense o f the signi ficance
o f the abuse must be protected against the resistant force and dominating tendencies of
dominant discourses. Otherwise the new speech will be subjugated by existing knowledge.
I argued that the way to do this is to promote the development o f a political group of
survivors who will internally legitimate the experiences o f its members. In doing this, the
survivor speech can be validated without having to lose the subjective nature of the
testimony and without having to resort to external legitimation from dominant discourses.
The group also acts as a vehicle for the assertion o f interests in the negotiation environment.

Throughout the previous chapters o f this thesis, the focus has been on asserting a survivorfocused subjective identity through an empowering dispute resolution process. Presuming
that the interests o f the abused person are articulated in the dispute resolution process, and
that the process results in a remedy, how is that remedy to be conceptualized? In a judicial
setting, civil institutional abuse cases result in a monetary award. Apology, access to
specialized counseling, creation of an historic record and other forms o f remedy that are not
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in monetary form215 are not available to the court. A non-judicial dispute resolution process
may provide for these types o f remedies should the parties so choose.

Monetary

compensation, however, often is still the core remedy for survivors o f abuse in a non-judicial
process. In this chapter, I would like to examine some o f the problems with existing
conceptualizations o f monetary awards. If an award objectifies the injury and does not
recognize the subjective nature o f the harm, does it perpetuate a sense o f fragmentation o f
identity? After establishing and preserving a non-dominant sense o f identity throughout the
process, it would defeat the purpose of the process if the remedy re-objectified the
experiences of the abused person.

C. The difficulty with monetary compensation

With the advent of a large number o f institutional abuse cases, governments have been and
continue to be faced with a prime opportunity to develop non-court based processes that can
meet the interests of the parties in an efficient manner. Although these cases are an
opportunity for process reform, they also present a significant challenge at the substantive
level. Both the decision-maker in a judicial process and the parties in a non-judicial conflict
resolution processes have to determine how to compensate persons whose injuries affect the
core o f their being and identity in a very personal, and sometimes collective way.

2i5A court can award a monetary amount for counseling but cannot provide a
counselor for the abuse survivor. In A. (C.) v. C. (J.W.) (1997), 35 B.C.L.R. (3d) 234 at 300
the court awarded survivors of institutional abuse amounts for future counseling. For further
details on the extent o f remedies available to civil litigants, please see: J. Berryman et al,
Remedies: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed., (Toronto:Emond Montgomery, 1992).
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A process that does not explicitly use conceptual language that creates space for the
subjective self may end up inappropriately objectifying facets o f the victims’ identity. In the
absence o f any alternative definition, compensation itself will tend to be conceptualized in
terms o f some form o f economic analysis. This will happen for two reasons. First, the main
tool for awarding compensation is money. Money is also the prime tool used to exchange
goods on the marketplace and signifies that goods are fungible and that their value is
transferable.

Prima facie, money indicates the existence o f a marketplace and

commodification o f objects. Where money is used to compensate, it is easy to conceptualize
damages as things which are exchanged for money. The second reason is the fact that
resolution in both the civil litigation system and a non-judicial compensation program can
be reached by way o f a negotiated agreement. Negotiations and other private mechanisms
o f dispute resolution rely on the parties to raise and recognize non-commodifiable values in
the negotiation process. However, it can be difficult for the parties to recognize subjective
harm in the first place, let alone find a way to acknowledge it in a negotiation where money
is often the prime universalizing negotiating tool.

Where the negotiation involves

reparations or compensation for serious wrongs such as physical and sexual abuse it is easy
to lose sight o f the subjective quality of the harm in the attempt to achieve agreement with
the other side.216 In attempting to reach a workable agreement for both sides, the subtleties

2l6For an insightful discussion on the public nature o f serious wrongs, see supra note
34 .For a discussion on the incompatibility between the ideology o f mediation, which is a
variation on negotiation, and the culture o f battering in domestic violence cases, see supra
note 116. In this article, Fischer, Vidmar and Ellis explore the difficulty o f using a process
that is geared towards achieving agreement and maintaining relationships when agreement
and continuing relations may be antithetical, and even extremely dangerous, for the victim
o f battering.
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o f how compensation for abuse should be conceptualized can be lost among the more
prominent targets o f achieving a monetary solution. And so, even with these tailored and
negotiated processes, parties and the public are in danger o f falling into the same type of
objectifying discourse that the alternative processes are supposedly designed to avoid. In
fact, without the explicit recognition o f subjective needs that is sometimes contained in
judicial decisions, survivors o f abuse can feel that they have simply been paid off and that
somehow yet again, the other party and society have missed the point o f their loss.217

D. An alternative conception of monetary compensation

Margaret Radin in her analysis o f the hegemonic properties of market-based economic
discourse, asserts that a rhetoric that commodifies personal attributes has a culture-shaping
function. Radin argues that law is a powerful rhetorical and discursive force which has the
ability to shape culture and our understanding o f the world. As she states:

when we live in a world in which many or most things people need and want
are routinely traded as commodities, and when we see dollars systematically
being paid to people after they are injured, and in some way “for” or “on
account o f’ the injury, we are likely to come to conceive o f freedom from
injury as another commodity bearing exchange value, even if we do not now
conceive of it that way.218

217R. Abel asserts that compensation has the effect of commodifying love. Also,
instead o f evoking compassion for victims, it has the result of evoking envy: see R. Abel,
“Torts” in D. Kairys, ed. The Politics o f Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Basic
Books Inc. 1998) at 456.
218M. Radin, Contested Commodities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)
at 203.
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To illustrate, Radin considers a topic frequently debated among law and economic theorists:
does simply speaking o f babies in terms o f market rhetoric have a real effect on culture
despite the fact that baby-selling is not a widely sanctioned practice in our culture? She
argues that a widespread conceptual scheme that has effectively infiltrated our discourse will
in fact shape the nature o f our relationships with our children. So, although we may feel that
children have an intrinsic value that is incommensurable with dollars, a hegemonic marketbased conceptual scheme that hypothetically allows for trade o f children for dollars will
infiltrate our understanding such that it is possible to conceive o f children as commodities
for various purposes. If we apply Radin’s theory of the culture-shaping function of legal
rhetoric to the situation of compensation for institutional abuse cases, we can perhaps
understand why abuse claimants may have felt that the money they received was “blood
money

Radin’s analysis focuses on the limitations o f a Posnerian economic analysis that uses dollar
value as its base and that reduces all human choices to market choices between
commodities.220 The traditional law and economics approach to compensation does not
easily lend itself to a compassionate view o f the law that recognizes the subjective and
personal nature of harm.221 Economics, as we have come to understand it, is associated with

219Supra note 2 at 19.
220Supra note 218 at 2-4.
21x[bid. at 184.
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classical liberal theory, extreme individualism, and wealth maximization. This particular
understanding o f economics requires a high degree of objectification so that wealth
maximizing choices can be made between comparable, or commensurable objects.222
Without de-subjectifying goods, it is impossible to alienate them to the extent required by
the market-place. In seeing the law through this particular economic lens, one is tempted as
Judge Posner has been, to discuss all characteristics of humanness as if they are
commensurable and fungible.223

E. Dilemma of liberal economic theory

Ironically, though the liberal conception o f the person envisages the attainment of maximum
autonomy and expression o f self, in the economic arena the opposite can occur. The self is
expressed through the physical being and the physical world. If the physical being and the
physical world is completely alienable, and if all alienable things are defined in monetary
terms, then self-expression becomes limited to monetary terms. Thus, radical alienation has
a limiting effect on self-expression.

Without specific clarification of the meaning o f compensation for abuse survivors, a process
that uses the tools o f the market and a structure that indicates commodification of personal
injury will absorb the hegemonic analysis o f a reductionist classical economic theory. The

n2Ibid. at 8.
122Ibid. at 2-15.
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discourse o f classical economic theory requires a radical degree of objectification. When this
objectification is applied to the realm o f our identity, then the resulting alienation creates a
dilemma for liberal theorists. Although the conception o f personhood in liberal theory
envisions a high degree o f autonomy and personal power, in objectifying all aspects of
human personality, liberal economic theory in fact destroys the physical integrity o f identity
that is required for the manifestation o f empowerment.

This analysis o f the liberal dilemma presupposes a conception of personhood where identity
is fundamental to well-being and alienation o f fundamental aspects of identity through
commodification is inimical to well-being. For instance, in this view, placing a woman’s
reproductive capacity in the marketplace strips her o f an important aspect o f her identity as
a woman; it does not represent her ultimate expression o f will.

(a) Avoiding the dilemma

But perhaps it is not necessary to entirely reject economic analysis if it proves flexible
enough to embrace a more holistic, subject-oriented focus. Economics is not necessarily
only about wealth maximization. It can be more generally about well-being, sustainability
and needs fulfillment224. If an economic model is expanded so that it recognizes these values
that relate directly to human personality as opposed to the indirect and abstract value of

224M. Morris, Measuring the Condition o f the World's Poor: The Physical Quality
o f Life Index (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) at 94. In this book the author explores the
possibility o f moving away from measuring growth and production and moving toward
measuring social welfare and needs-fulfillment in macro-economic analysis.
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wealth-maximization, then the nature o f the economic inquiry changes fundamentally. It
becomes more focused on the subjective experiences o f economic agents and less upon the
choices that they should, theoretically be able to make. It re-orients the focus o f economic
activity such that the subject’s role is not only to decide between an artificial array of
economic choices; the economic actor also has a contextual content that is affected by and
affects economic decision-making. The liberal model, on the other hand, depends heavily on
an abstract and highly stylized concept o f human personhood.

An economic focus on needs and well-being provides the opportunity to incorporate the
realities o f persons instead o f relying upon theoretical abstractions. An economic model that
relies upon well-being and well-fare o f groups and individuals can more easily recognize
values that are denied by Posnerians and raised as problematic by Radin. Amartya Sen
succinctly points out the limits o f a narrow economic theory in the following way:

It is not my purpose to argue that simplification can never be justified.
Economics - indeed any empirical discipline - would be impossible if
simplifications were to be ruled out. The point concerns the need to
recognize distinctions which are important for the purpose of the study at
hand. What is objectionable in the economic theorizing that identifies widely
different concepts o f self-interest, motivations, etc., is not the fact o f
simplification itself, but the particular simplification chosen, which has the
effect o f taking a very narrow view o f human beings (and their feelings, ideas
and actions), thereby significantly impoverishing the scope and reach of
economic theory.225
And so, it is not necessarily that an economic analysis of the law o f compensation is

225A.Sen, Commodities and Capabilities - Lectures in Economics: Theory,
Institutions, Policy (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.: Amsterdam, 1985) at 4.
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inadequate but rather that an economic analysis based solely on market maximization and
capital growth will lead to a conceptualization o f human personality and choice which is
overly narrow. Instead, economic analysis can perhaps recognize incommensurable values
as having value, although not capable o f being traded on the market.

F. Compensation in the Courts

Institutional abuse involves the objectification o f the person through the initial abusive acts.
This proposition can be illustrated through a specific case involving the decision of the
Eugenics Board in Alberta to sterilize a woman who was resident in a provincial institution.
The practices and policies o f the Alberta Eugenics Board and the effect that it had on certain
groups of people provides a particularly poignant and sad example of the relevance of
identity. In Muir v. Alberta, the plaintiff became a resident o f the Provincial Training School
for Mental Defectives. Ms Muir was placed in the institution, notwithstanding evidence that
she had behavioural problems and was not “defective” as her mother had the institutional
authorities believe.226 Despite the fact that some officials doubted whether or not Muir had
a mental deficiency, she was labeled as a mental defective and a moron. She became

226Supra note 214 at 705. Shortly after being admitted a psychiatrist examined Muir
and found that she had behavioural problems and there was doubt about whether or not she
had a primal mental deficiency. Muir had a very difficult relationship with her mother who
showed little interest in taking care o f her child. There is evidence to the effect that Muir’s
mother appears to have told the authorities that Muir was older than she really was. Thus her
psychometric tests would indicate that she was mentally deficient and she would be admitted
to the school. There is also evidence that Muir had been neglected at home. At one point,
Muir was considered abandoned by her family as they moved out of province without
notifying her.
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identified as a moron and as recognized by the trial judge in her lawsuit against the Province
o f Alberta, this had a severe lifelong impact on her sense o f self and her abilities. Muir
herself believed that she was deficient and suffered psychological damage because o f this
particular form of objectification. In fact, Ms Muir is exemplar o f how we all incorporate
external and socially constructed concepts o f identity into our ideas o f selfhood. If Muir had
been in an environment where her mental abilities or lack thereof were not the prime focus
o f her social identity, then perhaps she would have had a broader, more forgiving and
positive vision of herself. However, not only did labeling have a severe impact on her selfimage but the Eugenics Board focused and relied on this particular, imposed identifying
characteristic of Ms Muir, and sexually sterilized her against her knowledge and without her
consent227. Her identity as a moron not only objectified her as being primarily defined by her
mental acuity, but it also identified her to those in authority as a less worthy person who
must be stopped from procreating.

Identity is relevant in a second very important way in Muir. There is some evidence to
support the fact that the eugenics movement was also influenced by the desire o f certain
policy makers to maintain the purity o f the dominant racial group in Alberta and in British
Columbia. So not only was Muir’s personal subjective identity affected by the objectifying
labeling o f the Eugenics Board, so too was the identity of the group to which she belonged.
An expert witness in the case, Professor Robertson, testified that eugenics practices in the

227Under the Sexual Sterilization Act S. A. 1928, c. 37 as am. by S. A. 1937, c. 47 no
consent was required for the sterilization o f mental defectives: see T. Caulfield and G.
Robertson, “Eugenics Policies in Alberta: from the Systematic to the Systemic?” (1996) 35
Alta. L. Rev. 59.
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early 20th century were geared toward establishing racial purity and breeding out mental
defectives. The prevalent beliefs among the middle class contributed to the popularity of
eugenics. There was a belief that feeblemindedness is a menace to society and contributes
to crime, prostitution, drunkenness and other social problems228. At the same time, racist
beliefs were rampant and there was a high degree o f suspicion o f immigrants from Southern
Europe, Eastern Europe and the Orient.229 Claims were made that foreigners were
responsible for the (perceived) high degree o f crime. Fear of non-British, non-White, and
non-Protestant immigration led such stellar political characters as Emily Murphy, Nellie
McClung and J.S. Woodsworth (who later recanted these beliefs) to advocate eugenics
practices.230 In addition to the popular social climate in the early part o f the century,
scientists were disseminating theories linking feeblemindness to crime.231 B elief in scientific
method and the advent o f modernity bolstered questionable theorems about large groups of
people. Articles were written by doctors such as Dr. Morris Siegel in 1934 who claimed that
“the female morons grow up to be irresponsible women, falling deeply into the abyss of
prostitution, alcoholism and addiction to narcotic drugs”232.

The authority of these

statements from prominent medical practitioners and scientists fueled middle-class fears and
justified the objectification o f certain classes of people as less than worthy o f the same

228T. Caulfield, ibid. at at 69.
229Ibid. at 69.
220Ibid. at 61.
231Ibid. at 67-68.
232Ibid. at 67
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privileges as the dominant classes.

At the height o f the eugenics movement in Alberta society, the Sexual Sterilization Act was
passed.

The Act established a board which was empowered to authorize the sexual

sterilization o f individuals about to be discharged from a mental hospital to prevent the
procreation o f people with disabilities. After amendments in 1937, the powers of the board
were expanded to allow the sterilization o f people with neurosyphilis, epilepsy with
psychosis or mental deterioration, and Huntington’s Chorea. Consent was only required for
psychotic persons and was not required for the sterilization o f so-called mental defectives.
During the forty-four years of its operation, the Eugenics Board sterilized 2,822 people.233
Studies show that the Act was administered in such a way that it had disproportionate impact
on females, the unemployed, people o f minority ethnic backgrounds and the poor.234

The dominant group in society, British immigrants, sought to maintain control o f their vision
of the ideal citizen by limiting the population and power o f those who did not reflect their
cultural image. The eugenics belief that criminality was caused by an inherited feeble
mindedness that could be remedied through sterilization allowed the powerful middle-class
to ignore possible structural economic causes o f social ills.235 The explicit purpose o f the

233Supra note 214 at 745.
234Supra note 227 at 61.
235A. McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945 (Toronto:
McLelland and Stewart, 1990) at 37.
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Sexual Sterilization Act236 was to limit the reproductive capacity and sexuality - both being
fundamental, defining characteristics o f humans - o f particular groups o f people. It allowed
for social engineering that could change the face o f Alberta society so that it reflected the socalled desirable visage projected by dominant members of society. Thus the dominant,
objectifying group benefitted from the chauvinistic isolation that it imposed. Members o f
the dominant class held the reigns of control and maintained a distinct group identity237 that
had exclusive access to social privileges simply because o f membership in the group. This
articulation of desirability is one of the most arrogant and blatant238 examples o f a dominant
class wielding power to maintain the subjugation of groups that are excluded from setting
the terms of the dominant discourse.

2ze>Sexual Sterilization Act, supra note 227.
237The social construction of racial identity has reinforced the disenfranchisement o f
various oppressed groups. People have been categorized as Black, Jewish-Semitic, etc for
the purpose of imposing different levels o f privilege for those who are in the categories and
those who are in the dominant categories. For an in-depth examination o f the social
construction o f racial identity, with specific reference to Jewish people, please see: L.
Nochlin & Tamar Garb eds., The Jew in the Text: Modernity and the Construction o f Identity
(London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1995).
238In its imposition on the physical well-being of particular group, the eugenics
movement is an obvious and easily recognizable oppressive force. What are more insidious,
however, are the more subtle mechanisms for social control that today re-inforce the same
exclusivity underlying the eugenics movement o f the early 20th century. As an example,
please note the widespread use of Ritalin for controlling the behaviour o f children: see A.
Brown, “Mind-Control Drug Threat for Children” The Guardian Unlimited (27
February2000)
online:<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Distribution/Redirect_Artifact/0,4678,0-141145,00.ht
ml> (date accessed: 20 March 2001); and,
“Drug to control children’s behaviour ‘overused’” BBC Online Network (23 February 1999)
online:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/health/newsid_284000/284466.stm> (date accessed:
20 March 2001).
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A third way that the Eugenics Board affected Ms M uir’s sense of self was the impact that its
decisions had upon her physical integrity. This caused specific effects on her psyche and
identity as a woman. The attack on her physical se lf is not the same as the socially and
institutionally constructed labeling mentioned above.

The act o f sterilization was an

insidious form o f assault that undermined her sense o f physical being. This fundamental
type o f interference with personhood is qualitatively different from the psychological damage
inflicted upon her through labeling. This is not to say that there is a hierarchy of damage;
however, her body, as a foundational source o f her being, was invaded and altered. One
could say that her body was the last frontier that fell under the onslaught o f the Eugenics
Board and by extension, the dominant society in Alberta.

Although we know that there are varying degrees o f control that we have over our social
identity and labels that are attached to us throughout life, we at least think that we have
control over the imposition o f acts against our bodies. Our laws give us protection against
non-consensual touching and medical procedures precisely because as a society, we consider
physical integrity to be o f prime importance. And yet, the Sexual Sterilization Act allowed
for a breach o f physical integrity that goes to a core aspect o f our physicality - the ability to
reproduce. The sterilization imposed a severe physical limitation upon a core aspect of
M uir’s physical being. In the act o f irreversibly affecting her body without the concurrence
o f her will, the Eugenics Board created distance between Ms Muir’s sense o f self and her
reproductive capacity. When we will our hands to type something out, the act is a seamless
manifestation o f our will to do so; we do not notice that our hands are separate from
ourselves. When, however, someone takes control o f our hands without our will, we are
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aware o f our hands at some distance from our will and selfhood. In this way, Muir’s sexual
capacity, something taken for granted by many, was separated from her, both physically and
psychologically.

After years o f searching for answers about the procedures that were performed upon her, Ms
Muir brought her case before the courts. After determining liability, the judge was faced
with the daunting task o f addressing Ms Muir’s loss o f reproductive capacity and the injuries
that she suffered. Ms M uir’s loss was not easily equated to dollar values. She did not lose
a car or even wages, to a significant degree. The bulk o f her losses related to the loss o f part
o f herself. How a court characterizes this loss239 depends heavily on how compensation is
conceptualized.

(a) Summary

In examining Muir one can better understand that institutional abuse affects personal and
collective identity by forcefully fragmenting foundational aspects of personhood and taking
control o f them. Ms. Muir was artificially categorized as a “moron” by the Eugenics Board.
She did not have control over the social construction o f her identity; the Eugenics Board did.
Ms Muir came from an economically disadvantaged Eastern European family; the Eugenics
Board systemically targeted persons from this group for the purpose of limiting their power

239As stated by R. Abel, “the commodity form has been extended from goods, labor
and care to all forms o f human experience - everything can (and increasingly must) be
bought”: supra note 217 at 448.
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in society. Dominant society was composed o f persons with particular characteristics such
as place o f origin, religion and gender; these attributes were used to identify groups who
were the targets o f eugenics policies. Fragmentation of her social identity was bolstered by
theories that criminality was more prevalent among certain groups. Thus persons in Alberta
society were objectified and sterilized based on the fragmentation o f their social identity into
categories o f race, religion and gender.

Finally, Ms Muir’s physical integrity was

fragmented by the act of sterilization itself. Sterilization without consent created a distance
between Ms Muir and her personal sovereignty over her body and her reproductive capacity.
Her ability to reproduce was objectified by the Board when they decided to sterilize her
against her will.

(b) The meaning o f compensation in torts

Radin recognizes that we have some difficulty reconciling the incommensurability of market
rhetoric that is sometimes associated with compensation for the very subjective pain and
suffering o f a plaintiff. She explores how market rhetoric impacts on our culture and
understanding o f identity and she proposes that there are some aspects o f tort injuries that
we consider incommensurable with commodification. Some injuries are closer to our sense
o f self and thus are less easily placed on par with commodities on the market place. Other
aspects o f ourselves may be more easily objectified, or put at a distance from our subjective
selves, and are consequently easier to commodify and place in the marketplace for exchange.
As Radin notes, compensation for personal injury is one area where the contested meanings
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o f market commodification can most easily be examined.240 Specifically in personal injury
cases, the use o f dollars to remedy both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses can create
confusion around the meaning o f compensation.

In a pure deterrence model o f commodified compensation241, an economically rational
tortfeasor would implement safety features if these safety features cost less than paying
damages for accidents. For example in Muir, the government would evaluate the damages
that might be payable to M uir and then decide whether or not to sterilize her. The Muir case
demonstrates many problems with the pure deterrence model. First, perfect knowledge of
the potential costs o f their action is required for the government to make an accurate
judgement of whether or not to sterilize Muir. Second, the tortfeasor must understand that
their acts are actually inflicting an injury upon someone. At the tim e that the government
enacted the Sexual Sterilization Act, there was no understanding that their actions were
harmful or were in fact inflicting damages upon Muir.

Radin points out that many who are sympathetic to economic reasoning do not adopt a pure
version o f the deterrence model. Rather, although economic efficiency is a goal, rights
associated with bodily integrity are also recognized. This mixed view also engages a
commodified conception o f compensation as the payment o f damages is in exchange for the
rights that were violated. Ideally compensation makes the victim whole again. Thus, injury

240Supra note 218 at 184.
241Ibid. at 186.
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and the payment o f damages are treated exactly as if the victim sold a commodity that she
owns.242 In the Muir case, for example, this view would hold that the plaintiff had accepted
damages in exchange for the loss o f her reproductive capacity.

In this conception o f

compensation she is deemed to have owned her capacity to have children and because it was
taken away from her, she is entitled to receive money in exchange for it. In order to
compensate her, the court would have had to assessed the worth of her loss by evaluating
the value o f her right to reproduce and then ordered government to pay for taking it away
from her. As Radin states, in this view the damage award makes the victim whole again as
she is indifferent with respect to being harmed and getting the payment o f damages.243
In the Muir case, someone who is sympathetic to this kind o f analysis might perceive that
the Alberta government paid a sum o f money for Ms M uir’s reproductive capacity.
However, because the judge clearly delineated his intention to recognize her non-pecuniary
losses, there is less opportunity o f her monetary award being attributed to commodified
injuries. The judge in Muir clearly states that “(m)oney will not allow Ms Muir to conceive;
it can only provide succour for the pain that she has suffered during these past decades.”244.
Succour is a response to Ms M uir’s emotional needs and pain; this is something that the
judge recognizes, in accordance to our society’s understanding o f this type o f pain, as being
incommensurable with a market economic analysis. In this instance, money symbolizes
recognition o f pain; it does not signify an exchange o f goods.

242Ibid. at 187.
243Ibid. at 186-187.
244Supra note 214 at 193.
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Radin categorizes this understanding o f compensation as a non-commodified conception of
compensation that attempts to provide solace to the plaintiff. She argues that within the
judicial system we have a non-commodified understanding o f compensation that allows for
the centrality o f other values beside dollars and markets.245 For example, principles of
corrective justice seek to restore the moral balance between the parties. Thus, right and
wrong, concepts that are incommensurable with market values, are used for determining
compensation in the form o f punitive damages.246 Radin argues that compensation for injury
should be viewed as redress o f the harm done to the victim and as recognition o f the fault of
the defendant. Money, should be a symbolic, but not empty gesture of recognition. As she
states, “redress means showing the victim that her rights are taken seriously.

It is

accomplished by affirming that some action is required to symbolize public respect for the
existence of certain rights.247”.

I would suggest that Radin’s understanding of compensation can also be interpreted in terms
o f the relational nature o f identity, as discussed in chapter two. In providing compensation
that is a symbol o f respect and is for the purpose of re-establishing moral balance between
the parties, there is a recognition o f the re-configuration o f the relationship. The tortfeasor

145Supra note 218 at 189.
246This point is raised by R. Abel who states that “tort law has turned to the language
o f economics, replacing moral fault with the efficient allocation o f resources, a concept that
appears scientific and apolitical.” Abel points out that although cloaked in the guise of
neutrality, economic discourse itself has an inherent normative point o f reference - namely
efficiency: supra note 217 at 451.
247Supra note 218 at 188.
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acknowledges the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff and in doing so contributes to the new
construction o f the plaintiff’s identity as a respected person. The relationship matrix has
been slightly altered and power has been shifted within the matrix.

These examples of Radin’s taxonomy o f compensation reveal that our understanding o f
compensation is informed by various conceptual paradigms. She also asserts that in some
instances, the values that are recognized by the courts are incommensurable with an
economic rhetoric that assumes commodification and fungibility o f all aspects o f
personhood.

Compensation

can

mean

many

things.

Alongside

our

economic

conceptualization are bubbles o f incommensurable values which must be acknowledged
through compensation, but not reduced to commodities that are alienable from the person.
In describing both the commodified and non-commodified versions of compensation, Radin
is exposing our conflicting ideas o f the meaning o f compensation. We recognize that
something o f value has been lost or damaged but we have differing ideas o f how the address
the loss.248 Some prefer a simple, overarching economic conceptualization. Others see that
there is complexity associated with different types o f harms, complexity which cannot be
addressed by one single conceptualization based on economic theory.

248Note that I do not deal with the possibility o f not compensating injured parties
where their injury is imcommensurable with commodification. In my view, recognition o f
value must be at least symbolized through money because society recognizes money as being
valuable. In her book, Radin does discuss the possibility o f not compensating injured parties.
She notes that if one recognizes the incommensurability o f pain with compensation, it
becomes easier to argue that pain should not be compensated at all. Radin notes that this
argument is used in the context o f tort insurers who wish to limit the discretion that juries
have to make awards at their expense. Radin argues that proponents o f this argument often
do not go so far as to argue against all damage recovery but use it in a limited way. For a
further discussion of this issue, see ibid. at 195-200.
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(c) Evaluation ofjudicial treatment o f compensation

Up to this point, an examination o f the M uir case has revealed that the abuse o f power in an
institutional setting had an objectifying effect upon key aspects o f Ms. M uir’s identity.
Further, we have examined how economic theory tends to have a hegemonic culture-shaping
effect that leads us to a commodified conception of compensation. In institutional abuse
cases like Muir it was crucial for the judge to recognize the incommensurability between
M uir’s loss of reproductive capacity and a market-based conception o f compensation. He
recognized that monetary damages for non-pecuniary loss have the symbolic effect o f
providing succour for Ms Muir’s loss. In making this distinction in his decision, the judge
has explicitly refused to objectify an aspect o f Ms Muir’s subjective loss.

G. Non-judicial compensation programs and institutional abuse

Where there is a compensation program in place and no explicit explanation of how
compensation is to be conceived, there is a danger that compensation will be understood in
a way that further objectifies people who have already been objectified through the
institutional abuse. Many governments and institutions across Canada saw the emergence
o f these potentially expensive and difficult cases as a prime opportunity to implement
formalized alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Governments could use non-judicial
processes to reduce the transaction costs, such as time and expense, that all parties would
incur to their mutual detriment through the civil litigation process.

Lengthy civil

proceedings have severe cost implications cost for both parties; the claimant often bears a
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greater relative burden because of a lack o f initial resources for the payment for legal fees.
Governments could also address the stresses o f litigation on claimants by implementing a
mechanism that does not force claimants to face their abusers. If an alternative process is
designed well, the abused person who has already experienced psychological trauma will not
be re-victimized by the process. Further, dispute resolution mechanisms can provide a
process that is geared toward healing the victim as opposed to simply determining causal
damage and recognizing loss through monetary awards. Alternative mechanisms can also
allow for a greater range o f solutions than is available through formal legal proceedings. It
is possible for the parties to negotiate for monetary compensation, apologies, non-monetary
awards for psychological therapy and other treatments, an opportunity to establish a record
o f the stories told by victims, public education about abuse, support for families o f victims,
career counseling, and interim awards to assist claimants.249 Thus, a negotiated solution can
be more easily tailored to suit the subjective needs o f the parties involved in the negotiation
and the process itself can deal with the specific relationship between the parties.

The Nova Scotia Compensation Program provided non-monetary remedies that are not
available through a judicial process. There were provisions for an apology letter from the
Minister o f Justice, interim and long-term counseling, a list o f government services available
to the claimants, an independent recorder o f a public report o f Survivor’s testimonials, and
payment o f legal fees and disbursements.250 The most significant and contested remedy,

249Supra note 2 at 30.
250See clauses 28-63 and 66 o f the MOU: supra note 30.
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however, was the monetary compensation paid out to claimants.

Various mechanisms have been used across the country to provide monetary compensation
for people who had been abused while residents o f provincial and federal institutions. In
Kingsclear, the government o f New Brunswick provided compensation up to $120,000 for
sexual abuse suffered at the New Brunswick Training School at Kingsclear.251
Compensation was paid for pain and suffering, educational benefits, loss o f past earning s and
the loss o f future opportunity.252 In Ontario, the Helpline Reconciliation Agreement
provided compensation up to $25,000 for pain and suffering, with additional amounts o f
$3,000 for medical needs and vocational rehabilitation, and $5,000 for counseling.253
Compensation was provided to eligible persons who suffered acts that met the definition o f
injury in the Compensation fo r Victims o f Crime Act254. In the Grandview Agreement,
monetary compensation was provided for both physical and sexual abuse depending upon
the category o f the abusive act.255 The maximum amount that could be received was $60,000
for acts falling within the most serious category plus individual and group benefits for
counseling, educational upgrading, tattoo removal and other needs.

251Supra note 5 at 142.
252Ibid.
253Ibid. at 137.
254Compensation fo r Victims o f Crime Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 24, s. 1. This section
defines injury as “actual bodily harm”.
255Supra note 5 at 130-1.
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The Nova Scotia Compensation Program set out a grid or scalar format sim ilar to the one
used in the Grandview Agreement.256 However the maximum award in Nova Scotia was
higher and the grid had more categories. In the Nova Scotia Program, there were twelve
categories ranging from the most serious “Severe Sexual Abuse and Severe Physical Abuse”
category to the least serious “Minor Physical and/or Sexual Interference”257. If a claimant’s
statement alleged acts that fell within the most serious category, he could receive $ 120,000
plus a $10,000 counseling allotment. Guidelines were provided to assist Compensation
Program assessors with categorizing the claims o f abuse. For example, the category “severe
sexual abuse” includes anal intercourse, vaginal intercourse and oral intercourse that was
repeated and persistent such that it could be characterized as chronic. Severe physical abuse
was abuse that resulted in broken bones or other physical trauma with evidence of
hospitalization or permanent disability. The assessor also had to consider aggravating factors
such as verbal abuse or racial acts when determining the appropriate level o f
compensation.

Whereas the Kingsclear model and the Helpline Reconciliation Agreement focused on pain
and suffering, the Nova Scotia scalar model placed emphasis on the act instead o f the
subjective effect o f the act.

The problem is that the categories in the grid may have no

definite correlation to the actual damage suffered by the claimant. Institutional abuse is

256Supra note 30 at Schedule “B”.
151Ibid.
25SIbid. at Schedule “C”.
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experienced in a very subjective way. As has been argued herein, the injury in abuse cases
are a result o f the imposition o f power over the will o f the abused child; consequently the
claimant suffers from significant psychological damage. Psychological literature does not
support the assertion that injury from abuse can be purely correlated to the number o f
occurrences or the severity o f the act.259 The physical damage is important but the
psychological damage contains a significant subjective aspect that has a quality that cannot
be evaluated by objective means. Loss o f power and destruction o f identity are not things
that can be quantified because the nature of the damage is holographic; it cannot be excised
and valued because it affects all aspects o f personhood. Although these aspects o f damage
can be addressed through empowering features o f the process as discussed in previous
chapters, they should also be recognized, but not quantified, through a substantive remedy.

Where money, a concept which is very closely related to commodification, is distributed
through a grid or scalar model, it is easy to conceptualize the compensation as commodifying
the actual injury. Because commodification is likely to dominate out understanding o f
compensation, it will provide meaning, especially where there is no alternate understanding
o f why compensation is being awarded. Where the structure of the distribution mechanism
in itself indicates that the injuries have been objectified, there will be even more reason to
believe that the subjective aspect o f harm has not been recognized. Sadly, the lack o f an
articulated statement about the meaning of compensation can be crucial where a program
has been developed to address the specific well-being o f the claimants. In order to achieve

259Supra note 2 at 38.
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a healing result, an ADR mechanism and remedy should explicitly recognize the specifically
subjective nature o f abuse. There is no statement in the MOU that the monetary
compensation is for pain and suffering. There is no indication o f recognition o f subjective
harm in the awarding o f money amounts. In the absence of any statement to the contrary,
the grid and the guidelines themselves lead me to believe that the scalar model of
compensation employs an objective standard for the award o f damages. In doing so, the
model reinforces the commodification o f sexual and physical abuse. A claim o f chronic anal
intercourse is more valuable than a claim o f repeated instances o f oral intercourse, no matter
what the subjective effect was for the particular victim. In effect, the government is
evaluating the worth o f the objective act and not valuing the subjective harm.

In a survey done o f various survivors o f institutional abuse in Canada, the following was
stated:

While most women appreciated the financial award and felt that it was very
important, others said that it felt like ‘blood money’. Several women added
that there was no amount o f money that could make up for what they
experienced at Grandview;260
From this quote it is apparent that monetary compensation has multiple meanings for
survivors of abuse. At one level it is appreciated, at another it is resented. This ambivalent
relationship with money appears in another survey done by the same authors:

Several respondents expressed the view that financial compensation should
have been tied to claimants’ participation in education and upgrading, job

260Supra note 2 at Appendix 1, p. 19.
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skills and life skills training ‘so they could improve their lives’. Others were
adamant that survivors o f institutional abuse deserve direct financial
compensation for the abuse, harm and suffering they endured.261

There is some evidence that the meaning o f compensation is partially derived from the
process used to determine the level o f compensation to be awarded to various members of
the group that was abused. Again, in reference to the survey of survivors:

any objected to the use o f categories to define and rate their childhood abuse
experiences.. . . ‘its like they were labeling b e e f262

This statement points to the crux of the problem o f trying to achieve a healing result with the
use o f money. The survivors o f abuse, who have already faced fragmentation through the
acts o f abuse perpetrated on them by persons in authority, again face objectification through
the process that was supposedly designed to create some wholeness and provide redress for
their experiences.263 A person who has been sexually abused by a person in authority has had
their sexual autonomy forcibly overridden. He has become aware that some aspect of his
sexuality and body is being used by another. Sexuality and the body is an object for
someone else’s will. When being compensated, the aspects of selfhood that were originally
objectified during the abuse, are compensated through the grid; the core o f the subjective
experience is left unrecognized. So despite the provision of apologies and other non
monetary awards, the manner in which the compensation is determined, explained, and

261Ibid. at Appendix 1, p. 12.
262Ibid.
263Supra note 30.
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processed can lead to commodification, in the same way that beef is prepared for sale. In
other words, the worth o f their subjective injury is simply being derived through a process
with little reference to their understanding o f their pain. Because the compensation process
itself seems to commodify the injuries, and because no explanation was given to the contrary,
the hegemony of market rhetoric creates the impression among claimants that they were
“labeled like beef’ and were receiving “blood money”. The reactions o f the claimants
indicates the degree to which market rhetoric permeates our understanding o f economics.
The abuse that they went through is again somehow separate from them while at the same
time reflecting on their value as a person.

(a) Evaluation o f non-judicial treatment o f compensation

In negotiating a remedy for institutional abuse the parties can address a broad range o f issues
including the development o f a process that contributes to their health and well-being.
Unfortunately, if no thought is given to the meaning o f compensation, the meaning attributed
to the compensation by the parties and the public may achieve opposite results from the
original healing goals envisioned in the alternative dispute resolution process. Although not
perfect, judges can at least refer to jurisprudence on non-pecuniary damages in order to
provide a non-commodified meaning to compensation. This at least gives the claimant
recognition o f a form o f subjectivity that is beyond the reach o f the market place. The
judicial decision264that provides a non-objectifying explanation o f damages has the potential

264The author recognizes that the judicial process itself can be daunting and damaging
to the psychological well-being o f the plaintiff. This chapter, however, focuses on the
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to preserve the integrity o f the victim ’s identity.265

Non-judicial programs that do not articulate the meaning o f compensation cannot rely on
some precedential meaning to fill the gaps. The beauty with non-judicial processes is that
it is possible for the parties to design a process that is tailored to the needs o f the parties. The
problem is that the parties have the responsibility to articulate the meaning o f remedies in
order to ensure that their intentions are clear in the agreement and throughout the
administration of the program.

For example, in the Nova Scotia Compensation Program, the purpose o f monetary
compensation is not outlined in the agreement. This was a shortcoming o f the dispute
resolution process because it failed to explicitly recognize the subjective aspect of injuries
arising from abuse.

In the absence o f any other articulation, the grid format used for

distributing compensation indicates that claimants were compensated based upon the acts of
abuse and not upon the subjectively-felt effects of abuse such as pain and suffering. The grid
format suggests that the party responsible for the abuse is using an objectifying gaze and not
recognizing the subjective nature o f the abused person. This effectively denies the abused

necessity o f providing meaning for compensation once liability has been determined.
265Although I have focused on the Muir case, there are other cases where the judge
has explicitly recognized the nature o f non-pecuniary compensation. For example, please
see S.M.A.B. v. J. N., [1991] B.C.J. no. 3940, online: QL (CJ) where the Thackray J. stated
the following in awarding compensation for child sexual abuse: “no amount o f money can
replace the lost years. No amount o f money can totally overcome the damage that has been
done.... The money is designed to try and give solace to the victim and to try in some way
to compensate for what has been lost.”
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person an opportunity to receive recognition of her whole person, as opposed to simply a
recognition o f the act o f abuse. Any attempts to develop identity and empowerment through
the process will be diminished if the meaning o f the remedy does not reflect the re
configuration o f the abuser/abused relationship.

H. Conclusions

Claims o f institutional abuse have been dealt with in a variety o f ways. Damages have been
awarded by courts for personal injury inflicted by institutional authorities. Where there are
many cases o f abuse in one jurisdiction, compensation programs and other alternatives have
been developed by governments to pay awards to abuse claimants. These programs have the
potential for satisfying the various needs of the parties in institutional abuse cases.
Negotiations conducted by parties who are aware o f their needs can assert that the agreement
must include a healing component and must recognize the integrity of the participants.
These all too human needs must not be lost in the negotiations when money become the
prime discursive tool for achieving agreement. Although monetary compensation is often
the core component of the agreement, integrity and healing can still be incorporated into the
meaning o f the compensation that is awarded. However because of the hegemonic nature
o f commodification in our discourse, parties must actively provide an alternative conception
o f compensation that recognizes aspects of human personality that cannot be objectified from
one’s sense o f self. Compensation must be conceptualized and articulated in a way that
recognizes the subjective content and integrity of human personality.
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I. Recommendations

Although the remedy itself must emerge from the expressed goals and interests articulated
in the dispute resolution process, I would suggest that the parties involved in designing a
non-judicial compensation program should consider articulating the meaning of
compensation. Such an articulation might contain the following:

•

monetary compensation is symbolic recognition o f the pain and suffering inflicted
upon the person;

•

monetary compensation is acknowledgment that those responsible for the abuse have
listened to testimonials about the impact o f abuse; and,

•

monetary compensation acknowledges the shift in power and the ability of abused
persons to contribute their understanding o f abuse in social discourses.
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS

(the) self is both autonomous and socially dependent, vulnerable enough to
be undone by violence and yet resilient enough to be reconstructed with the
help o f empathic others.266
I can go anywhere and do anything I like. Nobody controls me. I can be who
I really am. People helped me find that freedom, and nobody can ever take
it away again. I am truly, truly free.267

The purpose o f this thesis has been to discern ways for people who have been socially
alienated to contribute their understanding o f their experiences in the broader world. To
discuss this, I have examined the situation o f persons who have been abused as children in
institutions and the dispute resolution processes used to address their injuries. I have chosen
this group because abused persons have experienced radical disenfranchisement through the
overpowering o f their bodies. Also, their claims have recently been dealt with through the
judicial system and through ADR processes.

Institutional abuse in Canada has emerged as a significant phenomenon over the past ten
years. Before that time, there was little recognition o f institutional abuse or historic child
abuse in remedial processes. Over the past decade courts in Canada have come to recognize
the various facets of the abusive experience. Judges have responded by acknowledging that
there are bona fid e reasons for delay in reporting o f child abuse, by allowing the rules o f
testimony to accommodate the needs o f abuse survivors, and by recognizing the subjective

266Supra note 80 at 12.
267Supra note 55 atI69.
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aspect of the injuries resulting from abuse. However, regardless o f the ability o f the courts
to recognize certain aspects of abusive experiences, the sheer number o f cases that has arisen
has prompted institutional defendants to move toward developing alternative dispute
resolution processes.

In this thesis I have argued that the move toward ADR provides the opportunity for abuse
survivors to achieve a relational remedy. Harms to identity inflicted through the relationship
with the abuser can be remedied through healthy identity formation in the dispute resolution
process. The abuser’s act o f rendering the survivor powerless in the abusive relationship can
be remedied through a non-judicial process by a re-configuration o f the power relationship.
The substantive remedy o f monetary compensation can be conceptualized in such a way as
to recognize the subjective nature o f the harm and the abuse survivor’s new power to assert
himself in the world.

In undertaking this project I first explored the nature o f identity. I found that a post
modernist conception o f identity fails to provide the abused person with the agency to
exercise control in the remedial process. A liberal conception o f identity, however, fails to
appreciate the relationships of power that give rise to socially constructed identities. The
most accurate description o f identity that recognizes both our social nature and the ability to
exercise volition arises from a relational notion of identity.

In exploring theories of

relational identity, I found that Lugones’ understanding of the plurality o f existence and her
notion of a thin, limnal self, provided a useful description o f identity. However, I did not
discard post-modernist notions o f power and in fact I relied upon Foucault’s description of
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the inter-relationship between power, knowledge and discourse to fill out my analysis.

My next task in this project was to describe abuse and the various effects o f abuse. I
concluded that abuse fragments a person’s sense o f connection with her body, supplants her
understanding of who she is, and overcomes her sense o f volition or will. For institutionally
abused persons, these harms can be addressed through a process where they can exercise
agency to recuperate these lost faculties. An ADR process where there is the possibility o f
exercising power directly with the other party provides such forum.

The problem that arose was that in order for the abused person to exercise his will in the
negotiation to develop an ADR process, he must first face the daunting task o f overcoming
the privacy initially imposed by the abuser. In order for this to occur, the abused person
must have the opportunity to re-orient himself so that he can access a loving listener. This
is the first step on the journey before seeking a remedy in the public arena.

The second task was to find a way for the person to find meaning for the abusive experiences
that is distinct from the meaning imposed by the abuser. By speaking to others who have
experienced abuse, the survivor will more easily find meaning that corresponds to her
subjective experience o f abuse.

Once this has been accomplished, the survivor has a

foundation for selfhood that is grounded in a ‘world’ or relational matrix that is loving and
non-abusive. In this personal space, the abuse survivor can gather the strength to speak in
the public arena about the abusive events.
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When a person speaks publicly, the nature o f the testimony w ill be defined by the purpose
o f the speaker and the listener. I described legal testimony, therapeutic testimony, historic
testimony, and political testimony. I examined the situation where different testimonial
purposes have been attributed to the same speech. I have determined that one o f the
problems that arises where there are different or unclear testimonial purposes is that the
resulting confusion may lead to the invalidation of survivor speech.

In order to protect survivor speech, a group that has an identity stemming from common
experiences of abuse must be able to assert the subjective knowledge o f the survivors’
abusive experiences. In asserting this common goal beyond the group, the group develops
a political aspect. With respect to validation of speech, the validation method chosen in a
negotiation will reflect the importance o f the various parties’ interests. If survivors wish to
seek a form o f remedy from the government, they should assert the importance o f their
understanding o f abuse for the purpose o f determining a validation method. If they have the
power to assert the significance o f their experiences in the negotiation arena, then ideally a
validation method will emerge that will recognize the interests o f all parties affected by the
allegations of abuse.

Depending upon the interests developed by the parties, the actual dispute resolution process
may take many forms. Parties may develop a restorative process, a public inquiry, a
compensation program or some permutation of an existing process. If they choose to
develop a compensation scheme that provides a monetary remedy, there must be some
articulation of the meaning o f monetary compensation so that abuse survivors are not re
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objectified by the remedy. Forjudges, the process dictates that they turn their mind to the
meaning o f compensation and address it in their decisions. Consequently, judicial decisions
can expressly recognize the subjective nature o f harm. Although there is the possibility that
parties in a non-judicial process will articulate the meaning o f compensation, if they fail to
do so, an objectifying mechanism for distributing compensation may lead one to believe that
subjective harm has been ignored.

Throughout this thesis, I have come to the conclusion that non-judicial processes can
encompass and recognize identity formation and political empowerment more readily than
judicial processes. Because the parameters o f judicial processes are not as flexible as non
judicial ones and because a third party provides the ultimate decision, there is less ability to
accommodate innovative mechanisms for advancing the subjugated knowledge o f the abuse
survivors.

However, with the higher degree o f control in non-judicial process comes an increase in the
level o f responsibility for the parties. They must actively design a process that protects the
subjective aspects abuse and recovery, lest they be overtaken by dominating discourses. If
no attention is paid to developing process mechanisms to achieve a particular purpose, then
that purpose will not necessarily be achieved. If the parties want to have a process that will
heal the abuse survivors, on collective and individual levels, the process must be able to
create a space within existing discourses for this goal to be achieved. On the issue o f the
meaning o f compensation, I have concluded that judicial decisions are more likely to
recognize the subjective nature of the harm inflicted upon abused persons. Unless non
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judicial processes actively articulate the meaning o f compensation, there is a risk that the
method of distribution will provide a commodifying meaning to the monetary award.

In working through my analysis various themes have emerged. I have focused on abuse as
being relational and not simply a compilation o f discrete abusive acts.

The abusive

relationship fixes the person in a damaging and unloving environment just at that period in
a person’s life when she is developing her sense of individuality. The theme o f imposed
privacy has arisen throughout the thesis. I have looked at privacy that is imposed upon an
individual and upon groups as being counter-productive to their ability to participate in the
world. The importance of speech has been emphasized, especially in the assertion of
interests. Although I recognize the power of detachment and disengagement, in this thesis
I have been primarily concerned with the achievement o f a remedy through the re
engagement o f a relationship between abuse survivors and the governmental authorities
responsible for institutional abuse.

In this thesis I have focused on the potential for a process to achieve substantive remedies
such as empowerment and identity formation. I have asserted that the process governing the
re-engagement o f the relationship itself can remedy the damage initially caused by the
abusive relationship. I have emphasized the subjective understanding of the experience of
abuse as opposed to potentially objectifying expert knowledge. Throughout the thesis, there
has been an emphasis on physical experience and the emotional harm that results from
damages to the physical self. We do not exist without our bodies; our sense o f self is
affected by abuse to our bodies. As a source o f our understanding of the world, we cannot
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lose sight o f our physicality in asserting meaning and interests in the world around us.
Consequently, I have tried to shift the focus from the intentions o f the listener to the
intentions of the speaker when an abused person is speaking about her experiences. I have
focused on the physical experiences o f abuse and their immediate meaning to the abused
person instead o f focusing on abstractions. Further, I have asserted that love and loving
relationships are the fundamental force in the recovery process o f abused persons.

I have made these efforts in order to try to address the alienation that results from physical
forms of abuse. Abuse alienates a person from her own body. It alienates her from her
immediate social environment. It alienates her from the world. The nucleus of a return to
the world begins with an abused person coming to an understanding o f physical existence
that does not depend upon the abuser. From there, barriers to participation can be overcome,
however it is not an easy journey. In clarifying the nature o f the barriers, I have attempted
to locate places in dispute resolution processes where there are possibilities for the
emergence of identity and power.

A. Further Inquiry

I leave the task o f designing an appropriate process to the parties and to other theorists. They
will be better able to define the parties’ interests and to explore the potential o f restorative
justice, public inquiries, special counsel and other such processes to meet their needs.

The question o f the subjugation o f intra-group minorities must be addressed in order to
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perfect the sustainability o f this model o f empowerment. Specifically questions surrounding
the relationship between individual self-actualization and collective empowerment might
serve as fodder for further graduate studies in law, philosophy, politics, or any other
discipline where this is relevant.

Hopefully this paper has clarified some o f the pitfalls that may stand in the way o f an abused
person who is trying to bring her experiences and the meaning o f those experiences into the
public realm. As more people enter well-designed processes, it will be easier for them to
find a sense o f self and overcome alienation in the world and worlds that non-abused persons
take for granted.
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REGARDING
COMPENSATION FOR SURVIVORS OF INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE

PREAMBLE
WHEREAS the Province o f Nova Scotia operated the Nova Scotia School for Boys
(Shelburne Youth Centre) from 1947 to date, and the Nova Scotia School for Girls (Nova Scotia
Residential Centre) from 1967 to date; and the Nova Scotia Youth Training Centre from 1927
to date;
AND WHEREAS individual Survivors have come forward at various times disclosing the
Sexual and Physical Abuse that was perpetrated against them and other residents at the
Institutions;
AND WHEREAS the efforts o f individual Survivors to bring their abusers to justice have
led to internal disciplinary and police investigations concerning abuse at the Institutions, which
investigations are continuing;
AND WHEREAS the Minister became aware o f allegations of Sexual and other Physical
Abuse at the Institutions;
AND WHEREAS the Minister recommended a process whereby an independent
investigation into the events that took place would be ordered to determine what had happened,
who was involved, who knew what was happening and what actions were taken in response by
those in authority; and further, that if such investigation revealed that Abuse had occurred, an
alternate dispute resolution mechanism was to be put in place to determine appropriate
compensation for the Survivors o f the Abuse;
AND WHEREAS pursuant to the recommendation o f the Minister and the direction o f
the Executive Council o f the Province, the Honourable Stuart G. Stratton, Q.C, was appointed
to carry out an investigation, the terms of his reference for engagement being to:
(a)

investigate the incidents of Sexual and other Physical Abuse o f residents that
occurred or are alleged to have occurred at the Institutions;

(b)

investigate and determine the practices and procedures in place at the Institutions
that either permitted or hindered the detection o f Abuse of residents;

perm ission of the copyright owner. Fu rther reproduction prohibited without permission.

- 2 (c)

investigate and determine whether any employees in the Institutions or any public
officials were aware o f abusive behaviour of staff toward residents; and

(d)

investigate and determine what steps, if any, were taken by employees or officials
in reference to any such Abuse.

AND WHEREAS after conducting the investigation, the Honourable Stuart G. Stratton,
Q.C., determined, inter alia, that Sexual and Physical Abuse had taken place at the Institutions
and that staff of the Institutions and officials in the Department of Community Services were
aware the Abuse was taking place but, at least until the mid-1970s, no positive steps were taken
to end the Abuse;
AND WHEREAS the Province agreed to employ an alternate dispute resolution
mechanism to determine compensation for Survivors of Physical and Sexual Abuse and entered
into discussions with the legal representatives o f Survivors;
AND WHEREAS the Province has agreed to compensate Survivors o f Physical and
Sexual Abuse through a compensation process that is principled, respectful, timely and consistent
with the following principles:
THAT the Province recognizes that the Survivors were all minors in the care and custody
o f the Province during the periods o f time they were committed to the Institutions;
THAT Abuse o f children can never be condoned and can only be condemned;
THAT the physical and sexual abuse of children by adults in positions o f power and trust
is a fundamental betrayal that operates to deny a child’s dignity and autonomy;
THAT the fundamental purposes o f this compensation process are:
■

to acknowledge moral responsibility for the Physical and Sexual Abuse
experienced by the Survivors which was perpetrated, condoned, or directed by
employees o f the Province during the time the Survivors were resident in the
Institutions;

■

to affirm the essential worth and dignity of ail o f the Survivors, who were
residents o f the Institutions;

■

to assist the Survivors, in a tangible way, with the healing process;

■

to affirm to the Survivors that they were not responsible in any way for the
Physical and Sexual Abuse perpetrated, condoned, or directed by employees o f the
Province while the Survivors were resident in the Institutions; and
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to implement financial compensation and other benefits to Survivors in a
principled, respectful and timely fashion.

DEFINITIONS
1.

In this Memorandum o f Understanding:
(a)

"Demand" means a letter from a Survivor to the Province which states the amount
o f compensation sought by the Survivor in accordance with Schedules "B" and "C"
and which is accompanied by a Statement;

(b)

"Department" means the Department o f Justice of the Province o f Nova Scotia,
unless another Department is specifically named;

(c)

"Institutions" means the Nova Scotia School for Boys, the Nova Scotia School for
Girls and the Nova Scotia Youth Training Centre;

(d)

"Minister" means the Minister of Justice of the Province o f Nova Scotia;

(e)

"Physical Abuse" means any act of physical assault which was a violation o f the
provisions o f the Crim inal Code, as that legislation existed at the time the act took
place;

(f)

"Province" means the Province of Nova Scotia;

(g)

"Racist Acts" means, in the list of aggravating factors contained in Schedule "C",
acts o f discrimination based on race which occurred in connection with Physical
or Sexual Abuse for which compensation is awarded;

(h)

"Response" means the Province’s written response to a Survivor’s Demand
indicating the Province’s acceptance, rejection, or compromise offer and which,
in the event of a rejection or compromise offer, shall include written reasons and
all information or materials in the possession or control o f the Province upon
which the Province relied in making its rejection or compromise offer;

(i)

"Sexual Abuse" means:
(i)

acts o f oral, vaginal or anal intercourse; masturbation; fondling; digital
penetration; and acts of sexual interference, which may include
inappropriate watching or staring, comments and sexual intimidation; and
includes any sexual act which was a violation of the Criminal Code, as that
legislation existed at the time the act took place; and/or

(ii)

attempted acts o f oral, vaginal or anal intercourse, masturbation, fondling,
or digital penetration, which were a violation of the Criminal Code, as that
legislation existed at the time the act took place;
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"Statement" means a written statement detailing the Physical and/or Sexual Abuse
experienced by a Survivor, taken by Facts-Probe Inc., the Department’s Internal
Investigation Unit, or a police agency, and signed by the Survivor;

(k)

"Survivor" means an individual who alleges that he or she was a victim o f
Physical and/or Sexual Abuse at one or more o f the Institutions from the years
referred to in the Preamble until the present; and

(1)

"Verbal abuse" includes any comments which would be a violation o f the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Act.

PROCESS
General
2.
Survivors, through their legal representatives, have resolved a process and parameters for
compensation for the Physical and Sexual Abuse they experienced while resident in the
Institutions. It is expressly acknowledged among the parties that neither the terms o f this
Memorandum nor the process which led to its creation constitute an admission o f liability,
vicarious or otherwise, on the part o f the Province. For further certainty, the parties agree that
this Memorandum shall not be introduced as evidence in any existing or future legal proceedings.
3.
Survivors whose claims are determined to be valid either through negotiation or file
review shall be compensated for Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse perpetrated, condoned, or
directed by employees o f the Province during the time the Survivors were resident in the
Institutions.
4.
Survivors shall only be eligible for the compensation and other benefits identified in this
document where it is established, through negotiation or file review, that Physical and/or Sexual
Abuse occurred.
5.
Compensation determined under this Memorandum of Understanding, whether through
negotiation or file review, shall be determined by reference to Statements and, at the option o f
either the Survivor or the Province, medical records of any of the Institutions. Reference may
be made to medical reports prepared for the purpose o f establishing Physical Abuse, physical
injury or physical disability where no other independent records exist
No monetary
compensation shall be made for any psychological consequences o f Abuse.
6.
Statements given by a Survivor and reduced to writing or recorded on videotape or
audiotape with a view to validating the Survivor’s claim for compensation shall be used only for
purposes o f this process and shall not be released to the public without the prior written consent
o f the Survivor.
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Survivors shall have access to:
(a)

any written statement taken by Facts-Probe Inc. or the Department’s Internal
Investigation Unit from the Survivor himself or herself or which the giver of the
statement has consented in writing to release; and

(b)

any medical, educational, social work or probation files kept or maintained by the
Institutions in respect o f the Survivor
personally andnot related to
others.

8.
Any dispute with respect to the truth of the allegations o f Abuse or quantum of
compensation shall be resolved either through negotiation between the parties (during which
corroborative evidence may be introduced) or, if such dispute cannot be so resolved, through the
file review process established in this Memorandum of Understanding.

MAKING A CLAIM
9.
A Survivor who chooses to participate in the process outlined in this Memorandum shall
make a Demand upon the Province.

I

j
;
|

10.
The Province shall provide its Response to the Demand within 45 days after receipt If
the Demand is accepted by the Province, then payment in full shall be made within 20 days of
the acceptance, and in any event not later than 65 days from the date o f the Demand, upon
receipt by the Province o f a Release in the form attached as Schedule "D", signed by the
Survivor.
1 1.
If the parties have not concluded an agreement through negotiation within 45 days of the
Demand, or such further time as the Survivor may agree, the Survivor may continue negotiation
with the Province or give notice to the Province that the Demand will be submitted to file review
in accordance with this Memorandum. Only written materials referred to in this Memorandum
o f Understanding, and which have been exchanged by the Survivor and the Province during
negotiations, shall be included in the file as either Demand or Response materials for file review.

4I
FILE REVIEW
i
(
1
(
^
[

12.
The parties acknowledge that the Survivors have chosen the list of file reviewers attached
as Schedule "A", and the Province has accepted the list
13.
The Survivors (as a group) and the Province shall each select interview statements taken
by Facts-Probe Inc. which, in their opinion, are representative o f the categories contained in
Schedule "B" (to a maximum of four statements per category for each of the Province and the
Survivors). Upon a file reviewer agreeing to conduct a particular file review, that person shall
be provided with the volumes of statements. All names and dates in such statements shall be
blanked out for the purposes o f their inclusion in the volumes. No interview statement shall be
included in any volume without the prior consent of the person who gave the statement. The file
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under this Memorandum.
14.
If a Survivor chooses to submit a Demand to file review, the Survivor shall give written
notice o f file review to the Province, indicating the Survivor’s choice o f file reviewer from the
list attached as Schedule "A". Concurrent with the notice of file review, the Survivor shall
execute a Release in the form attached as Schedule "D" and deliver it to the Province. The
Province shall only reject the Survivor’s choice of file reviewer in the case o f a conflict o f
interest, and shall provide written confirmation of acceptance or rejection o f the file reviewer
within 10 days o f receipt o f the notice. If necessary, the Survivor shall then have 10 days to
choose another file reviewer. This process may continue until a file reviewer has been appointed,
at which time the Survivor shall forward the Demand to the file reviewer and shall at the same
time provide a copy o f the Demand to the Province.
15.
File review shall take place within 30 days of the Survivor submitting the Demand to the
file reviewer. If the file reviewer chosen by the Survivor is not available within the time limits
prescribed herein, then the Survivor and the Province may agree to waive the time limits for
purposes o f having the matter reviewed by that particular person or, if both parties are not
agreeable to waiving the time limits, the Survivor shall choose a person from the list who can
conduct a review within the time limits described. The file reviewer ultimately chosen shall not
have the power to adjourn or recess a proceeding beyond the time limits prescribed without the
consent of both parties.
16.
The Province shall have 20 days from the date the Survivor submits the Demand to the
file reviewer to forward its Response to the file reviewer.
17.
Concurrently with the Survivor’s forwarding o f the Demand to the file reviewer, the
Survivor shall be entitled to request an appearance before the file reviewer to support his or her
Demand. The Province shall be notified in writing by the Survivor at the time such request is
made. The Survivor shall be entitled to appear before the file reviewer either personally or by
way o f videotape, audiotape or telephone. The Survivor may appear without counsel, in which
case the Survivor will be the sole party to appear before the file reviewer. The Survivor may
appear with counsel to make representations, in which case the Province may also appear and
make representations.
18.
Should the Survivor make allegations which are not already contained in the Statement
when appearing before the file reviewer, the file reviewer shall explain the following options to
the Survivor and ask the Survivor to choose one of them:
(a)

Immediately adjourn the file review, upon which the Survivor shall be required
to give a further Statement and make a further Demand upon the Province as
outlined in paragraph 9; or

(b)

Disregard the new allegations when deciding the Survivor’s quantum o f
compensation.
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19.
The Province undertakes to treat ail Survivor information it bolds or receives in respect
o f a Survivor's claim for compensation pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding in
accordance with its obligations under the Freedom o f Information and Protection o f Privacy Act.
20.
Should the Survivor choose to give a further Statement and submit a further Demand to
the Province as outlined in paragraph 18(a), the Survivor shall be responsible for his or her legal
costs incurred from the date of the adjournment.
21.
The file reviewer shall render a written decision to the Survivor and the Province within
30 days o f the later of the Province’s submission or the appearance before the file reviewer. The
file reviewer shall be provided with this Memorandum of Understanding and shall issue a
decision that accords with Schedule "C", having regard to the Statement Volumes provided by
counsel for the Province and counsel for the' Survivors, and which does not exceed the monetary
limits set forth in Schedule "B".

r

I
f
I

.

22.
Should the file reviewer fail to render a written decision within the time limit outlined in
paragraph 21, $100 shall be deducted from the file reviewer’s fee for every day the decision is
late.
23.
The decision of the file reviewer is final and not subject to appeal or other form o f
judicial review. The file review is not a submission to arbitration under any legislation, nor is
it a submission under any other legislative enactment dealing with alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms and providing for some right o f appeal.

(
COMPENSATION
t

r
v

24.
Where compensation becomes payable as a result of negotiation or a file reviewer’s
decision, the Province shall pay such amount to the Survivor within 20 days o f the amount being
decided.

;

25.
All compensation awards shall be paid to the lawyer representing the Survivor, in trust,
and shall only be paid upon the Province’s receipt o f a written direction to pay signed by the
Survivor.

L~

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE WAIVER

:
L

26.
A social assistance waiver will be provided to Survivors who receive compensation
pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding, the effect o f which will be to deem the amount
o f compensation received by the Survivor not to be income for purposes o f the laws of the
Province o f Nova Scotia. However, any income which a Survivor earns in a year, whether it be
income generated from the compensation amount or otherwise, shall be treated as income and
may disqualify the individual from social assistance in accordance with the applicable standards
or regulations under the applicable legislation.

I
^
I
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The Province undertakes to request the other provinces and territories of Canada to enact
reciprocating policies or legislation to provide similar waivers.

COUNSELLING
Interim
28.
Survivors acknowledge that the Province has made interim psychological counselling
available to them since July 20, 1995, to a maximum of the earlier o f one year’s counselling or
$5,000 in expenditure for counselling.
29.

A Survivor shall be entitled to continue interim counselling until:
(a)

compensation becomes payable to the Survivor pursuant to this Memorandum of
Understanding;

(b)

a file reviewer determines that no compensation is payable to the Survivor; or

(c)

the Survivor chooses to actively pursue legal action against the Province in respect
of the alleged Abuse.

Long-term
30.
Upon an amount becoming due to a Survivor as compensation pursuant to this
Memorandum of Understanding, all interim counselling shall be terminated and the Survivor shall
become entitled to receive counselling in accordance with Schedule "B".
31.
The counselling allotment so awarded may be applied to the cost of employment
counselling, psychological counselling, and/or financial counselling, at the option of the Survivor.
32.
A Survivor may transfer any portion o f the value of his or her psychological counselling
to his or her spousal partner or children, and the cost of such counselling shall be deducted from
the Survivor’s counselling allotment
33.
The Province shall be entitled to require that all counsellors be accredited in accordance
with the Province’s initial agreement to provide interim counselling in order to qualify for service
provision to Survivors pursuant to this Memorandum.

OTHER BENEFITS
35.
The Province shall provide Survivors and/or their counsel with a list of programs available
in Nova Scotia through the Drug Dependency Services division o f the Department o f Health.
36.
The Province shall facilitate and fund the preparation by an independent recorder o f a
public report of Survivors* testimonials.
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- 9 I.FGAL FEES
37.
Legal fees inclined by Survivors shall be paid by the Province in accordance with the
following Sections.
r

38.

Legal fees shall be paid in accordance with the following tariffs:
(a)

Senior counsel (10+ years’ practice): their usual hourly rate to a maximum o f
$175 per hour.

t
r

i

(b)
Intermediate counsel (5 to
a maximum of $150 per hour.

9

years’ practice, inclusive): their usual hourly rate to

<

,

(c)
Junior counsel (less than 5 years’ practice): their usual hourly rate to a maximum
o f $125 per hour.

>

f

(d)

Articled clerks: their usual hourly rate to a maximum of $75 per hour.

39.
Time spent by counsel’s office staff shall be considered to be includedin the abovehourly
rates.
t

1
j

40.
Disbursements shall be charged at the actual rate incurred, and may include the. usual
disbursements paid in relation to the preparation and advancement of a Survivor’s claim (i.e.,
photocopying, postage, long-distance telephone calls).
41.
Counsel’s travel shall be paid, where the distance travelled exceeds
accordance with the following tariffs:

5 0 kilometers,

in

(a)
Where travelling is done between the hours o f 8:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., counsel’s
time shall be charged in accordance with the hourly rates established in paragraph 38.
(b)
Where travelling is done outside the hours of 8:00 am. and 7:00 p.m., counsel’s
time shall be charged at one-half the hourly rates established in paragraph 38.
j
I

(c)

Airfare shall be paid at the actual amount incurred (receipts required).

(d)

Mileage, where travel was by car, shall be paid at $0.29 per kilometer.

I

(e)
Hotel room rates, exclusive o f room service, shall be paid at the actual amount
incurred (receipts required).

f
I

(f)

Actual cost o f two meals per day shall be paid, to a maximum o f $40.

I.

L
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Memorandum of Understanding Meeting Fees
42.
Counsel may submit an account for legal fees, travel and disbursements incurred, from
July 20, 1995 to the signing date o f this Memorandum, in the course of discussions with the
Province to develop this Memorandum o f Understanding, exclusive o f time, travel and
disbursements incurred in connection with services provided to a particular client's civil claim.
43.
Accounts for legal services rendered in accordance with paragraph 42 may only be
submitted on or after the signing date o f this Memorandum of Understanding.
44.
The Province shall, within 60 days after receipt o f an account for legal services rendered
in accordance with paragraph 42, respond in writing to the lawyer who submitted the account,
indicating the Province’s acceptance or rejection o f the account as rendered. If the Province fails
to respond within 60 days o f receiving the account, then the amount set forth in the account shall
be deemed to be rejected by the Province.
45.
Should the Province reject the account as submitted, counsel who submitted the account
shall either negotiate with the Province to establish, in writing, an account which is mutually
acceptable to the Province and counsel; or shall notify the Province in writing that the account
may be submitted to taxation in accordance with paragraphs 59-63.

(

46.
Once the final amount o f the account has been determined through acceptance, negotiation
or taxation, the amount so determined shall become payable .within 30 days after the
determination of the amount o f compensation payable to that counsel’s first client to receive
compensation.
47.
Counsel shall not be entitled to submit accounts in respect o f any Memorandum of
Understanding meetings which they did not personally attend.
Litigation Fees
48.
Counsel may submit an account for legal fees, disbursements and travel incurred in
furtherance o f a particular Survivor’s civil case, from the date counsel was retained by the
particular Survivor to the signing date o f this Memorandum of Understanding, which account
shall be exclusive o f time spent: in preparation for, correspondence regarding, or attendance at
media interviews; and in respect o f lobbying the Province for a public inquiry.
49.
Accounts rendered in accordance with paragraph 48 shall be submitted on or after the date
o f signing o f this Memorandum o f Understanding.

L.

L

50.
The Province shall, within 90 days after receipt of an account for legal services rendered
in accordance with paragraph 48, respond in writing to the lawyer who submitted the account,
indicating the Province’s acceptance or rejection o f the account as rendered. If the Province fails
to respond within 90 days of receiving the account, then the amount set forth in the account shall
be deemed to be rejected by the Province.

I.
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5 1.
Should the Province reject the account as submitted, counsel who submitted the account
shall either negotiate with the Province to establish, in writing, an account which is mutually
acceptable to the Province and counsel; or shall notify the Province in writing that the account
may be submitted to taxation in accordance with paragraphs 59-63.
52.
Once the amount o f the account has been determined through acceptance, negotiation or
taxation, the amount so determined shall be paid within 30 days of the date o f determination o f
the compensation payable to that particular Survivor. For further certainty, if there is a final
determination that no compensation is payable to the Survivor, then no litigation fees shall be
payable in respect o f that Survivor.
Process Fees

r

I"
j

i
(
(

53.
Counsel may, on receipt of compensation funds for a particular Survivor, submit an
account for legal fees, disbursements and travel incurred on behalf o f that Survivor after the date
o f signing of this Memorandum of Understanding.
54.

Such account shall not exceed 10 hours’ representation.

55.
The Province shall, within 30 days after receipt o f an account for legal services rendered
in accordance with paragraph 53, respond in writing to the lawyer who submitted the account,
indicating the Province’s acceptance or rejection o f the account as rendered. If the Province fails
to respond within 30 days of receiving the account, then the amount set forth in the account shall
be deemed to be rejected by the Province.
56.
Should the Province reject the account as submitted, counsel who submitted the account
shall either negotiate with the Province to establish, in writing, an account which is mutually
acceptable to the Province and counsel; or shall notify the Province in writing that the account
may be submitted to taxation in accordance with paragraphs 59-63.

i
57.
Once the final amount of the account has been determined through acceptance, negotiation
or taxation, the amount so determined shall become payable within 20 days.
Contingency Fees
'
1
(
[

58.
The parties agree that once a Survivor has signed a Release in the form attached as
Schedule "D" all contingency fee agreements previously entered into between counsel and the
Survivor shall be revoked, and no further contingency fee arrangements shall be entered into
between counsel and the Survivor in respect of compensation payable under this Memorandum
o f Understanding.

[

Taxation

f
I

59.
(1)
Notwithstanding any provincial legislation respecting taxation of legal accounts for
services, the parties agree that Robert W. Wright, Q.C., shall act as a taxing master in respect o f
any accounts for services rendered in accordance with this Memorandum of Understanding.

L
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(2)
Upon receipt o f a written request for taxation, Robert W. Wright, Q.C. shall,
within 30 days o f receipt of the request, set the matter down for a hearing on a date which is
acceptable to both parties, but in any event the hearing shall be held within 90 days o f receipt
o f the request.
60.
Notwithstanding paragraph 59, counsel and the Province may agree in writing to submit
an account to the provincial Taxing Master appointed in accordance with provincial legislation,
where Robert W. Wright, Q.C., is in a conflict of interest position in respect of that counsel or
a particular Survivor.
61.
The decision of Robert W. Wright, Q.C., or the provincial Taxing Master in respect of
a particular account shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal.
62.
Taxation of a particular account may be conducted by telephone conference or in person,
and counsel whose account is being taxed and the Province shall be entitled to participate in the
taxation.
63.
The Province shall be responsible for payment o f the fees of either Robert W. Wright,
Q.C., or the provincial Taxing Master.

ADDITIONAL
64.

The effective date of this Memorandum of Understanding shall be June 17, 1996.

65.
After the effective date of this agreement, if a Survivor who has given a Statement and
is eligible for compensation pursuant to this agreement dies, then the lawful heirs/estate o f the
Survivor shall be entitled to make a claim for compensation under this Memorandum of
Understanding.
66.
The Minister, on behalf of the Province, shall, within 30 days of the effective date o f this
agreement, convey a public apology to the Survivors and families of Survivors for the Physical
and Sexual Abuse the Survivors experienced while resident in the Institutions.
67.
Following the conclusion o f settlement of any individual claim hereunder, the Minister
shall, by personal letter addressed to the Survivor, convey an apology to the Survivor.
68.
A Survivor who is entitled to compensation hereunder may, at the Survivor’s option, have
all or part o f the compensation paid by way o f structured settlement on such terms and conditions
as may be agreed upon.

L

69.
To be eligible for compensation hereunder, a Survivor must, within six months o f the
effective date o f this Memorandum, give written notice o f the Survivor’s intention to make a
Demand upon the Province, and must submit a Demand within six months o f giving such notice.

L

70.
The parties, by their signatures below, agree that this Memorandum o f Understanding
constitutes all o f the terms discussed among them, and further agree that there are no other
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13 written or verbal terms which have been negotiated outside o f this Memorandum of
Understanding.
71.
The parties agree that this Memorandum o f Understanding may be executed in
counterparts, by facsimile signature or otherwise, and that such counterparts shall form part of
the Memorandum, and shall be as effective as if the original Memorandum had been signed by
each party.
CONSENTED TO AS TO FORM as o f the 15th day o f May, 1996.
THE PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA

COUNSEL FOR SURVIVOR

Per: ______________________________

Per:_________________________ .

Per: _______________________________

Per:
r

i

t
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(

1
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I
I

.
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(
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SCHEDULE "A "
F ILE REVIEWERS

(List to be Provided by June 17, 1996)

L
L
1

L
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SCHEDULE "B"
C O M PENSATIO N CATEGORIES and COUNSELLING ALLOTMENTS
Description

Range o f Awards
(S)
$100,000

Counselling
Allotments

- $120,000

Category 1

Severe Sexual and Severe Physical

Category 2

Severe Sexual and Medium Physical
Severe Physical and Medium Sexual

$80,000 - $100,000

Category 3

Severe Sexual and Minor Physical
Severe Physical and Minor Sexual

$60,000 - $80,000

Category 4

Severe Sexual

$50,000 - $60,000

Category 5

Severe Physical

$25,000

Category 6

Medium Physical and Medium Sexual

$50,000 - $60,000

Category 7

Minor Sexual and Medium Physical
Minor Physical and Medium Sexual

$40,000 - $50,000

Category 8

Medium Sexual

$30,000 - $50,000

Category 9

■■
Minor Sexual and Minor Physical

$20,000 - $30,000

Category 10

Medium Physical

$5,000

Category 11

Minor Sexual

Category 12

Minor Physical and/or Sexual
Interference

$10,000

- $60,000

$7,500

$5,000
$0

- $25,000
- $30,000
-

$5,000
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$5,000
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SCHEDULE "C"
GU ID ELINES

The following guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive, but exam ples o f the type and
frequency o f abuse that would m erit inclusion in a particular category. T he num ber o f incidents
may not be d eterm in ative of category, but may offer guidance to d e te rm in e category. Cases shall
be evaluated in the context o f Statements available for review. After determining which category
a Survivor shall be placed in, a file reviewer shall consider any aggravating factors present and
may, on the basis o f the aggravating factors, move the Survivor up w ithin the range o f that
category. The absence of aggravating factors in any particular situation shall not preclude a
Survivor from being placed at the top o f a category range.
For purposes o f clarity, any act which constituted sexual assault or attem pted sexual assault under
the Criminal Code, as it existed at the time of the act, as well as sexual interference as outlined
herein, shall be considered to be Sexual Abuse.

SE V E R E SEXUAL:

Tvpe o f Abuse:
■ anal intercourse
■ vaginal intercourse
■ oral intercourse
Duration/Number o f Incidents:
■ repeated, persistent, characterized as "chronic", "severe"
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ long-term solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation

SE V E R E PHYSICAL:

Tvpe o f Abuse:
■ physical assault, with broken bones (i.e., nose, arm, etc.),
or other serious physical trauma, w ith or without hands
(i.e., objects), with evidence o f hospitalization/treatment
or permanent partial disability
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ repeated, persistent, characterized as "chronic," "severe
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m
SEVERE PHYSICAL, cont’d:
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ Tong-term solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation

MEDIUM SEXUAL:

Type o f Abuse:
■ anal intercourse
■ vaginal intercourse

Type o f Abuse:
■
oral intercourse
■
masturbation/
fondling
■
digital penetration

Duration/Number o f Incidents:
■ one or more incidents
■ shorter duration

Duration/Number o f Incidents:
■ numerous incidents
■ repeated, persistent

Aggravating Factors:
■
verbal abuse
■
withholding treatment
■
solitary confinement
■
Racist Acts
■
threats
■
intimidation

MEDIUM PHYSICAL:

Type o f Abuse:
■ physical assault, with broken bone or bones (i.e., nose,
arm, etc.), or other serious physical trauma, with or
without hands (i.e., objects), with evidence o f
hospitalization/ treatment if available
■ chronic beatings, over significant period o f time
Duration/Number o f Incidents:
■ one or more incidents

1
t

L
R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

MEDIUM PHYSICAL, co n fd :
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation

MINOR SEXUAL:

i
■

Type o f Abuse:
■ fondling
■ masturbation
■ oral intercourse
■ digital penetration
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ fewer incidents
■ short duration

;
i

Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ threats
■ intimidation
■ withholding treatment
■ Racist Acts
■ solitary confinement

[
1

MINOR PHYSICAL:

Type o f Abuse:
■ physical assault, with or without hands (i.e., objects)
(a.k.a. common assaults)
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ isolated incidents
■ short duration

[

Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ threats
■ intimidation
■ Racist Acts
■ solitary confinement

r
L
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SEXUAL INTERFERENCE: Type o f Abuse (must be of a sexual nature):
■ watching
■ comments
■ intimidation
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ repeated/persistent
■ numerous incidents
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ threats
■ intimidation
■ Racist Acts

I
1

(
I

i

I.
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SCHEDULE "D ”
RELEASE

_______________________________ , called the "releasor," on behalf o f my heirs,
(PRINT NAME)
ecutors, administrators, successors and assigns, do hereby acknowledge that:
I am a Survivor of physical and/or sexual abuse experienced while I was a minor in the
re and custody of the Province at one or more o f the Institutions, as defined in the Memorandum
Understanding dated as of the 15th day of May, 1996.
I have received, read and understand the Memorandum o f Understanding. I understand that
i Memorandum of Understanding represents the full range of benefits to which I might be
titled and sets out the criteria or conditions that I must meet to access those benefits. There are
written or verbal representations outside of that Memorandum o f Understanding that I am
ying on.
I understand that the purpose o f the process under the Memorandum o f Understanding is
certify my claim and to determine the range o f benefits to which I am entitled and which will
ovide the most benefit to me under the Memorandum o f Understanding, having regard to the
o f the Memorandum o f Understanding.
x
I further agree and understand that provision of any benefit to me under the Memorandum
Understanding is made without any admission that her Majesty the Queen in Right o f the
ovince of Nova Scotia or her servants and/or agents were negligent or in breach o f any duty
wards me or that they were in any way responsible for my injuries or damages and that any
.bility is denied.
IN CONSIDERATION o f the provision to me o f the benefits under the Memorandum o f
iderstanding and in accordance with its terms and by which I now agree to be bound, and subject
my rights arising under the Memorandum of Understanding:
I hereby release and forever discharge Her Majesty the Queen in Right o f Nova Scotia and
r present and former servants, agents, employees or officials who were in any way involved in
e administration of the Institutions, whether involved in direct supervision or management, from
i manners of action, causes o f action, claims or demands which as against any o f the above I had,
>w have or may hereafter have for any cause, matter or thing whatsoever arising out o f my
:endance at any of the Institutions, and without limiting the generality o f the foregoing, by reason
' any injuries and damages which I experienced as a result of abuse or mistreatment otherwise
tionable at law while I was a minor in the care and custody of the Province at any or all o f the
stitutions;
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